Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a dispute between Petitioners Donia Townsend and several other home purchasers and Defendant Quadrant Corporation and its parent companies over an arbitration clause in the home purchasers' individual purchase contracts. Several years after the home purchases, Townsend and the other purchasers jointly filed suit in superior court against Quadrant alleging outrage, fraud, unfair business practices, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, rescission and breach of warranty. In support of these allegations, they claimed that Quadrant knowingly engaged in shoddy workmanship in building the homes, and that this resulted in serious construction defects that caused personal injuries relating to mold, pests, and poisonous gases. They claimed that the arbitration clause in their purchase agreements was unenforceable. The superior court denied Quadrant's motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the homeowners’ procedural unconscionability claim that pertained to the entire purchase contract, including the arbitration clause, was to be decided by an arbitrator. View "Townsend v. Quadrant Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the overall adequacy of state funding for K-12 education under the Washington State Constitution. "The legislature must develop a basic education program geared toward delivering the constitutionally required education, and it must fully fund that program through regular and dependable tax sources." The Court found that the State failed to meet its duty under the constitution by consistently providing school districts with a level of resources that fell short of the actual costs of the basic education program. The legislature enacted reforms to remedy the deficiencies in the funding system, and the Court deferred to the legislature's chosen means of discharging its duty. However, the Court retained jurisdiction over the case to help ensure progress in the State's plan to fully implement education reforms by 2018. The Court directed the parties to provide further briefing to the Court addressing the preferred method for retaining jurisdiction. View "McCleary v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioners Roger Scherner and Michael Gresham were separately charged with child molestation. At trial, relying on the recently enacted RCW 10.58.090, the State successfully introduced evidence that Scherner and Gresham had previously committed sex offenses against other children. In Scherner's case, the superior court ruled that evidence of his prior acts of molestation was also admissible for the purpose of demonstrating a common scheme or plan. In Gresham's case, a different superior court held that evidence of Gresham's prior conviction for second degree assault with sexual motivation was only admissible pursuant to RCW 10.58.090. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court in Scherner's case did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan and that its failure to give a limiting instruction, once requested, was harmless error. The Court therefore affirmed Scherner's conviction. Because RCW 10.58.090 irreconcilably conflicted with ER 404(b) and governed a procedural matter, the Court held that its enactment violated the separation of powers doctrine and was accordingly unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that the admission of evidence of Gresham's prior conviction was not harmless error and reversed his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Gresham" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Breitung was convicted of assaulting Ossie Cook and Richard Stevenson and of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Cook and Stevenson, both auto mechanics, took a client's truck for a test drive. During the drive they stopped for cigarettes. While at the smoke shop, Cook noticed a woman enter a black sports car and leave. When they left, Cook and Stevenson followed the same route as this woman and continued down a nearby gravel road. As they were leaving, Respondent appeared and walked into the middle of the gravel road ahead of the truck. According to Cook and Stevenson, as they approached Respondent, he pulled a handgun from behind his back, walked to the driver's side window, and pointed it at both men, telling them to stop following his girl friend. At trial, the State proposed jury instructions for second degree assault and second degree unlawful possession. Defense counsel proposed no additional instructions, and Respondent was convicted on all three counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's assault convictions, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request lesser included offense instructions on fourth degree assault. The court also reversed Respondent's conviction for unlawful possession, holding that where as part of a prior conviction the court fails to give notice required by statute, a subsequent conviction for unlawful possession is invalid. Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in "Washington v. Grier," (246 P.3d 1260 (2011)), the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the ineffectiveness claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the appellate court in its decision on the failure to give the statutorily required notice of firearm prohibition as part of a prior conviction, finding Washington law "required" reversal of Respondant's possession conviction. View "Washington v. Breitung" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the authority of the Department of Corrections (Department) to deduct funds from an inmate’s trust account. Defendant Chad Alan Pierce filed a personal restraint petition challenging the Department's collection of costs of incarceration and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from his account. He asserted that his judgment and sentence prohibits the Department from making such deductions. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Department has statutory authority to deduct costs of incarceration independent of the judgment and sentence. In addition, the Department could deduct LFOs while Defendant was confined, and need not issue a notice of payroll deduction before initiating its collection efforts. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pierce" on Justia Law

Respondent and Cross-Appellant Easterday Ranches, Inc. sought to operate a large feedlot in Franklin County. At the suggestion of the Department of Ecology (Department), Easterday acquired water rights from a neighboring farm. Appellants Scott Collin, Five Corners Family Farmers, the Center for Environmental Law and Policy (CELP), and the Sierra Club filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Washington, the Department, and Easterday seeking a declaration that the stockwatering exemption from the permit requirement in RCW 90.44.050 is limited to uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day. Appellants further sought an injunction ordering Easterday to cease groundwater use without a permit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the plain language of the statute, withdrawals of groundwater for stock-watering purposes are not limited to any particular quantity by RCW 90.44.050. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the respondents. View "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Almgren and Carol Schneider divorced in Nebraska and Schneider moved to Washington with the couple's two children. The decree of dissolution set child support to continue during each child's minority. In Nebraska, the age of majority is 19 years. The Nebraska court modified the decree, approving the mother's move and adjusting certain obligations. Neither modification changed the duration of the father's child support obligation. The mother registered and moved to modify the Nebraska decree in Asotin County under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Asotin County Superior Court entered an order of child support stating that the obligation would terminate when the children reach 18 or graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, and reserving the right to request postsecondary support. The order was entered without objection by the father regarding the application of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the Nebraska child support order. The mother later petitioned for postsecondary educational support for their daughter. The father filed a cross-motion to modify child support due to his recent job loss. The trial court granted the mother's motion for postsecondary educational support and denied the father's motion for a downward modification. The father moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of the trial court’s authority under the UIFSA to enter orders extending child support for his daughter beyond the age of majority in Nebraska, which was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by extending the father's child support obligation by granting postsecondary support for the daughter to attend college. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schneider v. Almgren" on Justia Law

In November 1998, Respondent David Moeller’s 1996 Honda Civic CRX was damaged in a collision. Respondent had an insurance policy through Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers). Farmers chose to repair Respondent's damaged car, and he authorized the repairs. In May 1999, Respondent brought suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Farmers policy holders in Washington State asserting a breach of contract claim on the grounds that Farmers failed to restore his vehicle to its "preloss condition through payment of the difference in the value between the vehicle's pre-loss value and its value after it was damaged, properly repaired and returned." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the contract between Farmers and Respondent provided for the diminished value of the post-accident, repaired car. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the policy language at issue here allowed for recovery for the diminution in value. View "Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

In 2007, five developers filed applications with the city of Yelm (City) for preliminary plat approval of proposed subdivisions. The only developer still party to this action, TTPH 3-8, LLC (Tahoma Terra), sought approval to develop 32 acres into residential lots. After a hearing examiner granted Tahoma Terra preliminary plat approval, Petitioner JZ Knight, a nearby property owner and senior water rights holder, appealed to the Yelm City Council (City Council), arguing the hearing examiner's conditional approval of the plats erroneously allowed the developers and the City to delay showing adequate water provisions for the subdivision until the building permit stage. The City Council affirmed the preliminary approvals, and Petitioner filed suit in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Petitioner had standing to bring the LUPA action. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioner established that the land use decision was likely to prejudice her water rights and satisfied the statutory standing requirement. View "Knight v. City of Yelm" on Justia Law

Petitioners Louise Lauer and Darrell de Tienne separately owned properties that border a lot owned by Mike and Shima Garrison. Through a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition, Petitioners challenged a fish and wildlife variance granted to the Garrisons by Pierce County (the County) to build a single family residence within the protective buffer zone of a stream that runs across the Garrisons' property. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Garrisons' rights vested in 2004 when they submitted their building application. The Garrisons also raised questions about the standing and timeliness of Petitioners' claim, as well as whether the relevant critical area regulation even applies to the Garrisons' shoreline property. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioners properly petitioned the superior court for review and that, because the Garrisons' building permit application contained misrepresentations of material fact, the Garrisons' rights did not vest in 2004. View "Laurer v. Pierce County" on Justia Law