Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

Lindy Deer was convicted of third degree rape of a child after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old boy on multiple occasions. Deer claimed that she was asleep during several acts of intercourse and could not be guilty of rape because she did not act with volition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Deer's claimed lack of volition amounted to an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court correctly refused Deer's request to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was awake during the acts at issue. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Deer" on Justia Law

Washington State Nurses Association (WSNA) sought overtime pay pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act (MWA) for work performed by the approximately 1,200 registered nurses employed by Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane. Sacred Heart was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with WSNA to provide its nurses with a paid 15 minute block rest period each four hour work period. The parties did not dispute that when a rest period was missed, Sacred Heart provided the nurses with the equivalent of 30 minutes of straight time compensation: the 15 minutes they would have received had they merely rested as well as 15 additional minutes for instead working during the period. Relying on a Washington industrial welfare regulation requiring a 10 minute rest period on the employer's time for every four hours worked, the nurses claimed they were entitled to overtime pay, not just the straight pay they already received, for 10 of the 15 minutes of each rest period they missed. The issue before the Supreme Court hinged on how "hours worked" are calculated: whether the 15 minutes nurses spent working through their breaks should be added to or substituted for the 15 minutes they would have spent at rest. The Court held that both the missed opportunity to rest and the additional labor nurses provide constitute "hours worked." Even though Sacred Heart did not require the nurses to physically remain at the hospital after the end of the workday to make up their rest periods, nurses were entitled to overtime compensation because they provided additional labor to Sacred Heart. View "Wash. State Nurses Ass'n v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

On direct review, appellant Phiengchai Sisouvanh challenged the adequacy of the competency evaluation she received pursuant to RCW 10.77.060 prior to her trial and conviction for aggravated first degree murder. Sisouvanh met a pregnant woman and offered to give the woman spare baby clothes. Sisouvanh drove the woman to a highway turnout, stabbed her, and then proceeded to a secluded location where she cut the woman’s abdomen open and removed the baby from the woman’s womb. Sisouvanh then drove to another location and called emergency services, reporting that she was giving birth and in need of assistance. She moved into the backseat of her car with her victim’s child, partially undressed herself, and waited for an ambulance to arrive. Sisouvanh was taken to a hospital, where a doctor examined her and discovered that she had not given birth. Although Sisouvanh initially persisted in denying the doctor’s allegation, eventually she admitted that she had cut the baby out of another woman. The doctor contacted police. Sisouvanh immigrated to the United States from Laos at around five years of age and alleges that the court appointed expert who conducted her evaluation failed to properly account for her distinct cultural background as a Laotian immigrant. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The court-appointed expert who evaluated Sisouvanh reasonably explained the propriety of the tests he administered and his interpretation of Sisouvanh’s behavior, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the expert’s examination and report as having been conducted in a qualified manner sufficient to satisfy RCW 10.77.060. View "Washington v. Sisouvanh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edward M. Glasmann was convicted of second degree assault, attempted second degree robbery, first degree kidnapping, and obstruction arising from incidents that occurred while he was intoxicated. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney made an electronic presentation to the jury that graphically displayed his personal opinion that Glasmann was “guilty, guilty, guilty” of the crimes charged by the State. The prosecutor’s misconduct was "flagrant, ill intentioned," and the Supreme Court could not conclude with "any confidence" that it did not to have an effect on the outcome of the trial. The Court reversed Petitioner's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann" on Justia Law

The Estates of Barbara J. Nelson and Sharon M. Bracken challenged the efforts of the Washington State Department of Revenue (DOR) to treat them as having engaged in a present taxable transfer of assets that were actually transferred years ago by Ms. Nelson’s and Ms. Bracken’s late husbands’ estates. DOR relied on the legislature’s adoption in 2005 of definitions from the federal estate tax regime. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that DOR exceeded its authority in enacting regulations that allowed it to treat transfers completed by William Nelson and Jim Bracken years ago as if the estates had elected to defer state estate tax on the transfers, to be paid by their wives’ estates. DOR stood on a different footing than the United States Treasury; "DOR must rely on the asserted authority of our legislature to tax transfers years after the fact absent any deferral agreement by the taxpayer." The Court reversed the trial court and directed summary judgment be entered in favor of the Estates. View "In re Estate of Bracken" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether particular officers and employees of a bank owed a quasi-fiduciary duty to particular bank depositors. Michael and Theresa Annechino deposited a large amount of money at a bank specifically to ensure that their savings would be protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Annechinos relied on bank employees’ recommendations of how to structure their accounts to meet FDIC coverage rules. Unfortunately, the bank went into receivership, and the FDIC found that nearly $500,000 of the Annechinos’ deposits were not insured. The Annechinos alleged that individual officers and employees of the bank owed them a duty, the breach of which resulted in their loss. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The officers and employees of the bank did not owe the Annechinos a quasi-fiduciary duty. Holding the officers and employees personally liable under these facts would have contravened established law regarding liability for acts committed on behalf of a corporation or principal. View "Annechino v. Worthy" on Justia Law

An employee of a church who claimed she was harmed by actions of a church's minister brought numerous claims against the church and the minister. At this point in the proceedings, the case involved her negligent retention, negligent supervision, and Title VII sex discrimination claims against the church. The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, ruled that these claims were not barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as the trial court had determined. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent retention and supervision claims. "Under the First Amendment, allowing these claims to go forward would violate the First Amendment right of the church to select and supervise its ministers as well as the First Amendment right of a hierarchical religious organization to be free of government involvement in the decisions made by its ecclesiastical tribunals. We remand the Title VII claims for further proceedings." View "Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law

The Automotive United Trades Organization (AUTO) and Tower Energy Group (Tower) brought an as-applied state constitutional challenge to a tax based on the possession of petroleum as a hazardous substance. AUTO and Tower claimed that the hazardous substances tax (HST) violated article II, section 40 of the state constitution because the revenue from motor vehicle fuel was not being "placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes." The trial court held on summary judgment that AUTO's claim was barred because it was not filed within a reasonable time under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and that the HST does not violate article II, section 40. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court in barring AUTO and Tower from bringing their constitutional challenge because to do so would deprive the Supreme Court of its vested power to determine the constitutionality of specific legislation. The Court affirmed the trial court, however, in granting summary judgment to the State because article II, section 40 provides that "this section shall not be construed to include revenue from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily for highway purposes." View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Parties David Koenig and Thurston County sought review of a decision by the Court of Appeals which held that a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluation could be disclosed under the Public Records Act (PRA), but a victim impact statement could not. The Court of Appeals found that both the SSOSA evaluation and victim impact statement were investigative records. The court then determined the victim impact statement was exempt under the essential-to-effective-law enforcement prong of the investigative records exemption but concluded the SSOSA evaluation was not exempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the SSOSA evaluation nor the victim impact statement are investigative records within the meaning of RCW 42.56.240. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Koenig v. Thurston County" on Justia Law