Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Flight Options, LLC challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the Department of Revenue to assess apportioned property taxes against a fleet of airplanes it managed. Specifically, Flight Options argued that its airplanes did not have a tax situs in Washington state, and that the due process clause of the federal constitution prohibited assessment of taxes on them. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court rejected each of Flight Options’ contentions and affirmed the lower court decision dismissing Flight Options’ case. View "Flight Options, LLC v. Dep't Of Revenue" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Kenneth Thorgerson on four counts of child molestation. On appeal, he contended that his convictions should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. Upon careful review of the trial court’s record, the Supreme Court found that some of the conduct Defendant challenged was not misconduct and that which was did not constitute reversible error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "Washington v. Thorgerson" on Justia Law

Appellant William Brousseau was convicted of first degree rape and of child molestation. The court held a pretrial hearing to determine whether the alleged victim was competent to testify and whether her out-of-court statements were admissible under Washington's child hearsay exception. The court heard testimony from Appellant's witness, a psychologist who had interviewed the child, but did not permit Appellant to call the child as a witness. On appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent without examining her at the competency hearing. He also claimed that the court's refusal to allow testimony from the victim at the competency hearing denied him due process of law. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the child victim was competent to testify. Additionally, the Court held that the state child hearsay exception does not require a child to testify at a child-hearsay hearing and that Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Washington v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

Appellants Kim Koenig, Lawrence Koss and Althea Paulson sought review of two separate superior court orders that enjoined disclosure of investigative records compiled by the Cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island. The records contained results of internal police department investigations whereby Appellants complained of gross officer misconduct. Appellants argued the records were wrongfully withheld. The appellate court affirmed withholding the records, interpreting case law that held police investigative records relating to an arrest was exempt from retention and copying under state law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation: "the statute does not exempt information relating to the conduct of the police during the investigation." The Court reversed the trial courts with direction that the trial courts redact the offending officers' identities, but that the description of the police department's investigation should have been produced. View "Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City Of Puyallup" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether RCW 82.02.020, which generally prohibits local governmental bodies from imposing taxes or fees on development, applied to shoreline master programs (SMP) created pursuant to the Shoreline Management Act of 1981. Members of the Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning (CRSP) owned land regulated under Whatcom County's SMP. The group filed a complaint alleging, in part, that the regulations contained in the SMP constituted a direct or indirect tax, fee or charge on development in violation of RCW 8202.020. The superior court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review of the implicated legal authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: "[w]hile local jurisdictions play a role in tailoring SMPs to local conditions, the Shoreline Management Act dictates that the Department of Ecology retains control over the final contents and approval of SMPs. Therefore, SMP regulations are the product of state action and are not subject to RCW 82.02.020." View "Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning v. Whatcom County" on Justia Law

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS. View "Dolan v. King County" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jack and Delaphine Feil appealed the issuance of development permits for the construction of a pedestrian and bike trail by the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. "Rocky Reach Trail" was scheduled for development entirely on public property. The Feils are orchardists and members of the Right to Farm Association of Baker Flats. Their property abuts the public property on which the proposed trail would be sited. They contended a developed trail would force the removal of mature fruit trees within the right-of-way, and that the trail violated multiple zoning ordinances that governed the area at issue. The Feils brought several unsuccessful appeals through the Commission and state development-management boards before taking their appeal to the superior court. The superior court dismissed their claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the site's comprehensive plan supported the proposed Rocky Reach Trail and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the orchardists' claims. View "Feil v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner David Oppelt, Jr. was accused by his stepdaughter of sexually abuse. Police investigated, but Petitioner was not charged until six years after the alleged incident. Petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated by the pre-accusatorial delay and that the charges against him should have been dismissed. The trial court disagreed, and Petitioner was convicted of child molestation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial court misapplied the "pre-accusatorial delay test" for determining whether due process was violated by the delay. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court engaged the proper test and found no violation of due process. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Oppelt" on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute that arose after the sale of a plot of residential land pursuant to a statutory warranty deed. Specifically, the issue on appeal centered on whether a grantor's duty to defend against another's claim to title was satisfied by that grantor's independent decision to settle the claim and pay the grantee damages for the breach of warranty. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the duty to defend requires that a grantor defend in good faith. The grantor in this case, Csaba Kiss, was ordered by a trial court to pay damages to grantees Ivan and Varvara Popchoi when the court granted summary judgment against them and awarded a portion of their land to their neighbors J.E. and Naomi Edmonson through adverse possession. Mr. Kiss did not dispute that he owed damages, but appealed whether he owed attorney fees to the Popchois to defend against the Edmonsons' claim. The Supreme Court held Mr. Kiss was liable to the Popchois for the breach of the warranty to defend and ordered to pay their attorney fees. View "Edmonson v. Popchoi" on Justia Law

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision. View "Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care" on Justia Law