Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner James Eastmond was convicted of first degree robbery and first degree burglary. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an enhancement on Petitioner's sentence, based on the jury's determination that he was armed with a deadly weapon. While Petitioner's case was pending, the Supreme Court had decided "Washington v. Recuenco (110P.3d 188 (2005)) in which the Court recognized that sentences like Petitioner's violated the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. Petitioner then brought a personal restraint petition to challenge the firearm enhancement. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether in these circumstances prejudice could be conclusively presumed on collateral review, or whether Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the rule announced in "Washington v. Williams-Walker (225 P.3d 913 (2010) did not apply retroactively, and as such, Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Because he had not done so, the Court dismissed his petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Eastmond" on Justia Law

The city of Tacoma has franchise agreements with Pierce County and the cities of Fircrest, University Place, and Federal Way (Municipalities) to provide them with water services. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether those franchise agreements required Tacoma to both maintain fire hydrants and bear the maintenance costs of those hydrants. Tacoma raised questions about the impact of the agreements' indemnification clauses had on this dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the franchise agreements contractually required Tacoma to provide hydrants to the Municipalities, and that the indemnification provisions did not preclude this case. View "City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Hurst was charged with a felony, but he was found incompetent to stand trial. He was twice committed to a mental health treatment facility. After two 90-day periods in the facility, Petitioner failed to regain competency. The State sought a third and final mental health treatment period, lasting this time for up to 180 days. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the standard of proof required to commit an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a felony to a third mental health treatment period. Petitioner alleged that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution requires that the standard of proof be "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." The Supreme Court disagreed: "the legislature's selected preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied the Due Process Clause." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hurst" on Justia Law

A person under arrest for vehicular assault is subject to a mandatory blood test. Prior to the test administered in this case, the arresting trooper asked an interpreter to read the special evidence warning in Spanish to Petitioner Jose Morales. The trooper did not speak Spanish, and could not verify that the warning was actually read to Petitioner. The interpreter was not called to testify at trial nor was any signed special evidence form introduced into evidence. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner was not adequately informed of his right to an independent blood test. View "Washington v. Morales" on Justia Law

ZDI Gaming, Inc. distributes certain gaming machines that allow players to play what amounts to "slot machines" using "cash cards" to place their bets. The version of the machine that gave rise to this case allows the machine to credit-back a player's winnings onto the card. The State Gambling Commission ultimately denied further distribution of the machines, finding that the machines "extended credit and allowed gambling without prepayment by 'cash, check or electronic point-of-sale bank transfer'" violating then-operative regulations. ZDI appealed the Gambling Commission's ruling to the Pierce County superior court; the State responded that it believed RCW 9.46.095 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the Thurston County superior court, and suggested that ZDI withdraw its petition from Pierce and refile at Thurston County. ZDI declined and the State moved to dismiss. Noting that sometimes "when the Legislature uses the word 'jurisdiction,' it really mean[s] 'venue,'" [the Pierce County court] denied the State’s motion to dismiss, but transferred the case to the Thurston County superior court. The Thurston County court reversed the Gambling Commission, finding that the cash cards were the equivalent to both cash and merchandise and therefore lawful under state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Pierce County had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and that substantial evidence did not support the Gambling Commission's determination that the cards did not meet the statutory definition of "cash." The court then remanded the case to Thurston County. The Supreme Court surmised that "this case was filed in a county other than where it was to be adjudicated," and asked whether "as a consequence, the case [would] not be heard." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the proper forum was a question of venue and not subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts," but otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deduction in RCW 82.04.433(1) applies to reduce Business and Occupation (B&O) taxes for manufacturing activities. Plaintiff Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company owns and operates a refinery in Washington state from which it processes crude oil from Alaska, Canada and other sources. The legislature created a tax deduction for the amount of tax "derived from the sales of fuel for consumption outside the territorial waters of the United States." On its monthly tax returns from 1999-2007, Tesoro reported its fuel sales on both the "Manufacturing" B&O tax line and the "Wholesaling and Retailing" B&O tax line. After completing an audit of the refinery, Tesoro requested a partial tax refund claiming the deduction against amounts paid in B&O tax on manufacturing from 1999 through 2004. The request was denied by the Department of Revenue's (DOR) appeals division on the ground that the deduction applied only to taxes paid under the "wholesaler and retailer" B&O tax line. Tesoro appealed to the superior court; the Court of Appeals held that the company could deduct the amount of its "offshore" bunker fuel sales from its B&O taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the DOR: "the plain language of RCW 82.04.433(1) … indicates that the B&O deduction applies only to ... taxes on wholesale and retail sales, not on manufacturing." View "Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a fact-finding hearing of "rapid recidivism" was a "sentencing" hearing exempt from the state rules of evidence. After a bench trial, the superior court found Petitioner James Griffin guilty of residential burglary. At sentencing, the judge imposed an exception sentence above the standard range, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance. In making its determination that the aggravating circumstance existed, the court relied on inadmissible hearsay from the trial. Petitioner appealed his exceptional sentence. Though the appellate court agreed with Petitioner that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay, it affirmed the exceptional sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the exceptional sentence and remanded the case for resentencing: "[o]n remand the trial court may receive evidence to justify imposition of the exceptional sentence, and the rules of evidence apply to [Petitioner's] resentencing." View "Washington v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a dispute between Petitioners Donia Townsend and several other home purchasers and Defendant Quadrant Corporation and its parent companies over an arbitration clause in the home purchasers' individual purchase contracts. Several years after the home purchases, Townsend and the other purchasers jointly filed suit in superior court against Quadrant alleging outrage, fraud, unfair business practices, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, rescission and breach of warranty. In support of these allegations, they claimed that Quadrant knowingly engaged in shoddy workmanship in building the homes, and that this resulted in serious construction defects that caused personal injuries relating to mold, pests, and poisonous gases. They claimed that the arbitration clause in their purchase agreements was unenforceable. The superior court denied Quadrant's motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the homeowners’ procedural unconscionability claim that pertained to the entire purchase contract, including the arbitration clause, was to be decided by an arbitrator. View "Townsend v. Quadrant Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the overall adequacy of state funding for K-12 education under the Washington State Constitution. "The legislature must develop a basic education program geared toward delivering the constitutionally required education, and it must fully fund that program through regular and dependable tax sources." The Court found that the State failed to meet its duty under the constitution by consistently providing school districts with a level of resources that fell short of the actual costs of the basic education program. The legislature enacted reforms to remedy the deficiencies in the funding system, and the Court deferred to the legislature's chosen means of discharging its duty. However, the Court retained jurisdiction over the case to help ensure progress in the State's plan to fully implement education reforms by 2018. The Court directed the parties to provide further briefing to the Court addressing the preferred method for retaining jurisdiction. View "McCleary v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioners Roger Scherner and Michael Gresham were separately charged with child molestation. At trial, relying on the recently enacted RCW 10.58.090, the State successfully introduced evidence that Scherner and Gresham had previously committed sex offenses against other children. In Scherner's case, the superior court ruled that evidence of his prior acts of molestation was also admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a common scheme or plan. In Gresham's case, a different superior court held that evidence of Gresham's prior conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation was only admissible pursuant to RCW 10.58.090. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court in Scherner's case did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan and that its failure to give a limiting instruction, once requested, was harmless error. The Court therefore affirmed Scherner's conviction. Because RCW 10.58.090 irreconcilably conflicted with ER 404(b) and governed a procedural matter, the Court held that its enactment violated the separation of powers doctrine and was accordingly unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that the admission of evidence of Gresham's prior conviction was not harmless error and reversed his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Gresham" on Justia Law