Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Gilberto Ibarra-Cisneros and his brother Adrian Ibarra-Raya, were separately prosecuted on drug charges in November 2006. Both moved unsuccessfully to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the warrantless search of Ibarra-Raya's home. Specifically, Ibarra-Cisneros argued to suppress the evidence against him as the fruit of an unlawful use of Ibarra-Raya's cell phone, which was seized during the search. The appellate court determined that the search of the home was unlawful, but that the connection between Ibarra-Raya's cell phone and "the bindle found at Mr. Ibarra-Cisneros's feet [was] too attenuated to affect his cocaine possession conviction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in relying on the "attenuation doctrine" as the basis to allow the cocaine evidence against Ibarra-Cisneros: "In light of the way this case has developed, the only fair resolution of Ibarra-Cisneros's appeal is to treat is as the Court of Appeals treated Ibarra-Raya's appeal. The State has not met its burden of purging the taint resulting from the unlawful home search." The Court remanded the case to the trial court "with the acknowledgement that, because the warrantless home search was unlawful, all evidence seized as a result must be suppressed." View "Washington v. Ibarra-Cisneros" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Ernest Carter's sentence. The Court of Appeals applied the "actual innocence doctrine" to hear Respondent's untimely personal restraint petition (PRP) and held that Respondent was erroneously sentenced as a persistent offender under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. In 1998, the superior court entered a judgment and sentence convicting Respondent on two counts of robbery in the first degree and sentenced him as a persistent offender to life in prison. Respondent's prior offenses included a 1983 California conviction for assault with a firearm on a police officer and a 1990 Oregon conviction for attempted murder. Respondent timely filed a direct appeal raising nine issues including a claim that his prior California assault conviction was not comparable to a Washington strike offense under the POAA and should not have been counted toward his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Almost seven years after the mandate, Respondent filed this PRP, arguing that his due process rights were violated during his 1998 trial when he appeared in shackles and that his sentence was unlawful. Respondent argued on appeal that: (1) there had been a significant change in the law (RCW 10.73.100(6)), (2) the sentence imposed was in excess of the court’s jurisdiction (RCW 10.73.100(5)), (3) Respondent's judgment and sentence were facially invalid (RCW 10.73.090), (4) equitable tolling under Washington common law warranted review, and (5) the federal actual innocence doctrine warranted review. The Court of Appeals dismissed Carter’s shackling claim as untimely, applied the actual innocence doctrine to the comparability issue, declined to address his alternative claims for relief, vacated Respondent's persistent offender sentence, and remanded for resentencing on the comparability issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the actual innocence doctrine to hear Respondent's untimely PRP prior to considering his other claimed exceptions to the time bar in RCW 10.73.090. View "In re Personal Restraint of Carter" on Justia Law

Linda Mohr suffered a trauma-induced stroke and became permanently disabled. She and her husband, Charles, claimed that negligent treatment by her health care providers caused Mrs. Mohr a loss of the chance of a better outcome. In "Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound," the Supreme Court recognized the "lost chance doctrine" in a survival action when the plaintiff died following the alleged failure of his doctor to timely diagnose his lung cancer. The Mohr's case "compel[led]" consideration of whether, in the medical malpractice context, there was a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate result is some serious harm short of death. The Supreme Court held that there was such a cause of action and, accordingly, reversed the order of summary judgment. View "Mohr v. Grantham" on Justia Law

Defendant John Franklin challenged the Court of Appeals decision affirming his convictions and sentences on assault and drug possession charges. The Supreme Court granted review only on the question of whether Defendant was entitled to resentencing for counts I and III as a result of then-new legislation requiring sentencing courts to reduce the term of community custody when the total terms of confinement and community custody exceeded the statutory maximum. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that while the legislation applied retroactively, the legislature charged the Department of Corrections, not the sentencing court, with adjusting the length of community custody for those serving terms of confinement or community custody by modifying the end date for community custody. Thus, the Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to resentencing by the trial court and it affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Defendant Alberto Perez-Valdez challenged two evidentiary decisions made by a judge of the Walla Walla County Superior Court during a trial that resulted in his conviction for one count of second degree rape of a child and one count of third degree rape of a child. He also challenged the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial based on a statement made by a state witness relating to the credibility of the victims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions. Therefore, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Perez-Valdez" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McKague appealed his conviction for second degree assault, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Defendant shoplifted a can of smoked oysters from a convenience store. The owner followed Defendant out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. Defendant punched the owner in the head several times and pushed him to the ground, causing the owner's head to strike the pavement. He was diagnosed with a concussion without loss of consciousness, a scalp contusion and lacerations, and head and neck pain. Defendant was charged with first degree robbery, with third degree theft as an inferior offense, and second degree assault predicated on the infliction of substantial bodily injury. At Defendant's request, the court also instructed the jury on third degree assault as an inferior offense of second degree assault. The jury convicted Defendant of third degree theft and second degree assault. The dissent on the appellate panel took issue with the of the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm.” Specifically, the dissent disagreed with the lead opinion’s citation to a dictionary definition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction, but in doing so the Court disapproved of the definition of “substantial bodily harm” applied by the Court of Appeals majority: "[w]e agree … that the majority applied an erroneous definition of 'substantial,' but we nonetheless affirm McKague’s conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show that [the owner's] injuries were 'substantial' under a proper definition." View "Washington v. McKague" on Justia Law

Defendant Chucco Robinson erroneously believed that his earlier juvenile convictions had washed out and no longer counted toward his offender score. Based upon this understanding and after extensive negotiations largely focused on an offender score that would lead to a mutually acceptable sentence, he pled guilty. Before sentencing, he learned that his juvenile convictions would count toward his offender score, significantly increasing the statutory sentencing range he faced. Defendant immediately moved to withdraw his plea. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that Defendant's misunderstanding of the consequences of Washington sentencing law was reasonable, though erroneous, and that the plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The State contended on appeal that the trial judge abused her discretion when she allowed Defendant to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court found the ruling was within the sound discretion of the trial court. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The issue central to this case involved a Public Records Act (PRA) request and a definition of the scope of discovery allowed in PRA-provoked lawsuits, what constitutes an adequate search for requested records, and whether a party may be prevailing when it possesses some responsive documents at the time suit is filed. On February 16, 2005, a copy machine at Spokane County's Building and Planning Department (BPD) printed copies of an undated office seating chart. This chart showed cubicle arrangements of employees at the BPD, but it also included two names within a cubicle of those who had not yet been hired, designated “Ron & Steve.” This caused quite a stir among the BPD employees, many of whom already suspected the BPD of illegal hiring practices. On February 19, 2005, the chart and an accompanying letter were anonymously transmitted to the Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County (the Alliance). The Alliance took interest in this matter when Steve Harris, son of the BPD Commissioner, and Ron Hand, a former employee, were hired in March. Essentially, the Alliance wanted to know when the “Ron & Steve” seating chart was created. It sought to prove, using the BPD’s own records, that the undated chart was created prior to job postings for the positions later filled by Ron and Steve. The Alliance petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding discovery was contrary to case law and that the Court rejected the Freedom of Information Act's (FOIA) “prevailing party” doctrine. The County cross-petitioned. It argued the appellate court’s decision created a new cause of action under the PRA because it significantly heightened the requirements of an adequate search, and such penalties will continue to accrue until the date of final judgment, including all appeals, thereby punishing an agency for exercising its right to appeal. The Supreme Court held that discovery in a PRA case is the same as in any other civil action and is therefore governed only by relevancy considerations, The Court adopted FOIA standards of reasonableness regarding an adequate search. The Court partly and partly affirmed the appellate court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of Spokane" on Justia Law

A public school teacher or other certificated employee discharged by a school district may obtain review by a hearing officer and appeal an adverse decision of the hearing officer to superior court. But the legislature did not give school districts the right to appeal an adverse hearing officer decision. When a hearing officer decided in favor of Petitioner David Vinson and against Respondent Federal Way School District, the school district sought review of the decision by statutory writ of certiorari. The superior court denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding sufficient cause to terminate Vinson. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statutory writ was not available to the school district. In contrast, the constitutional writ was always available to a party seeking relief from arbitrary, capricious, or illegal acts. However, the Court found that the hearing officer acted within the limits of his statutory authority, and his final decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the attorney fees awarded by the superior court. View "Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Demar Rhome argued on direct appeal to the Supreme Court that the state and federal constitutions require independent findings of fact that a defendant is competent to waive counsel and represent himself at trial. In November of 2003, 17-year-old Lashonda Flynn was stabbed to death. Seventeen-year-old Kialani Brown confessed to the killing but pointed to Defendant as the mastermind behind the slaying. Defendant was charged in King County Superior Court with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Defendant's mental competency became an issue at trial. After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the superior court found that the defense had not met the burden of proving Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Shortly after the competency hearing, Defendant received new counsel. Defendant represented himself throughout his 2006 proceedings with counsel on stand-by. In reviewing his performance during pretrial and trial proceedings, a defense expert opined that Defendant's mental illness impacted his ability to defend himself in court. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced to 371 months in prison. Represented by appointed federal public defenders, Defendant filed this original personal restraint petition to challenge the trial court’s decision to allow him to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant did not demonstrate that federal or state law requires an independent determination of mental competency to proceed pro se when a mentally ill defendant seeks to waive counsel: "[e]ven if such a rule could be crafted from [federal case law] in conjunction with this court’s precedent, Rhome cannot benefit from that rule on a personal restraint petition." The Court also concluded that Defendant failed to show the trial court abused its discretion when it found his waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent. The Court dismissed Defendant's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome" on Justia Law