Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a traffic stop motivated by an uncorroborated tip (but also independently motivated by a reasonable, articulable suspicion) was unconstitutionally pretextual under the Washington Constitution. Upon review, the Court concluded that a "mixed motive" traffic stop is not pretextual "so long as the desire to address a suspected traffic infraction (or criminal activity) for which the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion is an actual, conscious and independent cause" of the stop. View "Washington v. Arreola" on Justia Law

Larry Stout was severely injured while being apprehended by a subcontractor of CJ Johnson Bail Bonds. He sued the contractor, the subcontractor, and the owners of CJ Johnson under two theories of vicarious liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CJ Johnson, holding that vicarious liability did not apply in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, assuming that vicarious liability applies to the activity but holding that such liability is available only to "innocent[] nonparticipant[s]," not those voluntarily engaging in the dangerous activity with knowledge of the danger. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that fugitive apprehension was an activity that posed a peculiar risk of physical harm, and that defendant could assert a cause of action against CJ Johnson based on the theory of vicarious liability because the narrow exception for employees of independent contractors (in this case, the subcontractor) did not apply. View "Stout v. Warren" on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Nicholas Pappas challenged an appellate court decision that affirmed an exceptional sentence for vehicular assault based on the severity of the victim's injuries. The case arose from a 2008 motorcycle accident in which Petitioner's passenger was thrown from the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries, including permanent brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Washington case law and the language of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) authorized an exceptional sentence when the jury finds the victim's injuries substantially exceed "substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Pappas" on Justia Law

Appellants Vicki Parker, James Johnson, and Marie Clarke appealed a superior court order directly to the Supreme Court. The lower court's order denied them relief in an action challenging the candidacy of Christine Schaller for the office of judge of the Thurston County Superior Court. Appellants argued that Schaller was not statutorily eligible for the office because she did not reside in, and therefore was not a qualified elector of, Thurston County. Upon review, the Court held that Schaller was not required to reside in or be an elector of Thurston County to be eligible for the office. View "Parker v. Wyman" on Justia Law

P.E. Systems, LLC (PES) offered to analyze and reduce the credit card processing costs of CPI Corp. (CPI). The parties signed an agreement that appeared to be a contract. CPI later repudiated the contract, disputing its validity. PES sued for breach. CPI attached a copy of the contract to its answer to PES's complaint, and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the "contract" was a mere agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable. PES responded to the motion and attached an identical copy of the contract and a PowerPoint presentation it had given to CPI. The trial court found the contract was not binding but merely an agreement to agree and granted CPI's motion, thereby dismissing the case. PES appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed holding that both the contract was enforceable and that CPI had breached it. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held the contract was a valid with an open term, but reversed the balance of the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp." on Justia Law

"There exists a simple yet significant balancing test for trial courts to apply to consider whether specific circumstances warrant closing part of a trial to the public, set out in 'Washington v. Bone-Club,' (906 P.2d 325 (1995))." Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that that process was not followed in this case, and therefore found a violation of the public trial right. Because the violation constituted structural error and absence of an objection was not a waiver of the public trial right, prejudice is presumed, and a new trial is warranted. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wise" on Justia Law

In this consolidated case, petitioners raised several issues, some common to both cases and others specific to each. Petitioner Michael Sublett challenged his convictions for premeditated first degree murder and felony murder, arguing the trial court wrongfully denied severance. He also challenged the comparability of out of state convictions used to support his sentence as a persistent offender. Petitioner Christopher Olsen challenged his conviction for felony murder, raising claims regarding lesser included offense jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Both petitioners challenged the content of the accomplice liability jury instruction, and both claim a violation of their article I, section 22 trial rights occurred when the trial judge considered, in chambers and with counsel present, a question from the jury during its deliberations. The Court of Appeals rejected the issues raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Sublett" on Justia Law

Rene P. Paumier appealed his conviction for residential burglary and second degree theft. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Paumier's right to a public trial was violated when the trial court individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. The Court previously held that a court may close a courtroom to the public only after considering the factors established in "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)). Moreover, the Court held in "Washington v. Wise," (No. 82802-4, slip op. at 19 (Wash. Nov. 21, 2012)), that individual questioning of potential jurors in chambers without first considering the Bone-Club factors is a closure creating a presumption of prejudice. Therefore, Paumier was entitled to a new trial because the trial court closed the courtroom without first considering the Bone-Club factors. Because the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on this issue, there was no reason to address whether the trial court also violated Paumier's right to self-representation. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court on the public trial right grounds alone. View "Washington v. Paumier" on Justia Law