Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on an insured's duty to cooperate with an insurer's claim investigation. Petitioner John Staples' claim was denied for failing to cooperate, namely failing to submit to an examination under oath (EUO). Petitioner sued the insurer for bad faith and related causes of action; the trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that genuine issues of fact still existed and made summary judgment inappropriate in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue in this case concerned a challenge to a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration of an insurance coverage dispute. James River Insurance Company issued two "surplus line" insurance policies under which the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) claimed coverage. James River sought to compel arbitration of the coverage dispute pursuant to the insurance policies' arbitration clauses. WSDOT opposed arbitration and filed a motion for declaratory judgment, arguing that the arbitration clauses are unenforceable under RCW 48.18.200(1)(b), which prohibits insurance contracts from "depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer," and under RCW 48.15.150(1), which requires that "an unauthorized insurer must be sued in the superior court of the county in which the cause of action arose." In addition, WSDOT argued that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. 1012), shields the statutes from preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. secs. 1-14). The trial court agreed with WSDOT and denied James River's motion to compel arbitration. James River appealed and the Supreme Court granted direct review. The Court affirmed: "RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) is not merely a forum selection provision as James River maintain[ed], but rather a provision prohibiting binding arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. As such, we hold that this provision regulates the 'business of insurance' because it is aimed at protecting the performance of an insurance contract by ensuring the right of the policyholder to bring an action in state court to enforce the contract." The Court concluded that RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) was shielded from preemption by the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. View "Dep't of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether Jeffrey Manary or Edwin Anderson were entitled to a decedent's interest in real property that had been deeded to a trust. Manary claimed the interest as a successor trustee; his claim was based on the trust. Anderson claimed the interest as a testamentary beneficiary; his claim was based on chapter 11.11 RCW (the Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Act). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an owner complies with the Act when he specifically refers to a nonprobate asset in his will, even if he does not refer to the instrument under which the asset passes. Anderson was entitled to the decedent's interest in the property, but he was not entitled to attorney fees for answering the petition for review. View "Manary v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Doctor's Associates Inc. (DAI) franchises Subway sandwich shops across the country. Waqas Saleemi and Farooq Sharyar operated three Subway franchises in Washington State. Their franchise agreements provided that any disputes would be arbitrated in Bridgeport, Connecticut, under Connecticut law, except for Connecticut franchise law. After a dispute arose, a Washington State superior court judge found the choice of law and forum selection clause unenforceable and entered an order compelling Washington arbitration. DAI did not seek discretionary review at the time. Saleemi and Sharyar prevailed at arbitration. DAI appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, asking the Court to vacate the trial court's order compelling arbitration that would require this dispute to be arbitrated, again, but in Connecticut. The Supreme Court concluded that DAI failed to show that it has been prejudiced by the trial court's order compelling arbitration. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order compelling arbitration in Washington. View "Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Under chapter 10.05 RCW, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor in a Washington court of limited jurisdiction may petition the court for deferred prosecution if the crime was the result of substance dependency or mental illness. After the defendant fulfills the statutory requirements, the judge may dismiss the charges. RCW 10.05.130 requires the appropriation of public funds "to provide investigation, examination, report and treatment plan for any indigent person who is unable to pay the cost of any program of treatment" within a deferred prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the statutory interpretation of the term "treatment plan" in RCW 10.05.130. The Court held that according to the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 10.05.130, the legislature did not intend to commit public funds for the full course of treatment programs for indigent defendants in deferred prosecutions. View "Washington v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether records "sealed for good cause" submitted in support of a motion that was never decided became public information. The issue stemmed from a petition for the dissolution of a marriage. Smith Bunday Berman Britton PS (Smith Bunday) was the accounting firm for the parties Todd and Rondi Bennett. Rondi Bennett sued Smith Bunday alleging it aided Todd Bennett in embezzling and hiding money that belonged to businesses she co-owned with her ex-husband and her father. As part of discovery, plaintiffs requested tax records of nonparties to the suit. Smith Bunday objected on the ground that the disclosure was prohibited without the nonparty's consent. To resolve the problem, plaintiffs proposed a protective order, stipulated by the parties. The documents were ultimately produced under seal; Rondi Bennett moved to remove certain documents from the protective order so that they could be attached unsealed to her motion in response to Smith Bunday. The trial court ordered that the documents should be filed under seal first, then upon receipt, the court would examine them and determine whether they should remain subject to the protective order. A few hours after the response was filed but before the court had examined the motion to dismiss, the response and the documents, the case settled. Smith Bunday notified the court that the case had been settled and that its summary judgment motion should be removed from the calendar. Settlement did not bring resolution. Smith Bunday noticed that Rondi Bennett's response and supporting declaration contained or made reference to documents that had been stamped "confidential," but were not filed them under seal as required by the stipulated protective order. This was apparently accidental. After discussing the matter, and despite the fact the case had settled, the parties stipulated the plaintiffs would refile redacted and sealed versions of the response and declaration in accordance with the stipulated protective order. The plaintiffs' expert moved to intervene. He asserted his right as a member of the public to open access to court records in the case already filed under seal. The trial court granted his motion to intervene, but denied his motion to unseal. The expert appealed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order. The expert then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial court made no decision involving the disputed information, the Supreme Court concluded the supporting material (produced under seal) could not be relevant to a nonexistent decision. "We hold that because the information at issue in this case was not relevant to any decision made by the court, it is not presumptively public under article I, section 10 [of the Washington Constitution]." View "Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS" on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law