Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kut Suen and May Far Lui (the Luis) owned a building that sustained water damage after a pipe burst while the building was vacant. The Luis' insurance policy for the building limited coverage for water damage based on vacancy: coverage was suspended if the building remained vacant for 60 consecutive days and, effective at the beginning of any vacancy, and there was no coverage for certain specified losses, including water damage. The Luis argued that the policy was ambiguous and should have been interpreted in the Luis' favor to mean that the exclusion of coverage for water damage would commence only after a 60-day vacancy. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Luis' arguments and found that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for water damage immediately upon vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's contrary holding and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lui v. Essex Insur. Co." on Justia Law

The Barclay Court Owners Association amended its condominium declaration to restrict the number of units that could be leased at one time. After this amendment was passed and recorded, Carolyn Bilanko purchased a condo at Barclay Court. Four years later, Bilanko challenged the amendment as improperly passed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Bilanko's challenge was timely under the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), chapter 64.34 RCW. The Court determined that it was not timely and reversed. View "Bilanko v. Barclay Court Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Richard and Susan Millies purchased a secluded piece of property in Stevens County overlooking Deer Lake. Their title company overlooked an easement that could have rendered the property far less secluded. The title insurer, LandAmerica Transnation Title Insurance Company, conceded that the easement had been overlooked in the title search and conceded coverage for the omission. After the two sides could not agree on the proper amount of compensation, the Millies sued on a variety of grounds. The jury returned a verdict in favor of LandAmerica, and the Millies appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review concerned the authority of an Idaho court to impact property in Washington and whether the Washington Court had to respect that court's orders. This case arose through OneWest Bank FSB's attempted foreclosure of Washington property based on a reverse mortgage that an Idaho court ordered through Bill McKee's conservatorship proceedings. McKee's daughter, Maureen Erickson, challenged the foreclosure, claiming the reverse mortgage was void because she was the actual owner of the property and the Idaho court had no jurisdiction to affect Washington property. The trial court granted summary judgment to OneWest, allowing it to proceed with foreclosure, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted summary judgment for Erickson. The Washington Supreme Court had to decide whether the lower courts were required to give full faith and credit to the Idaho court orders. After review, the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit was due and OneWest was entitled to foreclose its reverse mortgage on the Spokane property. View "OneWest Bank FSB v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments. The Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property. Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA). The Cabreras answered, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking money for rent, security deposit, utility deposit, relocation assistance and other expenses related to moving into a new home, plus $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, and $5,209.55 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of RCW 59.18.085 does not allow recovery for emotional distress. View "Segura v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

After defaulting on her home loan, Darlene Brown requested a foreclosure fairness act (FFA) mediation. The Department denied the request, reasoning the beneficiary of her deed of trust was exempt from mediation. Whether that determination was correct turned on whether the beneficiary of Brown's deed of trust for purposes of the exemption statute, was the holder of her promissory note (M&T Bank, an exempt entity), or its owner (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), a nonexempt entity). The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Department correctly recognized the holder of the note as the beneficiary for the purposes of the mediation exemption statute. In addition, the Court held that a party's undisputed declaration submitted under penalty of perjury that the party is the holder of the note satisfied the DTA's proof of beneficiary provisions: “The holder of the note satisfies these provisions and is the beneficiary because the legislature intended the beneficiary to be the party who has authority to modify and enforce the note. The Department correctly determined that Brown is not entitled to mediation because the note holder and beneficiary, M&T Bank, satisfies the conditions of the mediation exemption statute, RCW 61.24.166.” View "Brown v. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Unit Owners Association of Centre Pointe Condominium (Centre Pointe) was formed in May 2003 by a declaration of condominium (Declaration) recorded in Whatcom County. A clubhouse and three residential buildings with 97 units of the Centre Pointe complex were built prior to 2011. In May 2011, Filmore LLP bought an unfinished portion of the Centre Pointe complex and all related development and special declarant rights. Filmore's property was part of the Centre Point complex and subject to its Declaration. Section 9.1.14 of the Declaration provided that there was "no restriction on the right of any Unit Owner to lease his or her Unit" other than the restrictions described in section 9.1.14. Nothing in section 9.1.14 limited the number of units that could be leased. In October 2011, owners of Centre Pointe units to which at least 67 percent (but less than 90 percent) of the votes in Centre Pointe were allocated approved a 12th amendment to the Declaration, requiring that no more than 30 percent of the total number of units could be leased. In October 2012, Filmore filed a complaint at the Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that the Declaration's Twelfth Amendment violated RCW 64.34.264(4) and section 17.3 of the Declaration because the 12th amendment was not passed with 90 percent of the eligible votes. Filmore requested that the 12th amendment be found void and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Filmore, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments. View "Filmore, LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Centre Pointe Condo." on Justia Law

Rocio Trujillo's home loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the home. She defaulted, and Northwest Trustee Services Inc. (NWTS), the successor trustee, sent a notice of default and scheduled a trustee's sale of her property. NWTS had a beneficiary declaration from Wells Fargo Bank. RCW 61.24.030(7)(a) (part of the Deeds of Trust Act) required that a trustee not initiate such a nonjudicial foreclosure without "proof that the beneficiary [of the deed of trust] is the owner of any promissory note ... secured by the deed of trust," and must include "[a] declaration by the beneficiary made under the penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust shall be sufficient proof as required under this subsection." NTWS' declaration did not contain that specific statutory language. Instead, it stated under penalty of perjury, "Wells Fargo Bank, NA is the actual holder of the promissory note . . . or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said [note]" (This declaration language differed from the language of RCW 61.24.030(7)(a), by adding the "or" alternative). Following the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Lyons v. U.S. Bank National Ass 'n," (336 P.3d 1142 (2014)), the Court held in this case that a trustee could not rely on a beneficiary declaration containing such ambiguous alternative language. The Court found that Trujillo alleged facts sufficient to show that NWTS breached the DTA and also to show that that breach could support the elements of a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. However, her allegations did not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or criminal profiteering. The Court therefore reversed in part and remanded for trial. View "Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The parties in this case, the Gamboas and Clarks, owned adjoining parcels of land separated by a gravel road in a rural area in Yakima County. Since coming to the parcel in 1992, the Gamboas used the gravel road as a driveway to access their home and some of their alfalfa crop. When the Clarks came to their parcel in 1995, they used the road to farm grapes, including watering the grape plants and spraying for weeds. The trial court found that "[t]he Gamboas and the Clarks both used the roadway as described above without any disputes until 2008. Each party was aware of the other's use of the roadway, but no one objected to the other's use until a dispute arose in 2008." A dispute arose over the Gamboas' dogs and the Clarks' irrigation practices, and "it eventually escalated into a dispute over which of them owned the land on which the roadway was situated." This case presented for the Supreme Court's review the issue of whether the Gamboas met one of the requirements of the rule that would allow them to continue using the road. Specifically, the Gamboas had to show that their use of the road was adverse to the Clarks. Since the evidence showed a reasonable inference that the Clarks let the Gamboas use the road out of "neighborly acquiescence," the Supreme Court held that the Gamboas did not show that their use of the road was adverse to the Clarks. Therefore, the Gamboas could not continue using the road. View "Gamboa v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the scope of landowners' or possessors' responsibility for harm that results when strangers commit criminal acts against invitees on business premises under Washington law. In 2005, Dominick Maldonado walked into the Tacoma Mall and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, injuring seven people. At the time of the shooting, there were four unarmed security guards on duty and no security cameras. While the mall had an intercom system, it was inaudible and inaccessible on weekends, and the security guards were never trained to use it. Brendan McKown was one of the people injured, and brought a negligence action against the mall's lawdowner/possessor of the mall, landlord to the businesses in the mall, Simon Property Group, Inc. In his complaint, McKown alleged that Simon failed to exercise reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable criminal harm. After removing the case to federal district court, Simon moved for summary judgment, arguing Maldonado's acts were unforeseeable, and any negligence on Simon's part was not a proximate cause of McKown's injuries. The trial court denied Simon's motion, then on reconsideration, the trial court vacated its holding and granted the motion. On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged it was bound to follow this court's interpretation of Washington law but expressed uncertainty as to the scope of a landowner's duty to protect business invitees from the criminal acts of third persons. In answering the Ninth Circuit's questions, the Washington Supreme Court held that when a duty is premised on evidence of prior similar acts, a landowner or possessor owes a duty to protect business invitees from third party criminal conduct when such conduct is foreseeable based on past experience of prior similar acts. The prior acts of violence on the business premises must have been sufficiently similar in nature and location to the criminal act that injured the plaintiff, sufficiently close in time to the act in question, and sufficiently numerous to have put the business on notice that such an act was likely to occur. Based on the limited focus of the questions and the briefing, the Court did not decide the circumstances under which a duty would arise when the duty is based solely on the business's place or character. View "McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law