Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Abeda Jafar filed an action in superior court to obtain a parenting plan involving her 19-month old son. She also filed a motion under GR 34 to waive all mandatory fees and surcharges on the basis of indigency. The trial court found that Jafar was indigent, but granted her only a partial waiver of the fees and surcharges. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether under GR 34 trial courts had discretion to grant partial waivers of fees and surcharges. The Court held that GR 34 provided a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent, and further required the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the trial court's order with instructions to waive all filing fees and surcharges. View "Jafar v. Webb" on Justia Law

In 2003, members of the Committee Against the VietCong Flag disseminated an e-mail message throughout the Olympia Vietnamese community accusing Duc Tan and the Vietnamese Community of Thurston County (VCTC), a nonprofit corporation, of engaging in procommunist activities. Additionally, defendant Norman Le authored three newsletter articles repeating allegations from the e-mail and also accusing Tan and the VCTC of being undercover Viet Cong agents. Tan and the VCTC sued the authors of the publications for defamation. The trial judge determined that Tan and the VCTC were public figures as a matter of law at summary judgment. The case then proceeded to trial where a jury found Le and his coauthors liable for defamation and awarded Tan and the VCTC $310,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the statements in the e-mail and newsletters were protected opinion supported by disclosed facts, with the exception of the allegation that members of the VCTC, including Tan, were undercover Viet Cong agents. The court found Tan and the VCTC failed to make the requisite showing that the authors published any of the statements with actual malice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defamatory statements made by Nonnan Le and the other authors were not protected opinion and therefore actionable. The Court also held that that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice with respect to those statements. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Tan v. Le" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the public disclosure of Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. SHA hearing decisions contain welfare recipients' personal information; this information is exempt from disclosure under the PRA, but the PRA requires redaction and disclosure of public records insofar as all exempt material can be removed. Applicable federal regulations do not exempt the hearing decisions from disclosure, nor do applicable federal regulations preempt the PRA. Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly ordered SHA to produce the grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the redaction requirement of the PRA, properly ordered SHA to produce the responsive records in electronic format and to establish necessary policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the PRA, and properly awarded statutory damages. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court and awarded respondent Resident Action Council (RAC) its attorney fees on appeal. View "Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court violated petitioner Brandon Coristine's constitutional rights by offering an affirmative defense instruction over his objection. Petitioner argued that offering the instruction to the jury violated his right to control his defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where a defendant chooses not to argue or invoke an affirmative defense, offering an instruction on the defense over the defendant's objection violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Coristine" on Justia Law

In 2010, Mike Siegel moved to intervene and to unseal the court file in the criminal case of "Washington v. Richardson,"(King County Superior Court No. 93-1-02331-2). The court file was originally sealed in 2002. The trial court authorized intervention but denied the motion to unseal. Siegel petitioned the Supreme Court for direct review of the trial court's order denying his motion to unseal. The deputy clerk denied appeal as a matter of right and redesignated the matter as a motion for discretionary review. The Court granted direct discretionary review. Siegel argued that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to unseal because it failed to perform an "Ishikawa" analysis and failed to comply with GR 15; (2) the denial of his motion to unseal is appealable as of right; and (3) he should have been entitled to attorney fees under RAP 18 .1. Because the trial court failed to apply Ishikawa and GR 15( e )(2); and failed to articulate its reasons for continued sealing on the record, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if the records should remain sealed under Ishikawa and GR 15(e)(2). View "Washington v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ian Dean worked aboard a fishing vessel owned by The Fishing Company of Alaska (FCA). While aboard the vessel, Dean experienced pain in his hands and neck. After Dean left the vessel, he sought medical treatment and FCA began paying Dean maintenance and cure as required by general maritime law. After paying Dean's maintenance and cure for just over three years, FCA stopped paying when it obtained the opinion of a physician that Dean's injuries had reached maximum cure. At the time when FCA cut off Dean's maintenance and cure, Dean's own physician opined that Dean's injuries could benefit from additional treatment. Dean sued FCA and filed a motion asking the trial court to order FCA to resume paying maintenance and cure. The trial court applied a summary judgment standard to Dean's motion and denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to apply the summary judgment standard and reversed. View "Dean v. Fishing Co. of Alaska" on Justia Law

During its investigation of Ameriquest Mortgage Company's lending practices, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AGO) obtained a number of e-mail messages from Ameriquest that Ameriquest employees had created while processing consumer loans. The AGO wanted to disclose redacted versions of a subset of these e-mails to Melissa A. Huelsman, an attorney who has requested the records in accordance with the Public Records Act (PRA). Ameriquest claimed that the Supreme Court decided in the first appeal of this case that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. secs. 6801-6809, and its accompanying regulations, prohibited the disclosure of any e-mails containing nonpublic personal information, even after redaction. Ameriquest also claimed that the e-mails were shielded by the PRA's investigative records exemption, and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which shields materials produced in response to a civil investigative demand (CID). Additionally, Ameriquest claimed it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery into why the AGO is not invoking the investigative records exemption. The trial court held that the GLBA did not prevent disclosure, that the PRA exemption and CPA shield were inapplicable, and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part, holding that the GLBA prevented the AGO from newly redacting and disclosing those e-mails that contained nonpublic personal information, even when the redaction process removed all of the nonpublic personal information. The Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the PRA investigative records exemption and the CPA's shield did not apply and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. View "Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved an exceptional sentence, imposed for a second degree assault conviction, where the jury found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense. Defendant Richard Duncalf was tried on charges of first degree assault and, as an alternative, second degree assault. The jury acquitted on the first degree assault but found defendant guilty of second degree assault. The jury also was instructed on an aggravating factor and found that the victim's injuries "substantially exceeded" the harm necessary to satisfy second degree assault to support the exceptional sentence imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging whether, under the statute defining second degree assault, a victim's injuries can legally exceed those contemplated by the statutory definition absent a jury finding of "great bodily harm." Defendant also challenged the exceptional circumstances inquiry as being unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed and after its review, finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Duncalf" on Justia Law

Petitioner Donald Fuller was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with one count of obstructing a law enforcement officer under RCW 9A.76.020 and one count of assault under SMC 12A. 16.010. Following a jury trial, petitioner was acquitted of assault but convicted of obstructing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 358 suspended, a $5,000 fine with $5,000 suspended, and he was ordered to pay restitution. Petitioner appealed to the King County Superior Court, arguing that the municipal court lacked the authority to order restitution and that restitution may only be imposed in lieu of a fine under RCW 9A.20.030. The superior court rejected this argument, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution and that it had the authority to order both restitution and a fine under the reasoning of "Washington v. Barnett, ( 675 P.2d 626 (1984)). Petitioner filed a motion for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which held that RCW 35.20.010(1) gave the municipal court authority to impose both a fine and restitution. Considering the amendments to these statutes in light of the legislature's intent and the surrounding statutes and case law, the Supreme Court held that the amendments did not alter the authority of municipal courts to impose restitution and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "City of Seattle v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Less than one year after Mayor Cy Sun took office, Donald Thomson started a recall petition alleging numerous acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, and violation of the oath of office. The superior court found two charges adequate for submission to voters, namely, that Sun attempted to use the city police department as his own personal police force and that Sun's actions jeopardized the city's liability insurance coverage. Sun appealed the superior court order finding these charges sufficient. Also at issue was Thomson's cross appeal asking the court to reinstate several charges that the superior court found insufficient. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "In re Recall of Sun" on Justia Law