Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Petitioner Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Respondent sought to collect Petitioner's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money could not be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned." Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . .retirement allowance." The survey of case law and the plain language in the LEOFF exemption statutes indicate that the latter statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not after receipt. View "Anthis v. Copland" on Justia Law

Respondent Lester Ray Jim, an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation, was cited by for unlawfully retaining undersized sturgeon. This occurred at the Maryhill Treaty Fishing Access Site (Maryhill), a plot of land set aside by Congress exclusively for the use of four Columbia River tribes to exercise their treaty fishing rights. The State argued it has rightfully assumed criminal jurisdiction at Maryhill. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that Maryhill was reserved and held by the United States for the exclusive use of tribal members and that the State therefore lacked criminal jurisdiction to cite Respondent. View "Washington v. Jim" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company" and "Weismann v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" for the purpose of clarifying the pro rata sharing rule announced in several precedential cases, including "Mahler v. Szucs" (957 P.2d 632). The rule is based on the "common fund" exception to the "American rule" on attorney fees. The rule requires personal injury protection (PIP) insurers to share pro rata in the attorney fees incurred by injured persons when the PIP insurer wins at trial. Plaintiffs in these cases recovered PIP funds as insureds under policies held by the tortfeasors. They incurred attorney fees arising from the recovery of the liability insurance. The insurance companies attempted to offset the funds expended under PIP policies by reducing plaintiffs' award under the tortfeasors' liability insurance. The Court of Appeals held that neither plaintiff was entitled to recoup a pro rata share of attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the pro rata fee sharing rule applied in this context. View "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner James Eastmond was convicted of first degree robbery and first degree burglary. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an enhancement on Petitioner's sentence, based on the jury's determination that he was armed with a deadly weapon. While Petitioner's case was pending, the Supreme Court had decided "Washington v. Recuenco (110P.3d 188 (2005)) in which the Court recognized that sentences like Petitioner's violated the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. Petitioner then brought a personal restraint petition to challenge the firearm enhancement. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether in these circumstances prejudice could be conclusively presumed on collateral review, or whether Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the rule announced in "Washington v. Williams-Walker (225 P.3d 913 (2010) did not apply retroactively, and as such, Petitioner needed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Because he had not done so, the Court dismissed his petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Eastmond" on Justia Law

The city of Tacoma has franchise agreements with Pierce County and the cities of Fircrest, University Place, and Federal Way (Municipalities) to provide them with water services. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether those franchise agreements required Tacoma to both maintain fire hydrants and bear the maintenance costs of those hydrants. Tacoma raised questions about the impact of the agreements' indemnification clauses had on this dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the franchise agreements contractually required Tacoma to provide hydrants to the Municipalities, and that the indemnification provisions did not preclude this case. View "City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Hurst was charged with a felony, but he was found incompetent to stand trial. He was twice committed to a mental health treatment facility. After two 90-day periods in the facility, Petitioner failed to regain competency. The State sought a third and final mental health treatment period, lasting this time for up to 180 days. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the standard of proof required to commit an incompetent criminal defendant charged with a felony to a third mental health treatment period. Petitioner alleged that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution requires that the standard of proof be "clear, cogent and convincing evidence." The Supreme Court disagreed: "the legislature's selected preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied the Due Process Clause." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hurst" on Justia Law

A person under arrest for vehicular assault is subject to a mandatory blood test. Prior to the test administered in this case, the arresting trooper asked an interpreter to read the special evidence warning in Spanish to Petitioner Jose Morales. The trooper did not speak Spanish, and could not verify that the warning was actually read to Petitioner. The interpreter was not called to testify at trial nor was any signed special evidence form introduced into evidence. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner was not adequately informed of his right to an independent blood test. View "Washington v. Morales" on Justia Law

ZDI Gaming, Inc. distributes certain gaming machines that allow players to play what amounts to "slot machines" using "cash cards" to place their bets. The version of the machine that gave rise to this case allows the machine to credit-back a player's winnings onto the card. The State Gambling Commission ultimately denied further distribution of the machines, finding that the machines "extended credit and allowed gambling without prepayment by 'cash, check or electronic point-of-sale bank transfer'" violating then-operative regulations. ZDI appealed the Gambling Commission's ruling to the Pierce County superior court; the State responded that it believed RCW 9.46.095 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the Thurston County superior court, and suggested that ZDI withdraw its petition from Pierce and refile at Thurston County. ZDI declined and the State moved to dismiss. Noting that sometimes "when the Legislature uses the word 'jurisdiction,' it really mean[s] 'venue,'" [the Pierce County court] denied the State’s motion to dismiss, but transferred the case to the Thurston County superior court. The Thurston County court reversed the Gambling Commission, finding that the cash cards were the equivalent to both cash and merchandise and therefore lawful under state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Pierce County had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and that substantial evidence did not support the Gambling Commission's determination that the cards did not meet the statutory definition of "cash." The court then remanded the case to Thurston County. The Supreme Court surmised that "this case was filed in a county other than where it was to be adjudicated," and asked whether "as a consequence, the case [would] not be heard." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the proper forum was a question of venue and not subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts," but otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deduction in RCW 82.04.433(1) applies to reduce Business and Occupation (B&O) taxes for manufacturing activities. Plaintiff Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company owns and operates a refinery in Washington state from which it processes crude oil from Alaska, Canada and other sources. The legislature created a tax deduction for the amount of tax "derived from the sales of fuel for consumption outside the territorial waters of the United States." On its monthly tax returns from 1999-2007, Tesoro reported its fuel sales on both the "Manufacturing" B&O tax line and the "Wholesaling and Retailing" B&O tax line. After completing an audit of the refinery, Tesoro requested a partial tax refund claiming the deduction against amounts paid in B&O tax on manufacturing from 1999 through 2004. The request was denied by the Department of Revenue's (DOR) appeals division on the ground that the deduction applied only to taxes paid under the "wholesaler and retailer" B&O tax line. Tesoro appealed to the superior court; the Court of Appeals held that the company could deduct the amount of its "offshore" bunker fuel sales from its B&O taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the DOR: "the plain language of RCW 82.04.433(1) … indicates that the B&O deduction applies only to ... taxes on wholesale and retail sales, not on manufacturing." View "Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a fact-finding hearing of "rapid recidivism" was a "sentencing" hearing exempt from the state rules of evidence. After a bench trial, the superior court found Petitioner James Griffin guilty of residential burglary. At sentencing, the judge imposed an exception sentence above the standard range, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance. In making its determination that the aggravating circumstance existed, the court relied on inadmissible hearsay from the trial. Petitioner appealed his exceptional sentence. Though the appellate court agreed with Petitioner that the trial court relied on inadmissible hearsay, it affirmed the exceptional sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the exceptional sentence and remanded the case for resentencing: "[o]n remand the trial court may receive evidence to justify imposition of the exceptional sentence, and the rules of evidence apply to [Petitioner's] resentencing." View "Washington v. Griffin" on Justia Law