Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The primary issue presented by this case was whether the State had jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes who sold unstamped cigarettes without a license at a store that located on trust allotment land outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation. In 2007 and 2008, agents of the Washington State Liquor Control Board purchased cigarettes from the "Indian Country Store" in Puyallup. The cigarette cartons and packs that were purchased did not contain Washington or tribal tax stamps. Consequently, in July 2008 agents went to the store again with a warrant and seized 37,000 cartons of unstamped cigarettes. The owner of the Indian Country Store at the time was Defendant Edward Comenout, an enrolled member of the Quinault Indian Nation. His brother, Robert Comenout Sr., and his nephew, Robert Comenout Jr., were engaged in running the store on a daily basis. Robert Sr. is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes and Robert Jr. is an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. The Indian Country Store, despite its name, was not on an Indian reservation, but on two trust allotments outside the boundary of any reservation. The State charged all three Comenouts in Pierce County Superior Court with (1) engaging in the business of purchasing, selling, consigning, or distributing cigarettes without a license; (2) unlawful possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes; and (3) first degree theft. Edward, who was the alleged principal, moved to dismiss on grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction, joined by Robert Sr. and Robert Jr. The superior court denied the motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Comenouts were not exempt from Washington’s cigarette tax. Because RCW 82.24.110 and .500 criminalize the possession of unstamped cigarettes and the unlicensed sale of cigarettes, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the charges. View "Washington v. Comenout" on Justia Law

"R.P.H." appealed a superior court's denial of his petition to restore his right to possess firearms. In 2000, 13-year-old R.P.H. pled guilty to one count of first degree child rape for sexually assaulting his 11- and 6-year-old sisters. At sentencing, the King County Juvenile Court accepted the State’s recommendation to impose a special sexual offender disposition alternative that included a suspended term of commitment, 12 months of community supervision, sexual deviancy counseling, and various other conditions, including a requirement that R.P.H. "[n]ot possess or use a weapon of any kind." At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court suggested that R.P.H.’s right to possess a firearm could be restored if he successfully completed treatment. Thereafter, R.P.H. successfully completed treatment and fulfilled the other conditions of his alternative disposition. In 2007, R.P.H. petitioned the King County Superior Court to relieve him of the obligation to register as a sex offender and to reinstate his right to possess firearms. The superior court granted R.P.H.'s request to terminate the registration requirement, but denied his motion to restore his right to possess firearms, noting a concern over R.P.H.'s traffic infractions. In ints review, the Supreme Court found it necessary to address only R.P.H.'s assertion that because the requirement he register as a sex offender was terminated by the superior court, his right to possess firearms should be restored. The Court considered the superior court's order discharging R.P.H. from registration as a sex offender to be the equivalent of a certificate of rehabilitation, and therefore, R.P.H. should not be barred from exercising his right to possess firearms. The Court reversed the superior court's decision with respect to R.P.H.'s right to possess firearms. View "Washington v. R.P.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Pannell pled guilty to incest and child molestation. His lengthy sentence was suspended pending satisfactory progress in sexual offender treatment, among other things. Petitioner failed to make satisfactory progress and his suspended sentence was revoked. He contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to credit for the time his sentence was suspended, at least to the extent that his time incarcerated, his time in postconfinement community custody, and his time on the suspended sentence added together exceed the statutory maximum for "class B" felonies. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in the community under a special sex offender sentence alternative (SSOSA) before his suspended sentence was revoked. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Washington v. Pannell" on Justia Law

James R. Hardman and his mother Alice Hardman, certified professional guardians, are the court-appointed guardians of more than twenty Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) clients residing at the Fircrest School, a residential habilitation center (RHC) in the city of Shoreline. The Hardmans also engage in extensive advocacy activities, lobbying officials at the local, state, and federal levels to keep Fircrest and other RHCs open and to oppose efforts to place Fircrest residents in community-based programs that the Hardmans believe provide inadequate care. In their triennial guardian reports, the Hardmans requested compensation for their advocacy activities. DSHS opposed the fee requests, arguing that the advocacy work was outside the scope of the guardians' duties. The Court of Appeals denied the Hardmans' request for advocacy fees, finding that the advocacy work did not provide a direct benefit to the indidivual wards. Upon review of the trial court record and the parties' appellate briefs, the Supreme Court found that the Hardmans were not entitled to the compensation because the advocacy activities were neither individualized to serve a particular ward's best interests nor necessary to perform their guardianship duties. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Guardianship of Lamb" on Justia Law

In 1995, Petitioner Jeffrey Coats pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery. He received a standard range sentence of 20 years. His judgment and sentence erroneously stated that the maximum sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery was life in prison. Fourteen years later, he filed a personal restraint petition contending that because of the erroneous statement, his judgment was not valid on its face and therefore he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that despite the error, Peititoner's judgment was valid on its face, and that the sentencing court did not exceed its authority in sentencing Petitioner. The Court remanded the case back to the sentencing court only to correct the erroneous statement pertaining to the sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Coats" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner Robert Danforth went to the King County Sheriff’s Office, described his history of sex offenses, and made explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys and have intercourse with a child. He repeatedly said that he would act on his plan if he was not committed as a sex offender. The King County prosecuting attorney filed a petition to civilly commit Petitioner, but he moved for summary judgment, arguing that his actions did not constitute a "recent overt act" to qualify him for commitment. The trial court denied his motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found that Petitioner committed a threat when he gave explicit descriptions of his plans to molest boys, and thus satisfied due process requirements that the State show an offender was presently dangerous before he or she was involuntarily committed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts' decisions. View "In re Det. of Danforth" on Justia Law

Former Pierce County Superior Court Judge Petitioner Michael Hecht was convicted of felony harassment and of patronizing a prostitute. The trial court denied his motion for an order of indigency, and the Court of Appeals denied his motion for discretionary review of that order. Petitioner sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court. The superior court denied indigency status on remand from the appellate court, finding that though he was unemployed (from resigning his post shortly after conviction) and had significant debts, the court reasoned Petitioner had "adequate means" to pay for his legal expenses. On discretionary review by the Supreme Court, Petitioner proffered evidence that he had begun receiving food stamps. The Court found that by statute an indigent person includes anyone who "at any stage of a court proceeding" receives certain types of public assistance, including "food stamps or food stamp benefits transferred electronically." Petitioner was therefore presumptively indigent. The Court granted Petitioner's motion for discretionary review and remanded the case back to the superior court for reconsideration of his motion for order of indigency. View "Washington v. Hecht" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Beadle appealed his convictions for first degree child molestation. At a pretrial child hearsay hearing, the four-year-old alleged victim had a serious emotional breakdown and refused to testify. The court found the child unavailable to testify at trial and admitted her out-of-court statements to family members, mental health providers, child protective services, and law enforcement. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by finding the victim's statements admissible. Upon review, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Washington v. Beadle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Helen Immelt sounded a car horn at length in front of a neighbor’s house in the early morning hours. She was arrested for violating a Snohomish County noise ordinance that included amongst its prohibited noise disturbances horn honking for a purpose other than public safety, or originating from an officially sanctioned parade or other public event. She challenged the horn ordinance as overbroad and in violation of free speech protections. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance was overbroad, and reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Immelt" on Justia Law

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bank of America, NA v. Owens" on Justia Law