Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Derrick Robert Evans stole a business check from the small business where he worked, made the check to himself for $500, then forged a signature on the check and cashed it. Evans was charged with identity theft and convicted after a bench trial. He challenged his conviction on the ground that RCW 9.35.020 (the identity theft statute) criminalized theft of a natural person's identity but did not criminalize theft of a corporate identity-or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Evans's arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "The plain language and legislative history of the identity theft statute demonstrate that theft of a corporate identity is a crime. The identity theft statute provided fair warning to Evans and other persons and contains sufficiently objective standards for purposes of enforcement. We thus affirm Evans's conviction." View "Washington v. Evans" on Justia Law

When Dr. Virgil Becker, Jr. died, his will left everything to his youngest daughter. His three older daughters contested the will, and the issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether his surviving spouse, Dr. Nancy Becker, had standing to participate in that will contest. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because Nancy had a direct, immediate, and legally ascertainable interest in the decedent's estate if the will was declared invalid, she would have standing in the will contest. View "In re Estate of Becker" on Justia Law

While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine. QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied. The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that was error. The Court remanded because questions of material fact remained as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly constituted peer review body. Further, questions remained as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff privileges. View "Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

A police officer positioned on a second floor observed Defendant Gregorio Ortega commit acts that gave the officer probable cause to believe Defendant was engaged in drug traffic loitering, a gross misdemeanor. The officer radioed fellow officers, described what he was witnessing, and instructed them to arrest Defendant. One of the arresting officers searched Defendant and found crack cocaine and cash. Defendant unsuccessfully moved the trial court to suppress evidence of the drugs and cash, and he was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether an officer has lawful authority to arrest a gross misdemeanor suspect based solely on whether the officer who directs the arrest from a remote location is an "arresting officer." After review, the Supreme Court concluded that unless a statutory exception applies, an officer may arrest a misdemeanor suspect without a warrant only if the officer was present when the misdemeanor was committed. Here, the officer who arrested Defendant was not present when the misdemeanor occurred, and the record did not support a finding that the officer who observed the offense was an "arresting officer." View "Washington v. Ortega" on Justia Law

In open court, Appellant Vanessa Condon and Respondent Fely Condon entered into a stipulated settlement and dismissal with prejudice of Vanessa's claims against Fely, stemming from an automobile accident. Before payment, Fely requested that Vanessa sign a release agreement, which the parties had not discussed nor placed on the record. Vanessa refused to sign, and Fely made a motion to enforce the settlement and release. The trial court deemed the release signed, and Vanessa appealed the trial court's order. On appeal, she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce release terms that were not a part of the original agreement. Fely argued that Vanessa waived her right to appeal by accepting the settlement check. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Vanessa did not waive her right to appeal, and that the trial court improperly added implied terms to the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Condon v. Condon" on Justia Law

In 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise (challengers) filed a petition with the Growth Management Hearings Board alleging Clark County was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA). The Challengers specifically argued that under the Act's requirements, the various lands affected by a 2007 local zoning ordinance designated as agricultural land of long-term commercial significance (ALLTCS) could not be designated as an urban growth area (UGA) by the ordinance. The cities of Camas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certain parcels of the disputed lands designated UGA by the 2007 ordinance. The Challengers did not contest the annexations, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention of the Board. The Board ultimately found that Clark County was not in compliance with the GMA, specifically finding that certain land designations from the 2007 ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation of the annexed lands as UGA. Multiple parties were permitted to intervene, and the Board's decision was appealed. The superior court entered an order that resolved various claims on appeal, including claims related to the annexed lands. The court reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation of a portion of the annexed lands as UGA was erroneous. The Challengers thereafter appealed the superior court's order. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of appellate procedure: whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing separate and district claims that had been resolved but were not actually raised on appeal. THe parties did not challenge the disposition of those claims, thus those claims were finally adjudicated. However, the appellate court addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion reversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. View "Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Flaherty attempted to file a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance with the Spokane Superior Court. In 2009, Petitioner was considered a "career offender" and subject to an increased sentence for a federal conviction. Petitioner tried to file his motion on the grounds that his attorney failed to advise him that pleading guilty would contribute to the "career offender" determination. The court refused the file the motion as untimely. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: "it is plainly not part of the clerk's ministerial function to determine whether a collateral challenge is timely." View "Washington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Yates, Jr. filed a personal restraint petition following the Supreme Court's decision to affirm his death sentence. Petitioner was sentenced in 2000 to 408 years in prison for thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. In 2002, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree murder, for which he received the death penalty. Petitioner raised 25 grounds for relief covering a host of legal issues, including procedural errors at trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, juror bias and public trial rights. The Court found that no merit to any of Petitioner's claims, and dismissed Petitioner's restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

Dr. James Haviland was a medical doctor who practiced in the Seattle area. Several years after the death of his first wife, the 85-year-old Dr. Haviland met 35-year-old Mary Burden who worked at the hospital where he was a patient. Following his discharge, the two began dating, and the doctor agreed to pay towards Ms. Burden's education and gave her an additional "nest egg." The couple married in 1997. The day before the wedding, Dr. Haviland changed his will to include his new wife, and revised it several more times during the marriage. The 2006 amendment allowed the doctor's total probate estate to pass to his new wife, excepting several special bequests. Ms. Haviland amended the doctor's living trust, transferred securities for her own benefit, and made multiple large cash gifts to her family members. Large sums of money were also transferred from the couple's joint checking account to Ms. Haviland's separate account. After Dr. Haviland died, his children contested the multiple amendments to his will. The trial court ultimately found that the estate was "so depleted by Mary's transfer of funds that, after distribution of specific bequests, the total value of the estate is a negative." The court invalidated the will after finding that the 2006 amendment was the product of undue influence. During the pendency of the contest, the Washington legislature amended the slayer statutes to disinherit those who financially abuse vulnerable adults. In light of the amendments, the administrator of the doctor's estate requested the trial court to determine whether Ms. Haviland should have been disinherited based on her conduct with respect to Dr. Haviland and as found by the trial court. The court determined that the abuser statutes did not apply to deny Ms. Haviland benefits from the estate since the statutes were triggered by financial abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the petition filed during probate to adjudicate whether an individual is an abuser was the triggering event for the statutes to apply, and as such, acted prospectively applied to the Haviland estate. Ms. Haviland appealed the appellate court's holding. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concurring that the abuser statutes act prospectively, and that the filing of the abuser petition during probate is the trigger. View "In re Estate of Haviland" on Justia Law