Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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In 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise (challengers) filed a petition with the Growth Management Hearings Board alleging Clark County was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA). The Challengers specifically argued that under the Act's requirements, the various lands affected by a 2007 local zoning ordinance designated as agricultural land of long-term commercial significance (ALLTCS) could not be designated as an urban growth area (UGA) by the ordinance. The cities of Camas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certain parcels of the disputed lands designated UGA by the 2007 ordinance. The Challengers did not contest the annexations, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention of the Board. The Board ultimately found that Clark County was not in compliance with the GMA, specifically finding that certain land designations from the 2007 ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation of the annexed lands as UGA. Multiple parties were permitted to intervene, and the Board's decision was appealed. The superior court entered an order that resolved various claims on appeal, including claims related to the annexed lands. The court reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation of a portion of the annexed lands as UGA was erroneous. The Challengers thereafter appealed the superior court's order. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of appellate procedure: whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing separate and district claims that had been resolved but were not actually raised on appeal. THe parties did not challenge the disposition of those claims, thus those claims were finally adjudicated. However, the appellate court addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion reversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. View "Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd." on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

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Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

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In 2009, Philip Haberthur nonjudicially foreclosed on Petitioner Steven Schreoder's property. Petitioner attempted to restrain the sale on grounds that his land was agricultural and not subject to nonjudicial foreclosure. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the parties to a deed of trust may waive the statutory requirement that agricultural land must be foreclosed judicially. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "although the procedure here was admittedly convoluted," the trial court abused its discretion in failing to restrain the sale of Petitioner's property without first determining whether the land was agricultural, and for dismissing Petitioner's other claims on summary judgment. The Court held that agricultural land must be foreclosed judicially; parties may not waive the statute. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

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Dorothy Halstein suffered from dementia. She owned a home worth between $235,000 and $320,000. While suffering demential, she owed approximately $75,000 to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), secured by a deed of trust on her home. Because of the cost of her care, her guardian did not have the funds to pay her mortgage. Quality Loan Services, acting as trustee of the deed of trust, foreclosed on her home. Quality sold the home for $83,087.67, one dollar more than Ms. Halstein owed. A notary falsely notarized the notice of sale by predating the notary acknowledgement. The falsification permitted the sale to take place earlier than it could have had the notice of sale been dated when it was actually signed. Before the foreclosure sale, Halstein's court-appointed guardian secured a buyer for her house willing to pay $235,000. There was not enough time before the scheduled foreclosure to close the sale with the buyer. Despite numerous requests, WaMu did not postpone the sale. A jury found that the trustee was negligent, and that the trustee's acts violated the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and that the trustee breached its contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals reversed all but the negligence claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, and restored the award based on the CPA. View "Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank" on Justia Law

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The Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington has asked the Washington Supreme Court to answer three certified questions relating to two home foreclosures pending in King County. In both cases, the Mortgage Electronic Registration System Inc. (MERS), in its role as the beneficiary of the deed of trust, was informed by the loan servicers that the homeowners were delinquent on their mortgages. MERS then appointed trustees who initiated foreclosure proceedings. The primary issue was whether MERS was a lawful beneficiary with the power to appoint trustees within the deed of trust act if it did not hold the promissory notes secured by the deeds of trust. A plain reading of the applicable statute leads the Supreme Court to conclude that only the actual holder of the promissory note or other instrument evidencing the obligation may be a beneficiary with the power to appoint a trustee to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on real property. "Simply put, if MERS does not hold the note, it is not a lawful beneficiary." The Court was unable to determine the "legal effect" of MERS not being a lawful beneficiary based on the record underlying these cases. Furthermore, the Court was asked to determine if a homeowner had a Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, claim based upon MERS representing that it was a beneficiary. The Court concluded that a homeowner may, "but it would turn on the specific facts of each case." View "Bain v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys." on Justia Law

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The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether RCW 4.16.160 bars a quiet title action where the claimant alleges he adversely possessed property belonging to a private individual before a municipality acquired record title to the land. James Gorman IV, as general partner of Hollywood Vineyards Limited Partnership, claimed title to certain real property through adverse possession. The property at issue was dedicated to the city of Woodinville by a private owner in December 2005 for a roadway improvement project. Gorman owned adjacent property. In 2007, Gorman filed an action to quiet title claiming he acquired the adjacent property through a 10-year period of adverse possession that transpired while the land was still in private hands. The City moved to dismiss arguing Gorman’s claim was prohibited by RCW 4.16.160. The trial court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Gorman’s claim. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held Gorman’s claim was not barred because it is alleged the statute of limitations ran while the subject land was privately owned. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.160 does not bar such quiet title actions, and affirmed the appellate court's decision. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the validity of Gorman's claim of title. View "Gorman v. City of Woodinville" on Justia Law

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Rogelio and Elaine Ruvalcaba brought suit to condemn an easement across neighboring property held by individual landowners, referred to collectively as the "Day Group Petitioners." The Ruvalcabas argued that they were entitled to an easement because their property is landlocked and contended that there is an overriding public policy against rendering landlocked property useless. The Day Group Petitioners contended that the Ruvalcabas voluntarily landlocked their property through severance of the parcel and failed to bring a condemnation action for 35 years. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Day Group Petitioners and dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Day Group Petitioners. View "Ruvalcaba v. Baek" on Justia Law

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After a landslide damaged their home, homeowners Timothy Jackowski and Eri Takase (the Jackowskis) sued the sellers of the home, seeking rescission or, in the alternative, damages for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The homeowners also sued the sellers' broker and agent, alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of common law fiduciary duties. They leveled similar claims against their own broker and agent together with a claim for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. The trial court entered summary judgment dismissing all of the Jackowskis' claims, except the fraudulent concealment claims against the sellers and the sellers’ broker and agent regarding cracks in the concrete basement floor. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in part and reversed it in part. The sellers and the homeowners’ broker and agent then sought review by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jackowski v. Borchelt" on Justia Law

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This case required the Supreme Court to construe the former RCW 64.12.030, the "timber trespass statute." Plaintiffs Jacon and Laura Jongeward, and Gordon and Jeannie Jongeward asserted a timber trespass claim against defendant BNSF Railway Company when a fire spread from BNSF's property and destroyed the Jongewards' trees. The district court certified the question to the Washington Supreme Court. To answer, the Court outlined the 142 year history of the statute, and concluded after its review of the history, that: (1) a plaintiff cannot recover damages under the timber trespass statute when a defendant commits an indirect act or omission that causes mere collateral injury; but (2) a plaintiff may recover damages when a defendant commits a direct trespass causing immediate injury to a plaintiff's trees, even if the defendant is not physically present on the plaintiff's property. View "Jongeward v. BNSF Ry." on Justia Law