Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether, in civil litigation, a party could decline to produce requested discoverable information on the basis that to locate the information would require consulting privileged documents. Petitioners Peacehealth and St. Joseph Hospital sought a protective order to prevent them from being required to review its quality assurance records to identify discoverable medical records in a medical negligence suit. The Court's policy favoring open discovery required "privileges in derogation of the common law" be narrowly construed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition of "review" in Washington's quality improvement statute, RCW 70.41.200, refers to external review and not internal review. The Court held in this case that the hospital's consultation of its own privileged database to identify relevant, discoverable files that fall outside of the privilege would not violate the hospital's privilege. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court. View "Lowy v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve four issues that arose after Defendants Anthony Marquise Emery Jr. and Aaron Edward Olson were convicted at a joint trial of first degree kidnapping, first degree robbery, first degree rape, and first degree accomplice rape. The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Olson’s motions to sever, and whether Emery’s counsel was ineffective in failing to move for severance; (2) whether the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument constitute misconduct that entitles Emery and Olson to a new trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Emery’s motion for a mistrial based on Olson’s outbursts; and (4) whether Emery is entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Olson’s motions to sever, and Emery’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to move for severance; (2) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument are improper but do not warrant a mistrial; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Emery’s motion for mistrial based on Olson’s outbursts; and (4) Emery is not entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error. Therefore the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Emery" on Justia Law

After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackowski v. Borchelt" on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases, the trial court instructed the jury that it must be unanimous to either accept or reject the aggravating circumstances, contrary to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "State v. Bashaw," (234 P.3d 195 (2010)). However, the nonunanimity rule adopted in "Bashaw" was based on an incorrect rule announced in "State v. Goldberg," (72 P.3d 1083 (2003)). This rule conflicted with statutory authority, "cause[d] needless confusion, [did] not serve the policies that gave rise to it, and frustrates the purpose of jury unanimity." Accordingly, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reconsider this portion of its holding in "Bashaw" and held that the nonunanimity rule could not stand. The Court affirmed the appellate court in upholding Petitioner Enrique Guzman Nunez's conviction and sentence, reversed the appellate court and reinstated Respondent George Ryan's exceptional sentence, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Guzman Nunez" on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court because they were based on the same facts. Petitioners Robert Brown and Theodore Kosewicz were both involved in the kidnapping, torture, and killing of Sebastian Esquibel. At trial, Brown was convicted of first degree kidnapping and felony murder with the predicate felony being the first degree kidnapping. At a separate trial, Kosewicz was convicted of first degree kidnapping and first degree aggravated murder with the aggravating factor being the first degree kidnapping. On appeal, both Brown's and Kosewicz's first degree kidnapping convictions were overturned because of a charging defect. The Court of Appeals did not overturn Brown's felony murder conviction or Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict. Brown and Kosewicz argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that reversal of the first degree kidnapping convictions requires reversal of the felony murder and aggravating factor verdict that were based in part on the first degree kidnapping. Upon review, the Court affirmed Brown's felony murder conviction and Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict. View "Washington v. Kosewicz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Initiative 1183 (I-1183) violated the single-subject and subject-in-title rules found in article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution. I-1183 removed the State from the business of distributing and selling spirits and wine, imposes sales-based fees on private liquor distributors and retailers, and provides a distribution of $10 million per year to local governments for the purpose of enhancing public safety programs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the Appellants Washington Association for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention, Gruss, Inc. and David Grumbois did not overcome the presumption that the initiative was constitutional, and therefore the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State and the intervenors. View "Wash. Ass'n for Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. Washington" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Jongeward v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

Personal restraint petitioner Eric Flint maintains that his return to total confinement as a result of repeated violations of conditions of community custody violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. He filed his personal restraint in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition as frivolous, and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Upon review, the Court concluded that application of the statute to Petitioner did not create an ex post facto problem and accordingly affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Petitioner's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Flint" on Justia Law

Christa Albice and Karen Tecca (hereinafter Tecca) inherited the property at issue in this case. In 2003, Tecca borrowed $115,500 against the property. The loan was serviced by Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), and Premier Mortgage Services of Washington (Premier) acted as the trustee. In 2006, Tecca defaulted on the loan and received a notice of trustee's sale. In July 2006, Tecca negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement to cure the default. The trustee's sale originally set for September 8, 2006 was continued six times. Each continuance was tied to the payments Tecca made under the Forbearance Agreement. The foreclosure sale finally took place on February 16, 2007. Through an agent, Petitioner Ron Dickinson, successfully bid on the property. Tecca first learned the property was sold when Dickinson told Tecca they no longer owned it and needed to leave. Dickinson then filed an unlawful detainer action and sought to quiet title. Tecca countersued, seeking to quiet title in an action to set aside the nonjudicial sale. Tecca also brought suit against Option One and Premier, but the trial court dismissed the action based on an arbitration clause. Dickinson moved for summary judgment to establish that he was a BFP and entitled to quiet title. Tecca also moved for summary judgment, arguing the foreclosure sale should have been set aside because the sale occurred after the statutory deadline and Premier was not a qualified trustee with authority to conduct the sale. The trial court granted Dickinson's motion, ruling that Dickinson was a BFP and despite procedural noncompliance by the trustee. Following trial, the court concluded Premier was authorized to act as the trustee, quieted title in Dickinson, and awarded Dickinson damages. Tecca appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, setting the sale aside. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were "marred" by repeated statutory noncompliance. The financial institution acting as the lender also appeared to be acting as the trustee under a different name; the lender repeatedly accepted late payments and, at its sole discretion, rejected only the final late payment that would have cured the default; and the trustee conducted a sale without statutory authority. The Court concluded the sale was invalid. View "Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash., Inc." on Justia Law