Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Patrick L. Morris filed a personal restraint petition, alleging a violation of his right to a public trial when the trial court conducted part of voir dire in chambers. Further, he claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the violation on direct review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that where appellate counsel fails to raise a public trial right claim, where prejudice would have been presumed on direct review, a petitioner is entitled to relief on collateral review. Morris additionally challenged evidentiary decisions by the trial court relating to a proposed defense expert witness and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in handling the expert testimony issue. The Court held that Morris failed to meet his burden on the evidentiary and trial counsel issues. But because of Morris's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Morris" on Justia Law

Respondent Monte Hunley was convicted by a jury in 2009 of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the sentencing court violated Respondent's right to due process by basing the imposed sentence on prior convictions demonstrated only by the prosecutor's written summary and Respondent's failure to object. The appellate court held that violated Respondent's right to due process. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "Washington v. Hunley" on Justia Law

William Munich was shot and killed by his neighbor, Marvin Ballsmider, approximately 18 minutes after he placed his first phone call to the Skagit Emergency Communications Center. The two had been in a property dispute related to access to a driveway and Ballsmider's property. Norma Smith, a Skagit 911 operator, took the call. Smith assured Munich that law enforcement was on the way. Smith entered the call as a priority two weapons offense rather than a priority one emergency call. Based on the code, the dispatched deputy, Dan Luvera, did not activate his emergency lights and only traveled slightly over the speed limit. About seven minutes later, Munich again called 911. Tammy Canniff took the second call, and Munich told her that he was running away from Ballsmider who was following and shooting. The dispatcher informed Deputy Luvera of these facts and the deputy consequently activated his emergency lights and siren and increased his speed. The second call ended with the sound of Munich being fatally shot on the highway. Deputy Luvera arrived two minutes later and arrested Ballsmider for Munich's murder. Munich was running toward the direction from which Deputy Luvera arrived. Munich's estate sued Skagit County, the Skagit County Sheriff's Office, and Skagit Emergency Communications Center (County) for wrongful death, alleging the County negligently responded to the incident. The County moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims asserting it was not liable for Munich's death under the public duty doctrine, specifically that the "special relationship" exception because the County provided no inaccurate or false information that Munich had detrimentally relied on. The trial court denied summary judgment, ruling the special relationship exception did not require false or inaccurate assurances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where the express assurance promises action there is no falsity requirement because the assurances may be superficially correct but negligently fulfilled. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of an assurance has no bearing on the issue of whether an actionable duty was established. View "Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'n Ctr." on Justia Law

When an insured defendant believes its insurer is refusing to settle a plaintiff's claims in bad faith, the insured can negotiate an independent pretrial settlement with the plaintiff, typically involving a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute the judgment, and an assignment of the insurer's bad faith claim to the plaintiff (collectively, a "covenant judgment). When accepted by the trial court, the settlement amount becomes the presumptive measure of damages in the later bad faith action. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned whether article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution entitles the insurer to have the reasonableness of the covenant judgment determined by a jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it does not, and affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Bird v. Best Plumbing Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

Lindy Deer was convicted of third degree rape of a child after having sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old boy on multiple occasions. Deer claimed that she was asleep during several acts of intercourse and could not be guilty of rape because she did not act with volition. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Deer's claimed lack of volition amounted to an affirmative defense, for which the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court correctly refused Deer's request to instruct the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was awake during the acts at issue. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Deer" on Justia Law

Washington State Nurses Association (WSNA) sought overtime pay pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act (MWA) for work performed by the approximately 1,200 registered nurses employed by Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane. Sacred Heart was obligated by its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with WSNA to provide its nurses with a paid 15 minute block rest period each four hour work period. The parties did not dispute that when a rest period was missed, Sacred Heart provided the nurses with the equivalent of 30 minutes of straight time compensation: the 15 minutes they would have received had they merely rested as well as 15 additional minutes for instead working during the period. Relying on a Washington industrial welfare regulation requiring a 10 minute rest period on the employer's time for every four hours worked, the nurses claimed they were entitled to overtime pay, not just the straight pay they already received, for 10 of the 15 minutes of each rest period they missed. The issue before the Supreme Court hinged on how "hours worked" are calculated: whether the 15 minutes nurses spent working through their breaks should be added to or substituted for the 15 minutes they would have spent at rest. The Court held that both the missed opportunity to rest and the additional labor nurses provide constitute "hours worked." Even though Sacred Heart did not require the nurses to physically remain at the hospital after the end of the workday to make up their rest periods, nurses were entitled to overtime compensation because they provided additional labor to Sacred Heart. View "Wash. State Nurses Ass'n v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

On direct review, appellant Phiengchai Sisouvanh challenged the adequacy of the competency evaluation she received pursuant to RCW 10.77.060 prior to her trial and conviction for aggravated first degree murder. Sisouvanh met a pregnant woman and offered to give the woman spare baby clothes. Sisouvanh drove the woman to a highway turnout, stabbed her, and then proceeded to a secluded location where she cut the woman’s abdomen open and removed the baby from the woman’s womb. Sisouvanh then drove to another location and called emergency services, reporting that she was giving birth and in need of assistance. She moved into the backseat of her car with her victim’s child, partially undressed herself, and waited for an ambulance to arrive. Sisouvanh was taken to a hospital, where a doctor examined her and discovered that she had not given birth. Although Sisouvanh initially persisted in denying the doctor’s allegation, eventually she admitted that she had cut the baby out of another woman. The doctor contacted police. Sisouvanh immigrated to the United States from Laos at around five years of age and alleges that the court appointed expert who conducted her evaluation failed to properly account for her distinct cultural background as a Laotian immigrant. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. The court-appointed expert who evaluated Sisouvanh reasonably explained the propriety of the tests he administered and his interpretation of Sisouvanh’s behavior, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the expert’s examination and report as having been conducted in a qualified manner sufficient to satisfy RCW 10.77.060. View "Washington v. Sisouvanh" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edward M. Glasmann was convicted of second degree assault, attempted second degree robbery, first degree kidnapping, and obstruction arising from incidents that occurred while he was intoxicated. During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney made an electronic presentation to the jury that graphically displayed his personal opinion that Glasmann was “guilty, guilty, guilty” of the crimes charged by the State. The prosecutor’s misconduct was "flagrant, ill intentioned," and the Supreme Court could not conclude with "any confidence" that it did not to have an effect on the outcome of the trial. The Court reversed Petitioner's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann" on Justia Law

The Estates of Barbara J. Nelson and Sharon M. Bracken challenged the efforts of the Washington State Department of Revenue (DOR) to treat them as having engaged in a present taxable transfer of assets that were actually transferred years ago by Ms. Nelson’s and Ms. Bracken’s late husbands’ estates. DOR relied on the legislature’s adoption in 2005 of definitions from the federal estate tax regime. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that DOR exceeded its authority in enacting regulations that allowed it to treat transfers completed by William Nelson and Jim Bracken years ago as if the estates had elected to defer state estate tax on the transfers, to be paid by their wives’ estates. DOR stood on a different footing than the United States Treasury; "DOR must rely on the asserted authority of our legislature to tax transfers years after the fact absent any deferral agreement by the taxpayer." The Court reversed the trial court and directed summary judgment be entered in favor of the Estates. View "In re Estate of Bracken" on Justia Law