Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police executed a search warrant and arrested Petitioner Patrick Jimi Lyons when they found a marijuana growing operation on his property. Probable cause for the search warrant was based solely on information from a confidential source. The affidavit for search warrant did not establish timely probable cause because it stated when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the criminal activity. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Washington State Constitution article I, section 7, and the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in the search. View "Washington v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee. View "Peck v. AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed Defendant Brian Siers's conviction on one count of second degree assault. That court reversed the conviction because the State did not allege an aggravating factor in the charging document. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a Supreme Court decision on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the information. The Court took the opportunity to revisit that decision and held that an aggravating factor is not the functional equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information. Because the charging document here contained the essential elements of the crimes charged and Defendant was given notice prior to trial of the State’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence, Defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Siers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which granted Respondent Mansour Heidari's personal restraint petition and vacated his second degree child molestation conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeals declined the State's request to direct entry of a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted second degree child molestation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly declined to direct the entry of judgment of the lesser included offense, and accordingly affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari" on Justia Law

An Auburn city police officer arrested Defendant Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against him in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant contended that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remanded the case back to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal. View "City of Auburn v. Gauntt" on Justia Law

Business Services of America II, Inc. (BSA) sued WaferTech LLC. After the trial court dismissed BSA's claims, BSA appealed. In March 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of all but one claim, which it remanded for trial. After remand, the case lay mostly dormant until June 2009, when BSA noted the case for trial. WaferTech then moved for dismissal. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and BSA appealed. BSA argued that the trial court had no discretion to dismiss the case because CR 41(b)(1) states that if a case is noted for trial before a dismissal hearing, it "shall not" be dismissed. The Court of Appeals agreed with BSA and reversed. WaferTech sought review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bus. Servs. of Am. II, Inc. v. WaferTech LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Gendler made a public records request for location-specific accident reports from the Washington State Patrol (WSP). The WSP refused to provide the records unless Gendler certified that he would not use the records in any litigation against the State, claiming a federal statute (23 U.S.C. sec. 409) protected the records sought. WSP claimed the records were shielded because they were located in an electronic database that the Department of Transportation (DOT) utilized for purposes related to the federal hazard elimination program. Respondent then brought a suit under the PRA and argued section 409 did not apply to the WSP because it did not compile or collect the information for the hazard elimination program's purposes. Rather, the information was collected pursuant to WSP’s statutory duty under RCW 46.52.060. The trial court agreed and on summary judgment ordered WSP to produce the requested accident reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed because section 409 does not extend to police accident reports generated and received by WSP pursuant to its own statutory duty. View "Gendler v. Batiste" on Justia Law

The Lewis County Superior Court found Defendant Michael Caton guilty of failure to report as a sex offender under the former RCW 9A.44.130 (2008). Defendant appealed, arguing among other things that the evidence did not support his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On May 19, 2009, Defendant registered with the Lewis County sheriff's office as a sex offender. On June 9, 2009, he was arrested for a driving offense. On June 10, after Defendant was released from jail, he appeared at the sheriff's office, believing that as a registered sex offender he was required to report to the sheriff after his release from confinement for any offense. But the sheriff's office did not give Defendant a new reporting date, leaving June 16 as the next reporting date. Defendant failed to report on June 16 and instead reported on June 17. The State charged him with failure to register as a sex offender for failing to report in person "on the required day for the 90 day reporting" period. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State had not proved that Defendant failed to report within 90 days of his registration: he reported on June 10 and again on June 17, both dates well within 90 days of his registration date of May 19, 2009. Accordingly, the Court reversed Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Caton" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court involved whether the children of a decedent's predeceased spouse could be considered "stepchildren" under the wrongful death recovery statute. The decedent Audrey Blessing and the children's father were married in 1964. The children's father died in 1994, and Blessing died in 2007. Her estate brought a wrongful death suit, arguing that the children ceased being her step children when their father died. The trial court relied on the close relationship the children and decedent maintained up until her death, and ruled that the children were indeed "stepchildren" and could be beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the stepchild/stepparent relationship legally ended before Blessing's death. Finding that the statutory term "stepchildren" was undefined in the statute, the Supreme Court held that which parent died first was irrelevant to whether a stepchild could maintain that status. "Any concerns over the result or regarding which stepchildren should be entitled to recover in a wrongful death suit are more appropriately factored into any damages determination." View "In re Estate of Blessing" on Justia Law

Ron Teter was diagnosed with a tumor in his right kidney. Urologist Dr. Andrew Deck, assisted by Dr. David Lauter, performed surgery to remove Teter’s kidney. Immediately after surgery, Teter developed a condition in which increased pressure in one compartment of the body that compromised the tissues in that compartment. Even after a procedure to relieve the pressure, Teter continued to suffer from pain in his left leg that interfered with his ability to stand for long periods of time and with his ability to engage in his usual activities. Teter and his wife (the Teters) sued Drs. Deck and Lauter for negligence. The Teters eventually settled with Dr. Lauter and stipulated to his dismissal as a defendant. The parties encountered difficulties in preparing for trial for their case against Dr. Deck. Neither the Teters nor Dr. Deck complied completely with discovery deadlines and the trial court granted motions to compel by both sides. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who made a record of his strict requirements of conducting the trial in his court. Defense counsel was routinely cautioned about her conduct during trial, and the judge noted his displeasure with both parties' "disregard for protocol and rules of evidence." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court involved the court's exclusion of a key medical witness as sanction for the parties' conduct during trial. The Court concluded the pretrial motions judge excluded the expert without making the required findings that the violation was willful and prejudicial and could be imposed only after explicitly considering less severe sanctions. When the trial judge was reassigned to this case, he granted a new trial on the ground that the exclusion was a prejudicial error of law, and he was "well within his discretion in granting the new trial." The Supreme Court found that the facts of this case "amply" supported the ruling. View "Teter v. Deck" on Justia Law