Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After trial, a judge found that the State had established all statutory and constitutional factors necessary for the termination of Appellant Nyakat Luak's parental rights to her twin sons. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding two of the statutory factors: (1) that the State expressly and understandably offered or provided to her all the necessary services to correct her parental deficiencies; and, (2) that there was little likelihood those deficiencies could be remedied in the foreseeable future. Additionally, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in not appointing counsel to represent her twin sons. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the judge's findings. The Court agreed that children whose parents are subject to dependency and termination proceedings have vital liberty interests at stake and may constitutionally be entitled to counsel to protect those interests. "But whether any individual child is entitled to counsel must be decided case by case." The Court held that the deprivation, if any, of a child's right to counsel in such circumstances may be protected by appellate review. Appellant raised her due process claim for the first time on appeal, denying the trial judge of the opportunity to timely consider the issue. Accordingly, Appellant failed to meet her burden of showing reversible error, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Dependency of M.S.R." on Justia Law

Respondents William and Sally Chapin Kiely owned real property in Port Townsend next to property owned by Kenneth and Karen Graves. An alley ran the length of the properties, and as long as anyone could remember, a wire fence ran the length of the two properties. The Graves property adjacent to the disputed alley has remained open space where the Graves have planted fruit trees, berry vines, and garlic. Part of the Kielys' cottage encroached upon the disputed alley. In 2008, the Graves filed a petition with the city to vacate the western half of the alley and merge it into their adjoining lands. The city held a public hearing on the application. In February 2009, the Port Townsend City Council passed an ordinance to vacate the alley and convey the vacated alley to the Graves through a lot line adjustment. The Kielys filed an action alleging ownership of the entire alley through adverse possession on June 10, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment and decree in favor of the Kielys. The Supreme Court granted direct review to decide whether the Kielys could assert adverse possession based on events which preceded vacation of the alley. Upon review, the Court found that Port Townsend held an easement interest in the alley until it was vacated by public hearing. Therefore, RCW 7.28.090 prohibited the Kielys from obtaining title to the alley through adverse possession. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Kiely v. Graves" on Justia Law

In September 2000, Joshua Dean Scott and his partner in crime, Douglas Sean James-Anderson, robbed a jewelry store in south Tacoma. They brought several guns, including an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle. Alerted by a silent alarm, the police were waiting in the store’s parking lot when Scott and James-Anderson emerged. They both ran, and both were caught. Scott was charged with and convicted of multiple counts of first degree robbery, unlawful possession of firearms, possession of stolen property, and possession of stolen firearms. The jury also found by special verdict that Scott was armed with a deadly weapon while committing most of the counts. On direct review, the Court of Appeals reversed the possession of stolen firearms charges, finding insufficient evidence that Scott knew the guns used in the robbery had been stolen, and remanded for resentencing. Scott was ultimately sentenced to 213 months. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may refer to verdict forms to determine whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face and thus not subject to collateral attack under RCW 10.73.090 and whether "Washington v. Recuenco" (180 P.3d 1276 (2008)) applied retroactively to cases that were final when the case was announced. The Court concluded that a court may consult the verdict forms to illuminate whether a judgment and sentence is valid on its face but that "Receunco" is not retroactive. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and dismissed this petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Scott" on Justia Law

Appellant Roosevelt Rafelo Johnson Jr. was convicted by a jury of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor based on his interaction with two undercover police officers. The female undercover officers were posing as 17-year-old girls, though both were in their mid to late 20s. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant can be found guilty of attempted promotion of commercial sexual abuse of a minor when the defendant intends the criminal result of the crime, believes that the intended victim is a minor even if the victim is an adult posing as a minor, and takes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Because the evidence was more than sufficient to show that Appellant intended to commit the crime and took a substantial step toward completion, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Harry Carrier filed an untimely personal restraint petition asserting that his mandatory life sentence under the "two strikes" provision of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) was invalid. He contended the trial court erroneously counted a dismissed conviction from 1981 as one of the strikes. The Commissioner denied review because Petitioner's judgment and sentence did not itself indicate that the 1981 conviction was dismissed. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's motion to modify and accepted review. Upon review, the Court concluded that the dismissal order attached as an exhibit to Petitioner's personal restraint petition could be considered in determining whether the judgment and sentence is valid on its face. In light of the dismissal order, the Court held that Petitioner's life sentence was invalid because a court may not include a dismissed conviction in a defendant's criminal history as a POAA strike offense. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which that court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant Bobby Ray Thompson's motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering a postarrest statement that Defendant made to the police, but which was not admitted in evidence. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court improperly relied on Defendant's unadmitted statement in denying the motion for postconviction DNA testing. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Several issues arose after a special deputy prosecuting attorney failed to attend a pretrial hearing and a superior court judge appointed a local defense attorney to take her place. The State appealed the resulting judgment and sentence and the trial court's refusal to vacate its appointment. The Court of Appeals found the appointment was improper and vacated the defendant's guilty plea. Affirming the Court of Appeals' holdings that the State has a right to appeal and that a superior court may appoint an attorney to replace any special prosecuting attorney, the Supreme Court found that the appointed attorney in this case was not qualified to serve as a prosecuting attorney due to a conflict of interest. In addition, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holdings that the "de facto official" doctrine could not save the attorney's appointment and that remand of the case did not violate the double jeopardy clause. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding that on remand, the case be tried to a different judge, noting that nothing in the record of this case suggested the judge displayed "animosity or bias, but simply demonstrated frustration at [the special deputy prosecuting attorney's] repeated failure to appear." View "Washington v. Tracer" on Justia Law

Four Mason County residents brought suit in Mason County Superior Court challenging the validity of an ordinance, which levied a special assessment on nonforest lands within the Mason Conservation District. The superior court ruled for the residents, concluding that the county ordinance is an unconstitutional tax. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the ordinance was invalid on statutory grounds. View "Cary v. Mason County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Budik was one of two victims of a shooting in Spokane. The other victim, Adama Walton, died as a result of the shooting. Based on Petitioner's statements that he did not know who was responsible for the crime, he was charged with, and convicted of, first degree rendering criminal assistance. Insufficient evidence supported Petitioner's conviction; accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated his conviction. The Court held that in order to prove that a defendant has rendered criminal assistance "by use of . . . deception," the State must show that the defendant made some affirmative act or statement; mere false disavowal of knowledge is insufficient to sustain a conviction for rendering criminal assistance. View "Washington v. Budik" on Justia Law