Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jose Toledo-Sotelo filed an untimely personal restraint petition but argued that his judgment and sentence recited an incorrect offender score and offense seriousness level. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court used the sentencing range that resulted from the correct offender score and seriousness level. Thus the sentencing court did not exceed its statutory authority and the judgment and sentence was valid on its face. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and dismissed Toledo-Sotelo’s untimely petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Toledo-Sotelo" on Justia Law

This case concerned attorney fees under the dissenters' rights provisions of the Washington Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act). The issue was first considered two years ago when the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Humphrey Industries Ltd. (Humphrey) and remanded to the trial court to reconsider an award of attorney fees in Humphrey's favor. On remand, the trial court awarded Humphrey part of its fees but also reinstated part of the attorney fee award against Humphrey that the Supreme Court had reversed. Humphrey appealed directly to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court on remand failed to follow the Supreme Court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by imposing fees on Humphrey. View "Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St. Assocs." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on what the State must prove when seeking to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals interpreted language from the Court's decision in "In re Dependency of J.C.," (924 P.2d 21 (1996)), to mean that when the State presents evidence sufficient to prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), it necessarily proved the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the parental rights of K.D.S.'s father, Derek Gladin, because the State proved RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm on these grounds. However, because the trial court properly found that the State had proved each element, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Gladin's parental rights. View "In re Dependency of K.D.S." on Justia Law

John George Cooper was arrested in Washington State in 2009 for attempting to obtain pain-killers with a fake prescription. In October while his case was pending, Cooper jumped bail. According to Cooper, he was summoned to Texas by his father to assist in his grandfather's funeral. While in Texas in 2010, Cooper committed another theft for which he was arrested and convicted. Cooper was sentenced at the same time for two thefts he had previously committed in Texas in 2008. The Texas court deferred those sentences in March 2010. Cooper returned to Washington a few months later and pled guilty to the pain-killer incident as well as bail jumping. The two deferred sentences he had received in Texas were counted as part of his offender score in Washington. Cooper's sole argument on appeal to the Supreme Court was that the Texas deferred sentences were not adjudications of guilt and so should not have counted as convictions for the purpose of calculating his Washington offender score. The trial court and Court of Appeals rejected his argument. The Supreme Court also rejected his argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the enforceability of a binding arbitration clause included within a debt adjustment contract. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the motion was untimely and that the binding arbitration clause was unconscionable. Upon review of the trial court record and the clause at issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the clause was unconscionable, which then required the Court to decide whether this conclusion as to the validity of the binding arbitration clause is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Finding no preemption, the Court affirmed. View "Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner James John Chambers Jr. was charged with several crimes arising from three incidents that occurred in 1999. Before committing the November crimes, Petitioner plead guilty to charges resulting from the February and May incidents. Prior to sentencing on these charges, Petitioner entered into an agreement that provided that he would plead guilty to the November crimes and stipulate to a 240 month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences for the February and May crimes. Petitioner was sentenced for the February and May crimes and pled guilty to the November crimes on the same date. He was sentenced for the November crimes at a subsequent hearing. Several years later, Petitioner filed personal restraint petitions (PRPs), seeking to withdraw his plea to the February charges and argued that his sentence on the November charges was incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted his motion to withdraw his February plea but denied his request for resentencing on the November charges. The Court of Appeals consolidated the PRPs and reversed, holding that the pleas were indivisible and declining to consider the validity of the sentence arising from the November crimes. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner entered into a global plea agreement that was indivisible and that he failed to demonstrate that his 240 month sentence was calculated in error. View "Washington v. Chambers" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the conflicting authority on which the standard of review applies to a sentencing court's determination of "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Defendant Julio Cesar Aldano Graciano was charged by amended information with four counts of first degree rape of a child and two counts of first degree child molestation relating to E.R. The jury was instructed that a guilty verdict required unanimous agreement on which act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was further instructed that the acts constituting each count must be separate and distinct from one another. The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Furthermore, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the molestation charge relating to a second child, J.R. At sentencing, defense counsel argued the crimes should have been considered the "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) for purposes of calculating Defendant's offender score. Both Defendant and the State sought review of the trial court's sentence. The Court of Appeals (Division Two) reviewed the trial court's determination de novo, adopting the reasoning of Division Three in "Washington v. Torngren," (196 P.3d 742 (2008)). The Torngren Court acknowledged a long line of precedent stating the proper standard is abuse of discretion but held that a de novo standard “seem[s] more appropriate." The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reaffirmed that determinations of same criminal conduct are reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of law, and concluded that the sentencing judge acted within her discretion in declining to find that Defendant's crimes constituted the same criminal conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's sentence. View "Washington v. Aldana Graciano" on Justia Law

Brandon Afoa was paralyzed in an accident while he was working at Sea-Tac Airport and sought to recover from the Port of Seattle on three theories the Supreme Court applied in other multiemployer workplace cases: as a business invitee; for breach of safety regulations under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA); and the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors. The Court concluded that the same principles that apply to other multiemployer workplaces apply to Sea-Tac and that a jury could find the Port (which owns and operates the airport) liable under any of these three theories. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Afoa's claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle and Officers Kevin McDaniel and Pohna Lim challenged an appellate court's decision affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Respondent Elsa Robb, on behalf of her deceased husband Michael Robb, alleged that law enforcement acted negligently by failing to pick up and remove shotgun shells lying near Samson Berhe after stopping him on suspicion of burglary. After the stop, Berhe returned to retrieve the cartridges, and shortly thereafter used one of them to kill Michael Robb. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B may create an independent duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party where the actor’s own affirmative act creates or exposes another to the recognizable high degree of risk of harm. However, the Court also held that in this case, the police officer’s failure to pick up shotgun shells lying near defendants in a "Terry" stop was not an affirmative act as contemplated by the Restatement. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Robb v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from a contract for construction of a baseball stadium and home field for the Seattle Mariners baseball team. In its first trip to the Supreme Court, "Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction Company," (202 P.3d 924 (2009) (PFD I)), the Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the owner’s suit against the general contractor because the action was brought for the benefit of the State, and therefore the exemption from the statute of limitations set out in RCW 4.16.160 applied. This case raised questions about whether the construction statute of repose barred suit against the general contractor and, if not, whether the general contractor may pursue third party claims against two of its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the general contractor and the subcontractors on statute of repose grounds. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "the statute of repose does not bar suit against the general contractor. In accord with several provisions in the subcontracts, the subcontractors are subject to liability to the same extent that the general contractor may be liable for any defective materials or work under the subcontracts. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statute of repose bars Hunt Kiewit’s third party claims against the subcontractors." View "Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co." on Justia Law