Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christa Albice and Karen Tecca (hereinafter Tecca) inherited the property at issue in this case. In 2003, Tecca borrowed $115,500 against the property. The loan was serviced by Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), and Premier Mortgage Services of Washington (Premier) acted as the trustee. In 2006, Tecca defaulted on the loan and received a notice of trustee's sale. In July 2006, Tecca negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement to cure the default. The trustee's sale originally set for September 8, 2006 was continued six times. Each continuance was tied to the payments Tecca made under the Forbearance Agreement. The foreclosure sale finally took place on February 16, 2007. Through an agent, Petitioner Ron Dickinson, successfully bid on the property. Tecca first learned the property was sold when Dickinson told Tecca they no longer owned it and needed to leave. Dickinson then filed an unlawful detainer action and sought to quiet title. Tecca countersued, seeking to quiet title in an action to set aside the nonjudicial sale. Tecca also brought suit against Option One and Premier, but the trial court dismissed the action based on an arbitration clause. Dickinson moved for summary judgment to establish that he was a BFP and entitled to quiet title. Tecca also moved for summary judgment, arguing the foreclosure sale should have been set aside because the sale occurred after the statutory deadline and Premier was not a qualified trustee with authority to conduct the sale. The trial court granted Dickinson's motion, ruling that Dickinson was a BFP and despite procedural noncompliance by the trustee. Following trial, the court concluded Premier was authorized to act as the trustee, quieted title in Dickinson, and awarded Dickinson damages. Tecca appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, setting the sale aside. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were "marred" by repeated statutory noncompliance. The financial institution acting as the lender also appeared to be acting as the trustee under a different name; the lender repeatedly accepted late payments and, at its sole discretion, rejected only the final late payment that would have cured the default; and the trustee conducted a sale without statutory authority. The Court concluded the sale was invalid. View "Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the proper interpretation of a "resulting loss" clause in an all-risk insurance policy. It also provided an opportunity to clarify application of the efficient proximate cause rule. The Court of Appeals overturned a jury verdict in favor of the insured, reasoning that the resulting loss clause did not apply in the absence of a secondary covered peril that proximately caused the loss. The court remanded for a jury determination as to the efficient proximate cause of the insured's loss, holding that if the efficient proximate cause was not itself a covered peril, then the policy did not provide coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Because the loss at issue was not excluded under the policy, coverage exists under the ensuing loss provision. And, because there is no rule of law excluding coverage under an efficient proximate cause analysis, and the insurer was precluded from changing the ground for its denial of coverage, there is no basis for a jury to determine the efficient proximate cause of the loss. Accordingly, the Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Vision One, LLC v.. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The supports for the deck system at Respondents Max and Krista Sprague's house rotted out due to improper construction techniques exposing the supports to the elements. Their claim for homeowners' insurance coverage was denied due to exclusions for rot and defective construction. The trial court granted summary judgment to their insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the ensuing loss provision provided coverage for the otherwise excluded losses. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the homeowners policies in this case excluded coverage for both rot and defective construction, the deterioration of Respondents' deck were not covered conditions. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner Darold Stenson was sentenced to death after he was found guilty of murdering his wife and business partner, Frank Hoerner. In 2009, Petitioner's counsel filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) raising a due process claim based on alleged violations of "Brady v. Maryland,"(373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Petitioner's "Brady" claim pertained to evidence consisting of photographs and an FBI file that the State had access to at the time of trial but did not provide to Petitioner's counsel until 2009. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the State violated Petitioner's rights under the mandates of "Brady" and its progeny. Because the Court held that it did, it reversed Petitioner's aggravated first degree murder conviction and his death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed Respondent Yussuf Abdulle's first degree theft and forgery convictions based on "Washington v. Davis" (438 P.2d 185 (1968)). The State urged the Court to overrule "Davis", arguing that it is incorrect because it rests on the mistaken view that "Miranda" requires proof of waiver beyond a reasonable doubt and harmful because it keeps relevant evidence from the trier of fact. The Court agreed that "Davis" was incorrect in light of cases that issued from the United States Supreme Court following "Miranda." Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions. View "Washington v. Abdulle" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.View "Minnick v. Clearwire US, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr." on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant and arrested Petitioner Patrick Jimi Lyons when they found a marijuana growing operation on his property. Probable cause for the search warrant was based solely on information from a confidential source. The affidavit for search warrant did not establish timely probable cause because it stated when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the criminal activity. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Washington State Constitution article I, section 7, and the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in the search. View "Washington v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee. View "Peck v. AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed Defendant Brian Siers's conviction on one count of second degree assault. That court reversed the conviction because the State did not allege an aggravating factor in the charging document. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a Supreme Court decision on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the information. The Court took the opportunity to revisit that decision and held that an aggravating factor is not the functional equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information. Because the charging document here contained the essential elements of the crimes charged and Defendant was given notice prior to trial of the State’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence, Defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Siers" on Justia Law