Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiff Broughton Lumber Company asserted a timber trespass claim against defendants BNSF Railway Company and Harsco Corporation in the United States District Court, District of Oregon, Portland Division, after a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed Broughton's trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law

Christa Albice and Karen Tecca (hereinafter Tecca) inherited the property at issue in this case. In 2003, Tecca borrowed $115,500 against the property. The loan was serviced by Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One), and Premier Mortgage Services of Washington (Premier) acted as the trustee. In 2006, Tecca defaulted on the loan and received a notice of trustee's sale. In July 2006, Tecca negotiated and entered into a forbearance agreement to cure the default. The trustee's sale originally set for September 8, 2006 was continued six times. Each continuance was tied to the payments Tecca made under the Forbearance Agreement. The foreclosure sale finally took place on February 16, 2007. Through an agent, Petitioner Ron Dickinson, successfully bid on the property. Tecca first learned the property was sold when Dickinson told Tecca they no longer owned it and needed to leave. Dickinson then filed an unlawful detainer action and sought to quiet title. Tecca countersued, seeking to quiet title in an action to set aside the nonjudicial sale. Tecca also brought suit against Option One and Premier, but the trial court dismissed the action based on an arbitration clause. Dickinson moved for summary judgment to establish that he was a BFP and entitled to quiet title. Tecca also moved for summary judgment, arguing the foreclosure sale should have been set aside because the sale occurred after the statutory deadline and Premier was not a qualified trustee with authority to conduct the sale. The trial court granted Dickinson's motion, ruling that Dickinson was a BFP and despite procedural noncompliance by the trustee. Following trial, the court concluded Premier was authorized to act as the trustee, quieted title in Dickinson, and awarded Dickinson damages. Tecca appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, setting the sale aside. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were "marred" by repeated statutory noncompliance. The financial institution acting as the lender also appeared to be acting as the trustee under a different name; the lender repeatedly accepted late payments and, at its sole discretion, rejected only the final late payment that would have cured the default; and the trustee conducted a sale without statutory authority. The Court concluded the sale was invalid. View "Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash., Inc." on Justia Law

The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Respondent-Cross Petitioner Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The issue on appeal involved whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also centered on whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but held that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. The Court also held that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case. View "Stafne v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

Respondents William and Sally Chapin Kiely owned real property in Port Townsend next to property owned by Kenneth and Karen Graves. An alley ran the length of the properties, and as long as anyone could remember, a wire fence ran the length of the two properties. The Graves property adjacent to the disputed alley has remained open space where the Graves have planted fruit trees, berry vines, and garlic. Part of the Kielys' cottage encroached upon the disputed alley. In 2008, the Graves filed a petition with the city to vacate the western half of the alley and merge it into their adjoining lands. The city held a public hearing on the application. In February 2009, the Port Townsend City Council passed an ordinance to vacate the alley and convey the vacated alley to the Graves through a lot line adjustment. The Kielys filed an action alleging ownership of the entire alley through adverse possession on June 10, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment and decree in favor of the Kielys. The Supreme Court granted direct review to decide whether the Kielys could assert adverse possession based on events which preceded vacation of the alley. Upon review, the Court found that Port Townsend held an easement interest in the alley until it was vacated by public hearing. Therefore, RCW 7.28.090 prohibited the Kielys from obtaining title to the alley through adverse possession. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Kiely v. Graves" on Justia Law

The city of Tacoma has franchise agreements with Pierce County and the cities of Fircrest, University Place, and Federal Way (Municipalities) to provide them with water services. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether those franchise agreements required Tacoma to both maintain fire hydrants and bear the maintenance costs of those hydrants. Tacoma raised questions about the impact of the agreements' indemnification clauses had on this dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the franchise agreements contractually required Tacoma to provide hydrants to the Municipalities, and that the indemnification provisions did not preclude this case. View "City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned a dispute between Petitioners Donia Townsend and several other home purchasers and Defendant Quadrant Corporation and its parent companies over an arbitration clause in the home purchasers' individual purchase contracts. Several years after the home purchases, Townsend and the other purchasers jointly filed suit in superior court against Quadrant alleging outrage, fraud, unfair business practices, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, rescission and breach of warranty. In support of these allegations, they claimed that Quadrant knowingly engaged in shoddy workmanship in building the homes, and that this resulted in serious construction defects that caused personal injuries relating to mold, pests, and poisonous gases. They claimed that the arbitration clause in their purchase agreements was unenforceable. The superior court denied Quadrant's motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the homeowners’ procedural unconscionability claim that pertained to the entire purchase contract, including the arbitration clause, was to be decided by an arbitrator. View "Townsend v. Quadrant Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent and Cross-Appellant Easterday Ranches, Inc. sought to operate a large feedlot in Franklin County. At the suggestion of the Department of Ecology (Department), Easterday acquired water rights from a neighboring farm. Appellants Scott Collin, Five Corners Family Farmers, the Center for Environmental Law and Policy (CELP), and the Sierra Club filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Washington, the Department, and Easterday seeking a declaration that the stockwatering exemption from the permit requirement in RCW 90.44.050 is limited to uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day. Appellants further sought an injunction ordering Easterday to cease groundwater use without a permit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the plain language of the statute, withdrawals of groundwater for stock-watering purposes are not limited to any particular quantity by RCW 90.44.050. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the respondents. View "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington" on Justia Law

Petitioners Louise Lauer and Darrell de Tienne separately owned properties that border a lot owned by Mike and Shima Garrison. Through a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition, Petitioners challenged a fish and wildlife variance granted to the Garrisons by Pierce County (the County) to build a single family residence within the protective buffer zone of a stream that runs across the Garrisons' property. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Garrisons' rights vested in 2004 when they submitted their building application. The Garrisons also raised questions about the standing and timeliness of Petitioners' claim, as well as whether the relevant critical area regulation even applies to the Garrisons' shoreline property. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioners properly petitioned the superior court for review and that, because the Garrisons' building permit application contained misrepresentations of material fact, the Garrisons' rights did not vest in 2004. View "Laurer v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bank of America, NA v. Owens" on Justia Law

RCW 60.04.091(2) requires mechanics' liens to be "acknowledged pursuant to chapter 64.08 RCW." In other words, an authorized person must certify in writing that the signor executed the lien freely and voluntarily. RCW 60.04.091(2) also includes a sample claim of lien that the statute states "shall be sufficient" but that does not include language satisfying the acknowledgment requirement. Contractors Athletic Fields Inc. and Hos Bros.Construction Inc. each filed claims of lien that used the sample form and did not contain certificates of acknowledgment. In each case, the lower court concluded the lien was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial courts and held that a claim of lien in the sample form is valid despite the absence of a proper acknowledgment. View "Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc." on Justia Law