Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

P.E. Systems, LLC (PES) offered to analyze and reduce the credit card processing costs of CPI Corp. (CPI). The parties signed an agreement that appeared to be a contract. CPI later repudiated the contract, disputing its validity. PES sued for breach. CPI attached a copy of the contract to its answer to PES's complaint, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the "contract" was a mere agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable. PES responded to the motion and attached an identical copy of the contract and a PowerPoint presentation it had given to CPI. The trial court found the contract was not binding but merely an agreement to agree and granted CPI's motion, thereby dismissing the case. PES appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that both the contract was enforceable and that CPI had breached it. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held the contract was a valid with an open term, but reversed the balance of the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp." on Justia Law

"There exists a simple yet significant balancing test for trial courts to apply to consider whether specific circumstances warrant closing part of a trial to the public, set out in 'Washington v. Bone-Club,' (906 P.2d 325 (1995))." Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that process was not followed in this case, and therefore found a violation of the public trial right. Because the violation constituted structural error and absence of an objection was not a waiver of the public trial right, prejudice is presumed, and a new trial is warranted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wise" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, petitioners raised several issues, some common to both cases and others specific to each. Petitioner Michael Sublett challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, arguing the trial court wrongfully denied severance. He also challenged the comparability of out of state convictions used to support his sentence as a persistent offender. Petitioner Christopher Olsen challenged his conviction for felony murder, raising claims regarding lesser included offense jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Both petitioners challenged the content of the accomplice liability jury instruction, and both claim a violation of their article I, section 22 trial rights occurred when the trial judge considered, in chambers and with counsel present, a question from the jury during its deliberations. The Court of Appeals rejected the issues raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Sublett" on Justia Law

Rene P. Paumier appealed his conviction for residential burglary and second degree theft. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Paumier's right to a public trial was violated when the trial court individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. The Court previously held that a court may close a courtroom to the public only after considering the factors established in "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)). Moreover, the Court held in "Washington v. Wise," (No. 82802-4, slip op. at 19 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012)), that individual questioning of potential jurors in chambers without first considering the Bone-Club factors is a closure creating a presumption of prejudice. Therefore, Paumier was entitled to a new trial because the trial court closed the courtroom without first considering the Bone-Club factors. Because the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on this issue, there was no reason to address whether the trial court also violated Paumier's right to self-representation. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court on the public trial right grounds alone. View "Washington v. Paumier" on Justia Law

Petitioner Patrick L. Morris filed a personal restraint petition, alleging a violation of his right to a public trial when the trial court conducted part of voir dire in chambers. Further, he claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the violation on direct review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review. Morris additionally challenged evidentiary decisions by the trial court relating to a proposed defense expert witness and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in handling the expert testimony issue. The Court held that Morris failed to meet his burden on the evidentiary and trial counsel issues. But because of Morris's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Morris" on Justia Law

Respondent Monte Hunley was convicted by a jury in 2009 of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court violated Respondent's right to due process by basing the imposed sentence on prior convictions demonstrated only by the prosecutor's written summary and Respondent's failure to object. The appellate court held that violated Respondent's right to due process. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hunley" on Justia Law

William Munich was shot and killed by his neighbor, Marvin Ballsmider, approximately 18 minutes after he placed his first phone call to the Skagit Emergency Communications Center. The two had been in a property dispute related to access to a driveway and Ballsmider's property. Norma Smith, a Skagit 911 operator, took the call. Smith assured Munich that law enforcement was on the way. Smith entered the call as a priority two weapons offense rather than a priority one emergency call. Based on the code, the dispatched deputy, Dan Luvera, did not activate his emergency lights and only traveled slightly over the speed limit. About seven minutes later, Munich again called 911. Tammy Canniff took the second call, and Munich told her that he was running away from Ballsmider who was following and shooting. The dispatcher informed Deputy Luvera of these facts and the deputy consequently activated his emergency lights and siren and increased his speed. The second call ended with the sound of Munich being fatally shot on the highway. Deputy Luvera arrived two minutes later and arrested Ballsmider for Munich's murder. Munich was running toward the direction from which Deputy Luvera arrived. Munich's estate sued Skagit County, the Skagit County Sheriff's Office, and Skagit Emergency Communications Center (County) for wrongful death, alleging the County negligently responded to the incident. The County moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims asserting it was not liable for Munich's death under the public duty doctrine, specifically that the "special relationship" exception because the County provided no inaccurate or false information that Munich had detrimentally relied on. The trial court denied summary judgment, ruling the special relationship exception did not require false or inaccurate assurances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where the express assurance promises action there is no falsity requirement because the assurances may be superficially correct but negligently fulfilled. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of an assurance has no bearing on the issue of whether an actionable duty was established. View "Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'n Ctr." on Justia Law

When an insured defendant believes its insurer is refusing to settle a plaintiff's claims in bad faith, the insured can negotiate an independent pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, typically involving a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute the judgment, and an assignment of the insurer's bad faith claim to the plaintiff (collectively, a "covenant judgment). When accepted by the trial court, the settlement amount becomes the presumptive measure of damages in the later bad faith action. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned whether article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution entitles the insurer to have the reasonableness of the covenant judgment determined by a jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does not, and affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

Lindy Deer was convicted of third degree rape of a child after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old boy on multiple occasions. Deer claimed that she was asleep during several acts of intercourse and could not be guilty of rape because she did not act with volition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Deer's claimed lack of volition amounted to an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court correctly refused Deer's request to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was awake during the acts at issue. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Deer" on Justia Law