Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "Blakely v. Washington" (542 U.S. 296 (2004)) applied to Petitioner Michael Rowland's resentencing hearing where he received an exceptional sentence on facts found by the trial court. Petitioner was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and taking a motor vehicle without permission. In 2007, he challenged his sentence on the basis that his offender score was erroneous. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing court found "Blakely" did not apply and reimposed the exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: under the circumstances of this case, the Court concluded that "Blakely" did not apply when the trial court neither "touched the actual findings supporting the exceptional sentence nor increased the sentence." View "Washington v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The principal issue in three consolidated cases was whether certifications attesting to the existence or nonexistence of public records are "testimonial statements" subject to the demands of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"(557 U.S. 305(2009)), the Washington Supreme Court held the confrontation clause does not forbid the admission of such evidence. "The teaching of 'Melendez-Diaz,' however, is that certifications declaring the existence or nonexistence of public records are in fact testimonial statements, which may not be introduced into evidence absent confrontation." Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior decisions to the extent they were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Here, defendants' confrontation rights were violated by admission of testimonial certifications. Excepting the hit and run conviction at issue in "Washington v. Jasper," admission of the certifications was not harmless. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in "State v. Jasper," affirmed the superior court in "Washington v. Cienfuegos," and reversed the superior court in "Washington v. Moimoi." View "Washington v. Jasper" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hahn asked someone to make a girl "disappear" or appear as if she "never existed" or "just be gone." Respondent was convicted of solicitation to commit first degree murder. Respondent was charged with four counts of third degree child rape, sexual exploitation of a minor, possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and stalking. While confined in jail awaiting trial, Respondent mentioned to another inmate, Mike Hendrickson, that he wished the complaining witness "S.M." was dead and that he would hurt her. Respondent asked Hendrickson if he knew anyone who could "get to" S.M., but Hendrickson said he could not help. Respondent then asked inmate Norman Livengood if he had any mafia connections, stating that he wanted someone hurt or killed. Livengood related the encounter to the police and agreed to cooperate in the resulting investigation. The police obtained a warrant and wired Livengood to record his conversations with Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of "solicitation" to commit fourth degree assault. Because the evidence did not support such an instruction, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Hahn" on Justia Law

This issue on appeal in this case involved a maritime claim for maintenance and cure and whether, under federal maritime law, a judge, instead of a jury, awards attorney fees following the jury award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of an injured seaman against the employer for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. Respondent Dana Clausen worked on board Appellant Icicle Seafoods' Bering Star as second engineer when he sustained injuries. Respondent encountered persistent difficulties in getting Icicle and its adjuster Spartan, to meet its obligation to pay him maintenance and cure during his recovery. Icicle paid Respondent $20 per day to cover lodging, utilities, and meals. Respondent resorted to living in a recreational vehicle with a leaking roof and with no heat, air conditioning, running water, or toilet facilities. Additionally, Icicle delayed or refused to pay for treatment that Respondent's doctors recommended. In a report to Icicle, Spartan confirmed that Respondent's injuries were likely career-ending. Icicle filed suit in federal court against Respondent to terminate Respondent's right to maintenance and cure. Respondent filed the present action and Icicle's suit in federal court was dismissed. Respondent sought damages for Icicle's negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 30104), unseaworthiness of the Bering Star, and wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure. The jury found Icicle negligent under the Jones Act, and that Icicle was callous or willful and wanton in its failure to pay maintenance and cure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under federal maritime law, the trial court calculates an attorney fee award related to a maintenance and cure action, and the punitive damages award as determined by the jury here, based on the callous or willful and wanton withholding of maintenance and cure, was proper. View "Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to an initiative measure (Proposition 1) which repealed an ordinance governing the use of automated traffic safety cameras in the city of Mukilteo. The trial court declined to grant an injunction, and Proposition 1 was placed on the November 2, 2010 Snohomish County general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the legislature expressly granted authority to the governing body of the city of Mukilteo to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, the subject matter of Proposition 1 was not within the initiative power. The Court reversed the trial court's order that denied the Citizens declaratory relief. View "Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Gov't v. City of Mukilteo" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Respondent-Cross Petitioner Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The issue on appeal involved whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also centered on whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but held that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. The Court also held that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case. View "Stafne v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved two different statutory schemes awarding attorney fees. One scheme, RCW 7.06.050-.060, discourages frivolous appeals from mandatory arbitration. The other scheme, RCW 4.84.250-.300, encourages parties to settle before going to court in cases where the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less by allowing a plaintiff to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement at least 10 days before the initial trial, the offer is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The question before the Court was whether the second scheme may be invoked for the first time 10 days before a trial de novo, rather than 10 days before the arbitration hearing, by a plaintiff that appealed an arbitration decision. After success at the trial de novo, Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Andrea Harris applied for and received prevailing party attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Plaintiffs argued that although they offered to settle for under $10,000 after the mandatory arbitration, RCW 4.84.250-.300 allowed them to recover attorney fees as long as they made their offers 10 days before the trial de novo. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that RCW 4.84.250-.300 applies only to a plaintiff that seeks recovery of $10,000 or less and makes an offer of settlement 10 days before the initial hearing whether it is a trial or an arbitration. View "Williams v. Tilaye" on Justia Law

After trial, a judge found that the State had established all statutory and constitutional factors necessary for the termination of Appellant Nyakat Luak's parental rights to her twin sons. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding two of the statutory factors: (1) that the State expressly and understandably offered or provided to her all the necessary services to correct her parental deficiencies; and, (2) that there was little likelihood those deficiencies could be remedied in the foreseeable future. Additionally, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in not appointing counsel to represent her twin sons. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the judge's findings. The Court agreed that children whose parents are subject to dependency and termination proceedings have vital liberty interests at stake and may constitutionally be entitled to counsel to protect those interests. "But whether any individual child is entitled to counsel must be decided case by case." The Court held that the deprivation, if any, of a child's right to counsel in such circumstances may be protected by appellate review. Appellant raised her due process claim for the first time on appeal, denying the trial judge of the opportunity to timely consider the issue. Accordingly, Appellant failed to meet her burden of showing reversible error, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Dependency of M.S.R." on Justia Law

Respondents William and Sally Chapin Kiely owned real property in Port Townsend next to property owned by Kenneth and Karen Graves. An alley ran the length of the properties, and as long as anyone could remember, a wire fence ran the length of the two properties. The Graves property adjacent to the disputed alley has remained open space where the Graves have planted fruit trees, berry vines, and garlic. Part of the Kielys' cottage encroached upon the disputed alley. In 2008, the Graves filed a petition with the city to vacate the western half of the alley and merge it into their adjoining lands. The city held a public hearing on the application. In February 2009, the Port Townsend City Council passed an ordinance to vacate the alley and convey the vacated alley to the Graves through a lot line adjustment. The Kielys filed an action alleging ownership of the entire alley through adverse possession on June 10, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment and decree in favor of the Kielys. The Supreme Court granted direct review to decide whether the Kielys could assert adverse possession based on events which preceded vacation of the alley. Upon review, the Court found that Port Townsend held an easement interest in the alley until it was vacated by public hearing. Therefore, RCW 7.28.090 prohibited the Kielys from obtaining title to the alley through adverse possession. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Kiely v. Graves" on Justia Law

In September 2000, Joshua Dean Scott and his partner in crime, Douglas Sean James-Anderson, robbed a jewelry store in south Tacoma. They brought several guns, including an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle. Alerted by a silent alarm, the police were waiting in the store’s parking lot when Scott and James-Anderson emerged. They both ran, and both were caught. Scott was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of first degree robbery, unlawful possession of firearms, possession of stolen property, and possession of stolen firearms. The jury also found by special verdict that Scott was armed with a deadly weapon while committing most of the counts. On direct review, the Court of Appeals reversed the possession of stolen firearms charges, finding insufficient evidence that Scott knew the guns used in the robbery had been stolen, and remanded for resentencing. Scott was ultimately sentenced to 213 months. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may refer to verdict forms to determine whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face and thus not subject to collateral attack under RCW 10.73.090 and whether "Washington v. Recuenco" (180 P.3d 1276 (2008)) applied retroactively to cases that were final when the case was announced. The Court concluded that a court may consult the verdict forms to illuminate whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face but that "Receunco" is not retroactive. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed this petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Scott" on Justia Law