Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the Court's holding in "Washington v. Winterstein," (220 P.3d 1226 (2009)) and whether the inevitable discovery doctrine (which was found inconsistent with the Washington constitution) applied retroactively to judgments that were made final when decided. A jury convicted defendant Nadder Haghighi on theft and unlawful issuance of checks or drafts. The underlying issue in this personal restraint petition involved the admissibility of evidence obtained through a warrant issued in Washington, but faxed to the bank's offices in Illinois. A representative at the bank provided records requested by Washington police which did not comply with Illinois' law on domestication of out-of-state warrants. Defendant moved to suppress the records police obtained from Illinois, and appealed the trial court's denial of that motion. He also claimed on appeal he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon review of the present case, the Court determined: (1) "Winterstein" did not apply retroactively; and, (2) defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Haghighi" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved a claim under RCW 10.73.090. Petitioner successfully argued that a 2000 judgment against him and subsequent sentence were based on an incorrectly-calculated offender score. Petitioner claims in this appeal that because he successfully challenged the score in a 2009 collateral challenge and received a new sentence, he should have been able to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel relating back to that challenge. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claim as untimely and because it was successive. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that petitioner's petition was time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioners Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller represented a class of employees who worked for an armored car company Garda CL Northwest, Inc. They brought a wage and hour suit against the company, citing violations of the Washington Industrial Welfare Act, and the Washington Minimum Wage Act. After several months of litigation, Garda moved to compel arbitration under the terms of a labor agreement. The trial court granted the motion, but ruled that the employees could arbitrate as a class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order to compel arbitration, but that the employees must arbitrate individually notwithstanding the class certification. Both sides appealed the appellate court decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the arbitration clause was unconscionable, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Hill v. Garda CL Northwest. Inc." on Justia Law

The State Department of Transportation and the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority entered into an agreement that would lease a portion of I-90 to Sound Transit for light rail. For this, Sound Transit agreed to pay an amount equal to the State's contribution to construct the light rail lanes and for the value of a 40-year lease. The appellants in this case, individuals and a non-profit, contended this lease violated state law and the state constitution. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the lease did not violate state law or the constitution, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Freeman v. Washington" on Justia Law

Rival hospice operators challenged the State Department of Health's decision to grant a certificate of need to Odyssey Healthcare Operating B, LP and Odyssey Healthcare Inc. in connection with the settlement of a federal lawsuit. The superior court revoked the certificate; the Court of Appeals reinstated the certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "King County Pub. Hosp. #2 v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the conflict between the statutory requirement that limits disclosure of competency evaluations prepared under RCW 10.77 and the constitutional requirement that "justice in all cases shall be administered openly." Once the evaluation is filed, the trial court uses it to determine defendant's competency to stand trial. The trial court in this case denied defendant's motion to seal the evaluation, and defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that once a competency evaluation becomes court record, it becomes subject to the constitutional presumption of openness, which could be rebutted only when the trial court makes a specific finding that "Ishikawa" factors weigh in favor of sealing. View "Washington v. Chen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's dismissal of notice of special death penalty sentencing proceedings. The King County prosecuting attorney appealed to the Supreme Court to decide whether he violated Washington's capital punishment statutes by considering the strength of the evidence against respondents Joseph McEnroe and Michele Anderson when he determined he would seek the death penalty. Respondents were accused of shooting and killing six people. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the prosecutor did not violate Washington law, reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions so that the cases against respondents could proceed. View "Washington v. McEnroe" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the siting of a wind powered energy facility under the energy facilities site locations act (EFSLA). The State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), after reducing the scope of the project applied for, recommended that the governor approve the project, which she did. Opponents of the project then sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The superior court certified the issue directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found no basis to reverse the EFSEC's recommendation or the governor's approval of the project. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jennifer Mau was convicted of making false insurance claims. She challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to prove the existence of any "contract of insurance" underlying Petitioner's claim. Therefore the Court reversed her conviction. View "Washington v. Mau" on Justia Law

Jared Barton sued Korrine Linvog, her parents Thomas and Madonna Linvog, and the State. Barton reached a settlement with the Linvogs through which the Linvogs agreed to advance Barton money in exchange for his promise not to execute a judgment against them above their insurance policy limits. Neither Barton nor the Linvogs disclosed this settlement to the court or to the State. After a jury trial, Barton was awarded $3.6 million, and the trial court entered judgment against the State and the Linvogs. In the process of paying the judgment, the State discovered the agreement. The State then moved to vacate the judgment on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court denied the motion but sanctioned Barton's attorney for failing to disclose the terms of the agreement. Barton's attorney appealed the sanction. Finding no abuse of discretion in its sanction against Barton's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barton v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law