Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Daniel Snapp was stopped by police when an officer observed air fresheners hanging from Defendant's rear view mirror that blocked the driver's view. Upon further inspection, the officer observed a carabiner that "patched together" the driver's seat belt, which he believed to be insufficient and defective. As the officer pulled Defendant's car over, he testified he saw Defendant dip his right shoulder as if he was placing something under the seat. The officer would ultimately arrest Defendant for driving under the influence, and a search of the car was conducted incident to his arrest. The officer found that Defendant had multiple credit and identification cards with other peoples' identities. The State would charge Defendant with 22 counts of identity theft and for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from that search, arguing the initial stop was unlawful. Acting pro se, Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review, arguing that the search violated the Washington Constitution. Finding that the warrantless searches of Defendant's vehicle violated his right to privacy, the Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Snapp" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a claim for damages relating to a drilling contract Petitioner Elcon Construction and Respondent Eastern Washington University. Elcon alleged tort and contract claims. The contract claims were resolved by arbitration. In dismissing the tort claims, the trial court applied the independent duty rule formerly known as the "economic loss rule," which the Court of Appeals similarly applied in affirming. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court and Court of Appeals misapplied the independent duty doctrine to bar Elcon's tort claims in this case. The Court found Elcon's claims failed factually. Viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Elcon, no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Elcon's fraud in the inducement or tortious interference claims. The Court affirmed on different grounds reached by the trial and appeals courts. View "Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Posey,Jr. committed two counts of second degree rape when he was sixteen years old. A jury convicted him, and the superior court sentenced him as an adult. On direct review, the Supreme Court remanded Petitioner's case with instructions that a juvenile court sentence him. Prior to the Court's mandate, Petitioner turned twenty-one. On remand, Petitioner challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence him. The presiding judge agreed. The superior court resentenced Petitioner as an adult, but imposed a sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the issue of this case was whether legislation relating to juvenile courts could deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the legislature did not have the power to alter that constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction. The Court thus affirmed the sentence imposed on remand by the superior court, and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Petitioner's original sentence. View "Washington v. Posey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "Blakely v. Washington" (542 U.S. 296 (2004)) applied to Petitioner Michael Rowland's resentencing hearing where he received an exceptional sentence on facts found by the trial court. Petitioner was convicted in 1991 of first degree murder and taking a motor vehicle without permission. In 2007, he challenged his sentence on the basis that his offender score was erroneous. The Court of Appeals agreed and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing court found "Blakely" did not apply and reimposed the exceptional sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: under the circumstances of this case, the Court concluded that "Blakely" did not apply when the trial court neither "touched the actual findings supporting the exceptional sentence nor increased the sentence." View "Washington v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The principal issue in three consolidated cases was whether certifications attesting to the existence or nonexistence of public records are "testimonial statements" subject to the demands of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"(557 U.S. 305(2009)), the Washington Supreme Court held the confrontation clause does not forbid the admission of such evidence. "The teaching of 'Melendez-Diaz,' however, is that certifications declaring the existence or nonexistence of public records are in fact testimonial statements, which may not be introduced into evidence absent confrontation." Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior decisions to the extent they were contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Here, defendants' confrontation rights were violated by admission of testimonial certifications. Excepting the hit and run conviction at issue in "Washington v. Jasper," admission of the certifications was not harmless. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in "State v. Jasper," affirmed the superior court in "Washington v. Cienfuegos," and reversed the superior court in "Washington v. Moimoi." View "Washington v. Jasper" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hahn asked someone to make a girl "disappear" or appear as if she "never existed" or "just be gone." Respondent was convicted of solicitation to commit first degree murder. Respondent was charged with four counts of third degree child rape, sexual exploitation of a minor, possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and stalking. While confined in jail awaiting trial, Respondent mentioned to another inmate, Mike Hendrickson, that he wished the complaining witness "S.M." was dead and that he would hurt her. Respondent asked Hendrickson if he knew anyone who could "get to" S.M., but Hendrickson said he could not help. Respondent then asked inmate Norman Livengood if he had any mafia connections, stating that he wanted someone hurt or killed. Livengood related the encounter to the police and agreed to cooperate in the resulting investigation. The police obtained a warrant and wired Livengood to record his conversations with Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of "solicitation" to commit fourth degree assault. Because the evidence did not support such an instruction, the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Hahn" on Justia Law

This issue on appeal in this case involved a maritime claim for maintenance and cure and whether, under federal maritime law, a judge, instead of a jury, awards attorney fees following the jury award of compensatory and punitive damages in favor of an injured seaman against the employer for willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. Respondent Dana Clausen worked on board Appellant Icicle Seafoods' Bering Star as second engineer when he sustained injuries. Respondent encountered persistent difficulties in getting Icicle and its adjuster Spartan, to meet its obligation to pay him maintenance and cure during his recovery. Icicle paid Respondent $20 per day to cover lodging, utilities, and meals. Respondent resorted to living in a recreational vehicle with a leaking roof and with no heat, air conditioning, running water, or toilet facilities. Additionally, Icicle delayed or refused to pay for treatment that Respondent's doctors recommended. In a report to Icicle, Spartan confirmed that Respondent's injuries were likely career-ending. Icicle filed suit in federal court against Respondent to terminate Respondent's right to maintenance and cure. Respondent filed the present action and Icicle's suit in federal court was dismissed. Respondent sought damages for Icicle's negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 30104), unseaworthiness of the Bering Star, and wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure. The jury found Icicle negligent under the Jones Act, and that Icicle was callous or willful and wanton in its failure to pay maintenance and cure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under federal maritime law, the trial court calculates an attorney fee award related to a maintenance and cure action, and the punitive damages award as determined by the jury here, based on the callous or willful and wanton withholding of maintenance and cure, was proper. View "Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to an initiative measure (Proposition 1) which repealed an ordinance governing the use of automated traffic safety cameras in the city of Mukilteo. The trial court declined to grant an injunction, and Proposition 1 was placed on the November 2, 2010 Snohomish County general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the legislature expressly granted authority to the governing body of the city of Mukilteo to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, the subject matter of Proposition 1 was not within the initiative power. The Court reversed the trial court's order that denied the Citizens declaratory relief. View "Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Gov't v. City of Mukilteo" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Respondent-Cross Petitioner Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The issue on appeal involved whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also centered on whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but held that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. The Court also held that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case. View "Stafne v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved two different statutory schemes awarding attorney fees. One scheme, RCW 7.06.050-.060, discourages frivolous appeals from mandatory arbitration. The other scheme, RCW 4.84.250-.300, encourages parties to settle before going to court in cases where the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less by allowing a plaintiff to recover attorney fees if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement at least 10 days before the initial trial, the offer is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers more than was offered. The question before the Court was whether the second scheme may be invoked for the first time 10 days before a trial de novo, rather than 10 days before the arbitration hearing, by a plaintiff that appealed an arbitration decision. After success at the trial de novo, Plaintiffs Patrick Williams and Andrea Harris applied for and received prevailing party attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250. Plaintiffs argued that although they offered to settle for under $10,000 after the mandatory arbitration, RCW 4.84.250-.300 allowed them to recover attorney fees as long as they made their offers 10 days before the trial de novo. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that RCW 4.84.250-.300 applies only to a plaintiff that seeks recovery of $10,000 or less and makes an offer of settlement 10 days before the initial hearing whether it is a trial or an arbitration. View "Williams v. Tilaye" on Justia Law