Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether records "sealed for good cause" submitted in support of a motion that was never decided became public information. The issue stemmed from a petition for the dissolution of a marriage. Smith Bunday Berman Britton PS (Smith Bunday) was the accounting firm for the parties Todd and Rondi Bennett. Rondi Bennett sued Smith Bunday alleging it aided Todd Bennett in embezzling and hiding money that belonged to businesses she co-owned with her ex-husband and her father. As part of discovery, plaintiffs requested tax records of nonparties to the suit. Smith Bunday objected on the ground that the disclosure was prohibited without the nonparty's consent. To resolve the problem, plaintiffs proposed a protective order, stipulated by the parties. The documents were ultimately produced under seal; Rondi Bennett moved to remove certain documents from the protective order so that they could be attached unsealed to her motion in response to Smith Bunday. The trial court ordered that the documents should be filed under seal first, then upon receipt, the court would examine them and determine whether they should remain subject to the protective order. A few hours after the response was filed but before the court had examined the motion to dismiss, the response and the documents, the case settled. Smith Bunday notified the court that the case had been settled and that its summary judgment motion should be removed from the calendar. Settlement did not bring resolution. Smith Bunday noticed that Rondi Bennett's response and supporting declaration contained or made reference to documents that had been stamped "confidential," but were not filed them under seal as required by the stipulated protective order. This was apparently accidental. After discussing the matter, and despite the fact the case had settled, the parties stipulated the plaintiffs would refile redacted and sealed versions of the response and declaration in accordance with the stipulated protective order. The plaintiffs' expert moved to intervene. He asserted his right as a member of the public to open access to court records in the case already filed under seal. The trial court granted his motion to intervene, but denied his motion to unseal. The expert appealed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order. The expert then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial court made no decision involving the disputed information, the Supreme Court concluded the supporting material (produced under seal) could not be relevant to a nonexistent decision. "We hold that because the information at issue in this case was not relevant to any decision made by the court, it is not presumptively public under article I, section 10 [of the Washington Constitution]." View "Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS" on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Pappas challenged an appellate court decision that affirmed an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault based on the severity of the victim's injuries. The case arose from a 2008 motorcycle accident in which Petitioner's passenger was thrown from the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries, including permanent brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Washington case law and the language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) authorized an exceptional sentence when the jury finds the victim's injuries substantially exceed "substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Pappas" on Justia Law

Appellants Vicki Parker, James Johnson, and Marie Clarke appealed a superior court order directly to the Supreme Court. The lower court's order denied them relief in an action challenging the candidacy of Christine Schaller for the office of judge of the Thurston County Superior Court. Appellants argued that Schaller was not statutorily eligible for the office because she did not reside in, and therefore was not a qualified elector of, Thurston County. Upon review, the Court held that Schaller was not required to reside in or be an elector of Thurston County to be eligible for the office. View "Parker v. Wyman" on Justia Law

P.E. Systems, LLC (PES) offered to analyze and reduce the credit card processing costs of CPI Corp. (CPI). The parties signed an agreement that appeared to be a contract. CPI later repudiated the contract, disputing its validity. PES sued for breach. CPI attached a copy of the contract to its answer to PES's complaint, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the "contract" was a mere agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable. PES responded to the motion and attached an identical copy of the contract and a PowerPoint presentation it had given to CPI. The trial court found the contract was not binding but merely an agreement to agree and granted CPI's motion, thereby dismissing the case. PES appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that both the contract was enforceable and that CPI had breached it. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held the contract was a valid with an open term, but reversed the balance of the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp." on Justia Law

"There exists a simple yet significant balancing test for trial courts to apply to consider whether specific circumstances warrant closing part of a trial to the public, set out in 'Washington v. Bone-Club,' (906 P.2d 325 (1995))." Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that process was not followed in this case, and therefore found a violation of the public trial right. Because the violation constituted structural error and absence of an objection was not a waiver of the public trial right, prejudice is presumed, and a new trial is warranted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wise" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, petitioners raised several issues, some common to both cases and others specific to each. Petitioner Michael Sublett challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, arguing the trial court wrongfully denied severance. He also challenged the comparability of out of state convictions used to support his sentence as a persistent offender. Petitioner Christopher Olsen challenged his conviction for felony murder, raising claims regarding lesser included offense jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Both petitioners challenged the content of the accomplice liability jury instruction, and both claim a violation of their article I, section 22 trial rights occurred when the trial judge considered, in chambers and with counsel present, a question from the jury during its deliberations. The Court of Appeals rejected the issues raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Sublett" on Justia Law