Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Roosevelt Rafelo Johnson Jr. was convicted by a jury of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor based on his interaction with two undercover police officers. The female undercover officers were posing as 17-year-old girls, though both were in their mid to late 20s. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant can be found guilty of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor when the defendant intends the criminal result of the crime, believes that the intended victim is a minor even if the victim is an adult posing as a minor, and takes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Because the evidence was more than sufficient to show that Appellant intended to commit the crime and took a substantial step toward completion, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Harry Carrier filed an untimely personal restraint petition asserting that his mandatory life sentence under the "two strikes" provision of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) was invalid. He contended the trial court erroneously counted a dismissed conviction from 1981 as one of the strikes. The Commissioner denied review because Petitioner's judgment and sentence did not itself indicate that the 1981 conviction was dismissed. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's motion to modify and accepted review. Upon review, the Court concluded that the dismissal order attached as an exhibit to Petitioner's personal restraint petition could be considered in determining whether the judgment and sentence is valid on its face. In light of the dismissal order, the Court held that Petitioner's life sentence was invalid because a court may not include a dismissed conviction in a defendant's criminal history as a POAA strike offense. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which that court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant Bobby Ray Thompson's motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering a postarrest statement that Defendant made to the police, but which was not admitted in evidence. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court improperly relied on Defendant's unadmitted statement in denying the motion for postconviction DNA testing. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Several issues arose after a special deputy prosecuting attorney failed to attend a pretrial hearing and a superior court judge appointed a local defense attorney to take her place. The State appealed the resulting judgment and sentence and the trial court's refusal to vacate its appointment. The Court of Appeals found the appointment was improper and vacated the defendant's guilty plea. Affirming the Court of Appeals' holdings that the State has a right to appeal and that a superior court may appoint an attorney to replace any special prosecuting attorney, the Supreme Court found that the appointed attorney in this case was not qualified to serve as a prosecuting attorney due to a conflict of interest. In addition, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holdings that the "de facto official" doctrine could not save the attorney's appointment and that remand of the case did not violate the double jeopardy clause. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding that on remand, the case be tried to a different judge, noting that nothing in the record of this case suggested the judge displayed "animosity or bias, but simply demonstrated frustration at [the special deputy prosecuting attorney's] repeated failure to appear." View "Washington v. Tracer" on Justia Law

Four Mason County residents brought suit in Mason County Superior Court challenging the validity of an ordinance, which levied a special assessment on nonforest lands within the Mason Conservation District. The superior court ruled for the residents, concluding that the county ordinance is an unconstitutional tax. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the ordinance was invalid on statutory grounds. View "Cary v. Mason County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Budik was one of two victims of a shooting in Spokane. The other victim, Adama Walton, died as a result of the shooting. Based on Petitioner's statements that he did not know who was responsible for the crime, he was charged with, and convicted of, first degree rendering criminal assistance. Insufficient evidence supported Petitioner's conviction; accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated his conviction. The Court held that in order to prove that a defendant has rendered criminal assistance "by use of . . . deception," the State must show that the defendant made some affirmative act or statement; mere false disavowal of knowledge is insufficient to sustain a conviction for rendering criminal assistance. View "Washington v. Budik" on Justia Law

Respondent Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Petitioner Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Respondent sought to collect Petitioner's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money could not be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned." Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . .retirement allowance." The survey of case law and the plain language in the LEOFF exemption statutes indicate that the latter statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not after receipt. View "Anthis v. Copland" on Justia Law

Respondent Lester Ray Jim, an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation, was cited by for unlawfully retaining undersized sturgeon. This occurred at the Maryhill Treaty Fishing Access Site (Maryhill), a plot of land set aside by Congress exclusively for the use of four Columbia River tribes to exercise their treaty fishing rights. The State argued it has rightfully assumed criminal jurisdiction at Maryhill. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that Maryhill was reserved and held by the United States for the exclusive use of tribal members and that the State therefore lacked criminal jurisdiction to cite Respondent. View "Washington v. Jim" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company" and "Weismann v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" for the purpose of clarifying the pro rata sharing rule announced in several precedential cases, including "Mahler v. Szucs" (957 P.2d 632). The rule is based on the "common fund" exception to the "American rule" on attorney fees. The rule requires personal injury protection (PIP) insurers to share pro rata in the attorney fees incurred by injured persons when the PIP insurer wins at trial. Plaintiffs in these cases recovered PIP funds as insureds under policies held by the tortfeasors. They incurred attorney fees arising from the recovery of the liability insurance. The insurance companies attempted to offset the funds expended under PIP policies by reducing plaintiffs' award under the tortfeasors' liability insurance. The Court of Appeals held that neither plaintiff was entitled to recoup a pro rata share of attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the pro rata fee sharing rule applied in this context. View "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law