Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2006, Petitioner Bao Dinh Dang walked up to a gas pump in Seattle, lit newspaper on fire, and attempted to pump gas in order to ignite the gas. A station employee successfully knocked the flaming newspaper out of petitioner's hand with a window-washing squeegee while a customer phoned police. Petitioner was arrested, and the State charged him with attempted arson in the first degree. Petitioner moved for acquittal on the grounds of insanity. The court granted the motion, finding that petitioner was suffering from a mental disease but that he was "not a substantial danger to other persons and [did] not [. . .] present a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, but . . . is in need of further control by the court or other persons or institutions." The court ordered petitioner conditionally released subject to various conditions. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether trial courts are required to enter a finding of dangerousness before revoking the conditional release of a person acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity. Furthermore, the Court decided whether trial courts must also decide the appropriate standard of proof governing the revocation determination. The Court's conclusion was that Washington law requires trial courts to find conditionally released insanity acquittees dangerous before committing them to mental institutions against their will. The Court also concluded that a preponderance of the evidence sufficiently protects an insanity acquittee's rights in the context of revoking conditional release. Because the trial court in this case specifically determined that Bao Dinh Dang was dangerous, the trial court held that it properly revoked his conditional release. However, the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements at Dang's revocation hearing without finding good cause for doing so but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Washington v. Dang" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Ollivier was convicted for possession of child pornography. On appeal, he contended his rights to a speedy trial under the United States and Washington State Constitution were violated by delay in bringing him to trial. He also contended that evidence obtained in a search of his apartment should have been suppressed because of misrepresentations and other defects in the affidavit in support of probable cause to issue the warrant, and he was not presented with a copy of the search warrant prior to commencement of the search. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the delay in bringing petitioner to trial did not violate speedy trial rights when defendant's own counsel requested the continuances causing the delay and no claim of ineffective counsel was made related to those continuances, that probable cause for the search warrant was sufficiently established by qualifying information in the affidavit, and no violation of CrR 2.3(d) occurred because a copy of the search warrant was posted upon seizure of property pursuant to the warrant. View "Washington v. Ollivier" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Wooten was convicted of first degree malicious mischief for damaging a home he was purchasing on a real estate contract. Petitioner claimed he did not damage "property of another" because he had exclusive possessory and proprietary interests in the property. He also argued the trial court abused its discretion by excluding closing argument about financing issues relating to the home. The Supreme Court concluded after review of the trial court record that Petitioner was not the exclusive owner of the property for the purposes of malicious mischief, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Petitioner's attorney's closing argument. View "Washington v. Wooten" on Justia Law

After years of negotiation and lawsuits, Snohomish County agreed to let King County build a sewage treatment plant in south Snohomish County. As part of the settlement, King County agreed to provide a substantial mitigation package for the local Snohomish County community near the plant. The cost of the mitigation was included in the capital cost of the plant. Two local utility districts that contract with King County for sewage treatment filed suit, arguing that the mitigation package was excessive, among many other claims. The trial judge largely rejected the districts' claims. After careful consideration of the record, the Supreme Court largely affirmed. View "Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Washington's constitutional separation of powers creates a qualified gubernatorial communications privilege that functions as an exemption to the Public Records Act (PRA). Freedom Foundation sued the governor to compel production of documents under the PRA after the governor asserted executive privilege and refused to release them. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled that separation of powers principles produced a qualified gubernatorial communications privilege. Because the Foundation made no attempt to overcome this qualified privilege, the trial court granted the governor summary judgment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freedom Foundation v. Gregoire" on Justia Law

Paul Chan Kim murdered his partner, Baerbel K. Roznowski, after officer Andrew Rensing of the Federal Way Police Department served Kim with an antiharassment order forbidding him to contact or remain near Roznowski. Roznowski's two daughters filed suit against the city of Federal Way, alleging that Rensing's negligent service of the order resulted in Roznowski's death at Kim's hands. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict against the City. The City claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it owed Roznowski no duty under the public duty doctrine, foreclosing any tort liability. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City had a duty to serve the antiharassment order on Kim, and because it had a duty to act, it had a duty to act with reasonable care in serving the order. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motions, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals. View "Washburn v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the search of Lisa Byrd's purse was a search of her person. Because the purse was in her lap when she was arrested, it was an article of her person under the long-standing "time of arrest" rule. If the arrest was lawful, the arresting officer was entitled to search Byrd's person and articles closely associated with her person without showing the search was motivated by particularized concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for further trial court proceedings. View "Washington v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In late 2008, Cost Management Services Inc. (CMS) reviewed its years of tax payments made to the City of Lakewood. In examining the relevant regulations, CMS decided that it did not in fact owe the tax that it had been paying. In November 2008, it stopped paying the tax and it submitted a claim to Lakewood for a refund of taxes it had previously paid from 2004 to September 2008. Lakewood did not respond to the request for a refund of the 2004-2008 tax payments. But six months later, in May 2009, it issued a notice and order to CMS demanding payment of past due taxes for a different time period-October 2008 to May 2009. CMS did not respond to the notice and order from Lakewood. Instead, CMS sued Lakewood in superior court on its refund claim, asserting a state common law claim of money had and received. The trial court held a bench trial and found in favor of CMS, ruling that CMS did not owe the taxes it had paid to Lakewood. In addition (in a separate action), the trial court granted CMS 's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering Lakewood to respond to the refund claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that since Lakewood had never actually responded to the refund claim, CMS had no further administrative steps available to it on the refund claim, and thus exhaustion was not required. The appellate court also ruled that the trial court had properly issued the writ of mandamus. Lakewood sought review of the Court of Appeals' decisions on the exhaustion and the mandamus issues. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals as to the exhaustion issue, but reversed the Court of Appeals as to the mandamus issue. View "Cost Mgmt. Servs. v. City of Lakewood" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the validity of an amended rule from the Department of Ecology that reserved water from the Skagit River system for future year-round out-of-stream uses, despite the fact that in times of low stream flows these uses would impair established minimum in-stream flows necessary for fish, wildlife, recreation, navigation, scenic and aesthetic values. The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (Tribe) sued, challenging the validity of Ecology's amended rule reserving the water. The trial court upheld the amended rule and dismissed the Tribe's petition. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ecology erroneously interpreted the statutory exception as broad authority to reallocate water for new beneficial uses when the requirements for appropriating water for these uses otherwise cannot be met. "The exception is very narrow, however, and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow water right can be impaired." Because the amended rule exceeded Ecology's authority under the statute, the amended rule reserving the water was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). View "Swinomish Indian Tribal Comm'y v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Stewart Title Guaranty Company hired the law firm Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, PS to defend its insured, Sterling Savings Bank, from a claim of lien priority on real property by a construction company. The claim was resolved in favor of the construction company, and Stewart Title sued the firm for malpractice. Witherspoon moved for summary judgment arguing it owed a duty to the client Sterling Bank and not Stewart Title, and that the alleged malfeasance (not arguing equitable subrogation) was not a viable argument in the lien priority suit. The trial court ruled against Witherspoon on the first, no-duty, ground but agreed with it on the second, no-breach, ground. The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Witherspoon. Stewart Title appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in dismissing Stewart Title's malpractice case on the basis that Witherspoon owed Stewart Title no duty. The Court did not address the subrogation issue. View "Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling Sav. Bank" on Justia Law