Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robin Farris filed six charges against the Pierce County Assessor-Treasurer Dale Washam. Ms. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated whistleblower protections, retaliated against his employees, grossly wasted public funds, failed to cooperate with discrimination and retaliation investigations, and violated his oath of office. Ms. Farris appeared pro se, and there were technical flaws with the filing of her six charges against Mr. Washam. Through the course of the proceedings, Ms. Farris amended her charges to comply with the courtâs rules of pleading. Mr. Washam contended that there was no statutory authority to allow the recall charges to be amended, and because the original filing was fatally flawed, the Supreme Court should dismiss the entire recall effort. On March 3, 2011, the Supreme Court entered a brief order that affirmed the lower courtâs decision to allow the recall effort to proceed. The Courtâs May 12, 2011 order set forth the reasons for its March decision. The Court affirmed the trial court in all aspects.

Petitioner Michael Williams drove away from a car dealership without paying for new tires and wheels. An employee called the police, and officers tracked down Petitioner at his girlfriendâs home. Petitioner admitted that he had driven away, but to avoid discovery of an outstanding warrant against him, Petitioner gave a fake name. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree theft, making false statements to an officer, and for obstructing law enforcement by giving a fake name. Petitioner appealed his obstruction conviction, arguing that legislative history and case law show that the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute. The appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that obstruction requires more than just a statementâit requires some conduct in addition to making the statement. The Court vacated Petitionerâs conviction on the obstruction charge alone, but affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions in all other respects.

Petitioner Jack Sims appealed only part of his sentence stemming from child molestation charges. As his defense against the charges, Petitioner argued that the contact he had with the victim was an isolated event, and that the evidence supported his contention at trial. The Department of Corrections recommended Petitioner receive a âspecial sex offender sentencing alternativeâ (SSOSA) sentence. The recommendation was supported by testimony from an expert that opined that Petitioner had a very low risk of re-offending. The trial court ordered a lifetime âno-contactâ order, and banished Petitioner from the city and county in which the victim lived. Petitioner challenged the banishment portion of his sentence, arguing that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed that the sentence was unconstitutional, and concluded that the proper remedy in this case would be a resentencing for the limited purpose of narrowly tailoring the geographic condition of Petitionerâs SSOSA sentence that banished him from the county. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

A jury found Petitioner Gale West to be a sexually violent predator, and the trial court ordered him to be civilly committed. The appellate court affirmed the lower courtâs order. Petitioner appealed, seeking a new trial because he believed he was prejudiced by the trial courtâs evidentiary rulings. The Supreme Court found that although âsome errors occurred, they were harmless.â The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

In 2006, Defendant Whatcom County (County) approved three land use applications for development in the Birch Bay urban growth area. Petitioner Whatcom County Fire District No. 21 (the Fire District) filed a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition to challenge the approvals. At issue between the parties was whether the completion of the proposed developments would reduce fire protection services to below an âadequateâ level of service. On review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the County had assigned the responsibility for assessing the adequacy of fire protection services to the Fire District. Because the Fire District determined the services it could provide would fall below an âadequateâ standard, the lower court properly granted its LUPA petition. The Court reversed the Countyâs approval of the land use applications for Birch Bay.

Petitioner Raymond Martinez challenged his conviction for first degree burglary, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a deadly weapon within the meaning of the applicable statute. At trial, a knife and sheath were admitted into evidence, but none of the witnesses provided a verbal description of the sheath, or indicated whether it was fastened or unfastened when it was found on Petitionerâs person. On appeal, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor misstated the evidence, mislead the jury, and made an inflammatory statement in his closing remarks. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a first degree burglary conviction. The Court vacated Petitionerâs conviction, and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Glen Nichols was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and with possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana. Following a denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his arrest, the case proceeded to a bench trial at which Petitioner was found guilty on both charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner appealed his convictions. Petitioner filed a Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) challenging the police search of the motel registry where he was staying when he was arrested. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided State v. Surge where it held that a random, warrantless check of motel registry records was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed Petitionerâs convictions and denied his PRP. On appeal, Petitioner argues that in light of the Supreme Courtâs decision in the âSurgeâ case, evidence stemming from the police search of the motel registry should have been suppressed. The Court was not persuaded by his argument, holding that Petitionerâs case differed from the âSurgeâ case in that police were not doing a random check of the records, rather, they had âindividualized suspicion that drug selling activity had taken place fromâ his room. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Petitioner Maureen Blair was a long-haul trucker. In 2003, she slipped and fell on a gasoline spill at a truck stop operated by Respondent TA-Seattle East No. 176 (also known as Travelcenters of America). Petitioner and her husband brought suit against Travelcenters in 2006. From the onset, there were problems with her case. Her trial counsel had problems at the firm, and as a result, missed several key discovery deadlines, particularly one involving disclosure of Petitioner's proposed witness list. Travelcenters moved to strike the witness list. The trial court did not enter any findings, but it struck the witness list, and sanctioned Petitioner's counsel for subsequent untimely disclosures. Three days before trial, Travelcenters moved to dismiss the case because without witnesses, Petitioner could not prove her case. The trial court granted the motion, and Petitioner appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner challenged the propriety of the trial court's sanctions and for striking the witnesses, claiming that the court was required to make a finding for the record why it did what it did. The appellate court held that the trial court did not have to enumerate its reasons. But the Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misread the case law governing this kind of matter, and vacated the sanction orders from the trial court, and reversed the order granting Travelcenter's motion to dismiss.

Kemper Freeman and several other Washington taxpayers appealed directly to the Supreme Court to try to stop the governor and other state officials from "taking any action" on plans to convert high-occupancy lanes on Interstate 90 into light rail lines. Though Petitioners asked the Court to grant a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioners were essentially seeking a declaratory judgment to bar the State Department of Transportation from selling or leasing any portion of the Interstate for light rail use. The Court found that such a request was outside of it's jurisdiction, and refused to issue the writ.