Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Ian Dean worked aboard a fishing vessel owned by The Fishing Company of Alaska (FCA). While aboard the vessel, Dean experienced pain in his hands and neck. After Dean left the vessel, he sought medical treatment and FCA began paying Dean maintenance and cure as required by general maritime law. After paying Dean's maintenance and cure for just over three years, FCA stopped paying when it obtained the opinion of a physician that Dean's injuries had reached maximum cure. At the time when FCA cut off Dean's maintenance and cure, Dean's own physician opined that Dean's injuries could benefit from additional treatment. Dean sued FCA and filed a motion asking the trial court to order FCA to resume paying maintenance and cure. The trial court applied a summary judgment standard to Dean's motion and denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to apply the summary judgment standard and reversed. View "Dean v. Fishing Co. of Alaska" on Justia Law

During its investigation of Ameriquest Mortgage Company's lending practices, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AGO) obtained a number of e-mail messages from Ameriquest that Ameriquest employees had created while processing consumer loans. The AGO wanted to disclose redacted versions of a subset of these e-mails to Melissa A. Huelsman, an attorney who has requested the records in accordance with the Public Records Act (PRA). Ameriquest claimed that the Supreme Court decided in the first appeal of this case that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. secs. 6801-6809, and its accompanying regulations, prohibited the disclosure of any e-mails containing nonpublic personal information, even after redaction. Ameriquest also claimed that the e-mails were shielded by the PRA's investigative records exemption, and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which shields materials produced in response to a civil investigative demand (CID). Additionally, Ameriquest claimed it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery into why the AGO is not invoking the investigative records exemption. The trial court held that the GLBA did not prevent disclosure, that the PRA exemption and CPA shield were inapplicable, and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part, holding that the GLBA prevented the AGO from newly redacting and disclosing those e-mails that contained nonpublic personal information, even when the redaction process removed all of the nonpublic personal information. The Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the PRA investigative records exemption and the CPA's shield did not apply and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. View "Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved an exceptional sentence, imposed for a second degree assault conviction, where the jury found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. Defendant Richard Duncalf was tried on charges of first degree assault and, as an alternative, second degree assault. The jury acquitted on the first degree assault but found defendant guilty of second degree assault. The jury also was instructed on an aggravating factor and found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy second degree assault to support the exceptional sentence imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging whether, under the statute defining second degree assault, a victim's injuries can legally exceed those contemplated by the statutory definition absent a jury finding of "great bodily harm." Defendant also challenged the exceptional circumstances inquiry as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed and after its review, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Duncalf" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Fuller was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with one count of obstructing a law enforcement officer under RCW 9A.76.020 and one count of assault under SMC 12A. 16.010. Following a jury trial, petitioner was acquitted of assault but convicted of obstructing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 358 suspended, a $5,000 fine with $5,000 suspended, and he was ordered to pay restitution. Petitioner appealed to the King County Superior Court, arguing that the municipal court lacked the authority to order restitution and that restitution may only be imposed in lieu of a fine under RCW 9A.20.030. The superior court rejected this argument, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution and that it had the authority to order both restitution and a fine under the reasoning of "Washington v. Barnett, ( 675 P.2d 626 (1984)). Petitioner filed a motion for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which held that RCW 35.20.010(1) gave the municipal court authority to impose both a fine and restitution. Considering the amendments to these statutes in light of the legislature's intent and the surrounding statutes and case law, the Supreme Court held that the amendments did not alter the authority of municipal courts to impose restitution and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "City of Seattle v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Less than one year after Mayor Cy Sun took office, Donald Thomson started a recall petition alleging numerous acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, and violation of the oath of office. The superior court found two charges adequate for submission to voters, namely, that Sun attempted to use the city police department as his own personal police force and that Sun's actions jeopardized the city's liability insurance coverage. Sun appealed the superior court order finding these charges sufficient. Also at issue was Thomson's cross appeal asking the court to reinstate several charges that the superior court found insufficient. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "In re Recall of Sun" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick Robert Evans stole a business check from the small business where he worked, made the check to himself for $500, then forged a signature on the check and cashed it. Evans was charged with identity theft and convicted after a bench trial. He challenged his conviction on the ground that RCW 9.35.020 (the identity theft statute) criminalized theft of a natural person's identity but did not criminalize theft of a corporate identity-or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Evans's arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "The plain language and legislative history of the identity theft statute demonstrate that theft of a corporate identity is a crime. The identity theft statute provided fair warning to Evans and other persons and contains sufficiently objective standards for purposes of enforcement. We thus affirm Evans's conviction." View "Washington v. Evans" on Justia Law

When Dr. Virgil Becker, Jr. died, his will left everything to his youngest daughter. His three older daughters contested the will, and the issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether his surviving spouse, Dr. Nancy Becker, had standing to participate in that will contest. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because Nancy had a direct, immediate, and legally ascertainable interest in the decedent's estate if the will was declared invalid, she would have standing in the will contest. View "In re Estate of Becker" on Justia Law

While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine. QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied. The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that was error. The Court remanded because questions of material fact remained as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly constituted peer review body. Further, questions remained as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff privileges. View "Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

A police officer positioned on a second floor observed Defendant Gregorio Ortega commit acts that gave the officer probable cause to believe Defendant was engaged in drug traffic loitering, a gross misdemeanor. The officer radioed fellow officers, described what he was witnessing, and instructed them to arrest Defendant. One of the arresting officers searched Defendant and found crack cocaine and cash. Defendant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress evidence of the drugs and cash, and he was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether an officer has lawful authority to arrest a gross misdemeanor suspect based solely on whether the officer who directs the arrest from a remote location is an "arresting officer." After review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless a statutory exception applies, an officer may arrest a misdemeanor suspect without a warrant only if the officer was present when the misdemeanor was committed. Here, the officer who arrested Defendant was not present when the misdemeanor occurred, and the record did not support a finding that the officer who observed the offense was an "arresting officer." View "Washington v. Ortega" on Justia Law