Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Bothell charged Respondent James Barnhart with stalking within the portion of the City that falls within Snohomish County. The jury, which was composed of two King County and four Snohomish County jurors, ultimately convicted Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's conviction because it found the impaneling of King County jurors, though valid under state law, violated Article 1 Section 22 of the state constitution. The City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding "the composition of [Respondent's] jury violated his right to an 'impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed.'" The case was remanded for a new trial. View "City of Bothell v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Petitioners Kittitas County and several other parties challenged two final decisions and orders of the Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (Board). The Board found several provisions of the County's revised comprehensive plan (Plan) and development code noncompliant with the Growth Management Act (GMA). Petitioners argued that the Board misinterpreted the law and acted beyond its jurisdiction, without substantial evidence, and arbitrarily and capriciously in making findings related to rural and agricultural densities and uses, zoning techniques, land use near airports and water resources. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the Board did not improperly disregard evidence and appropriately found that the County violated the GMA by failing to: develop the required written record explaining its rural element; include provisions in its Plan that protect rural areas; provide for a variety of rural densities; protect agricultural land; and protect water resources. However, the Court found that the Board improperly found the County's airport overlay zone was noncompliant with the GMA. The Court remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings with respect to the airport overlay zone. View "Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners Albert Ugas and Daniel Fishburn filed a recall petition against Respondent Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist, charging him with misfeasance and/or malfeasance and breach of his oath of office. Petitioners alleged that Mr. Lindquist failed to investigate alleged corruption and falsification of records by a former county assessor-treasurer. Additionally, Petitioners contended that Mr. Lindquist obstructed justice by deterring law enforcement from investigating the assessor-treasurer. The lower court dismissed Petitioners' affidavit of prejudice and held that the recall petition was legally and factually insufficient. The court awarded Mr. Lindquist $50,000 in attorney fees for Petitioners' intentionally filing a frivolous recall petition in bad faith. Petitioners argued on appeal that their recall petition was legally and factually sufficient and that they should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees. Upon review of the petition and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re Recall of Lindquist" on Justia Law

Central to this case is the proper interpretation of a 2006 statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to a claim for medical malpractice. Appellant Lisa Unruh filed suit against her orthodontist, Dr. Dino Cacchiotti, alleging that his negligent treatment when she was a minor resulted in her losing her teeth and having to undergo extensive implant surgery. The Doctor successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations had expired. At the Court of Appeals, the Doctor raised an alternative ground for dismissing Appellant's case based on an eight-year statute of repose. After requesting supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case for the Supreme Court's review. After review of the applicable legal authority, the Court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose barred Appellant's claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Unruh v. Cacchiotti" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the removal of a person from the courtroom during trial was a "closure" in violation of the right to a public trial and whether such a "closure" could be considered too trivial as to implicate a defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant Dean Lormor was arrested following a domestic disturbance. During his jail intake, a small bag of methamphetamine was found in his pants pocket. Defendant's daughter, who was four days shy of her fourth birthday, was excluded from the courtroom before trial. The daughter, who was terminally ill, was confined to a wheelchair and required a ventilator to breathe. Before trial, the prosecutor brought the matter up, because Defendant had either talked to or near one of the jurors regarding his daughter. The prosecutor requested that Defendant be precluded from discussing his daughter and her condition. Counsel and and Defendant acquiesced, but Defendant had concerns about eventual sentencing because he hoped to accompany his daughter to Disneyland with the Make-a-Wish Foundation. Defendant was eventually convicted on the possession charge and sentenced to 24 months. He was allowed to go to Disneyland with his daughter before serving his sentence. On appeal Defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his daughter from trial. Additionally, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the exclusion as a cautionary measure. The appellate court determined that the exclusion was a "closure" but that the trial court's actions did not implicate Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of one person is not a closure that violates a Defendant's right to a public trial, but instead is an aspect of the court's power to control the proceedings. Under the facts of this case, the Court found that the trial court's removal of the young daughter was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's conviction. View "Washington v. Lormor" on Justia Law

The issue before the court came from the involuntary commitment of D.F.F. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course under state law. D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing that the mandatory closure of the proceedings violated her rights under the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law was unconstitutional and reversed the commitment order. The Supreme Court held upon review that "a fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceedings falls far short of guaranteeing open justice." The Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the applicable state law (MPR 1.3) is unconstitutional and reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order. The case was remanded for new commitment proceedings. View "In re Detention of D.F.F." on Justia Law

A reporter from the News Tribune newspaper sought access to the deposition of a material witness in a criminal trial. The deposition took place in a courtroom with the judge present. Without engaging in an inquiry into the factors pursuant to "Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa," the trial court closed the courtroom on the ground that depositions are not open to the public. The deposition was not introduced at trial and did not become part of the court's decision making process. The News Tribune sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the transcript and videotape of the deposition, arguing that it had the right to attend the deposition under the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the state or federal constitution was violated by the trial court's ruling that the deposition proceeding was not open to the public: "The News Tribune's claim that the location and presence of the judge turned the deposition into a 'hearing' to which the open courts protections apply" was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denied the News Tribune's application for a writ of mandamus. View "Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce" on Justia Law

Washington law provides that the State's decision to revoke a home childcare license should be upheld if it is supported at an evidentiary hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. In a prior holding, the Supreme Court held that due process required the State to support a decision to revoke a nursing assistant's registration under a higher standard of "clear and convincing" evidence. In this case, the principal issue was whether the strictures of due process required the State to support its decision to revoke a home childcare license by the higher standard. Respondent Kathleen Hardee's license was revoked. She requested a hearing, and a review judge reversed the hearing officer's decision, finding that the Department of Early Learning proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The superior court and Court of Appeals affirmed the order. Upon review, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision, and held in this case that due process required not more than a preponderance of the evidence to justify the revocation of a home child care license. View "Hardee v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Cliff Jones challenged the trial court's denial of credit toward his sentence of community custody for the time he spent incarcerated in excess of his amended sentence of incarceration. After affirming the trial court's decision, the appeals court expressly declined to follow a sister division's holding that community custody began at completion of a sentence of confinement; an offender is entitled to credit toward a sentence of community custody for time spent incarcerated. Upon review, the Supreme Court disavowed the lower court's holding regarding credit, and affirmed the appellate division that heard Defendant's case. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Donaghe was convicted of second degree rape. In 1995, when Defendant’s incarceration was set to end, the State filed a petition to have Defendant committed as a “sexually violent predator” (SVP). In 2000 while awaiting his for his SVP commitment trial, Defendant moved to obtain a certificate of discharge for his rape convictions. The State argued against the discharge because Defendant had not fulfilled his community placement sentence, which the State argued tolled while he was confined. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Defendant’s motion. Three years later in 2003, the court found Defendant as an SVP. The Court of Appeals affirmed that determination in 2005. In 2007, Defendant renewed his motion for a certificate of discharge, but the trial court adhered to its 2000 ruling, holding that defendant’s custodial detention tolled the running of the community placement requirement. Defendant moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that because Defendant had been detained as an SVP, his term of community placement could not “begin” until the State released him to the supervision of the community. Therefore, his sentence was not complete, and he was not entitled to a certificate of discharge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the trial court had the authority to deny Defendant’s certificate of discharge because his community placement was indeed tolled by his confinement as an SVP. View "Washington v. Donaghe" on Justia Law