Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) condemned property owned by Airport Investment Company (AIC) in order to secure easements to construct and operate an elevated light rail. The parties could not agree on the amount of just compensation for the taking, so the matter proceeded to trial. AIC argued it was statutorily entitled to attorney fees because Sound Transit failed to make a valid settlement offer 30 days before trial. Specifically, AIC argued that the 30-day offer Sound Transit made did not reflect the reduced temporary construction easement it ultimately obtained, making the offer ineffective or resulting in a total abandonment of the condemnation. AIC also sought a new trial, alleging the trial court erroneously allowed Sound Transit's counsel to question AIC's president about the taking valuation of an appraisal expert who did not testify. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed the Court of Appeals: a condemnee is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070(l)(a) only "[i]f[the] condemnor fails to make any written offer in settlement" at least 30 days before trial. Sound Transit made a timely settlement offer, which was not rendered ineffective by subsequent revisions to reduce the impact of its temporary construction easement. The Court was not persuaded by AIC's evidentiary objection, finding the trial court properly admitted the president's testimony under ER 80l(d)(2) as an admission of a party opponent. View "Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Airport Inv. Co." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court: "Does a title company owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments?" This certified question arose out of a civil action for money damages. Plaintiffs Centurion Properties Ill LLC (CP Ill) and SMI Group XIV LLC (collectively Plaintiffs) asserted that defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company negligently breached its duty of care and caused damages when it recorded unauthorized liens on CP Ill's property. The Washington Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question "no," holding that title companies did not owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments. "Such a duty is contrary to Washington's policy and precedent, and other duty of care considerations." View "Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Laura Jordan defaulted on a mortgage payment, and one day after returning home from work, she could not enter the house: the locks had been changed without warning. Nationstar Mortgage left a notice on the house that she needed to contact them to retrieve her belongings. Jordan removed those belongings the next day, and did not return. The house was secured by a deed of trust that contained provisions that allowed Nationstar to enter her home upon default without providing any notice. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether those provisions conflicted with Washington law. Jordan represented a class action proceeding in federal court, which certified two questions of Washington law: (1) whether the deed of trust provisions conflicted with a Washington law that prohibited a lender from taking possession of property prior to foreclosure; and (2) whether Washington's statutory receivership scheme was the exclusive remedy by which a lender may gain access to the property. The Washington Supreme Court held that the deed of trust provisions in this case conflicted with Washington law because they allowed Nationstar to take possession of the property after default. Furthermore, the Court held that nothing in Washington law established the receivership statutes as an exclusive remedy. View "Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

Kut Suen and May Far Lui (the Luis) owned a building that sustained water damage after a pipe burst while the building was vacant. The Luis' insurance policy for the building limited coverage for water damage based on vacancy: coverage was suspended if the building remained vacant for 60 consecutive days and, effective at the beginning of any vacancy, and there was no coverage for certain specified losses, including water damage. The Luis argued that the policy was ambiguous and should have been interpreted in the Luis' favor to mean that the exclusion of coverage for water damage would commence only after a 60-day vacancy. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Luis' arguments and found that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for water damage immediately upon vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's contrary holding and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lui v. Essex Insur. Co." on Justia Law

The Barclay Court Owners Association amended its condominium declaration to restrict the number of units that could be leased at one time. After this amendment was passed and recorded, Carolyn Bilanko purchased a condo at Barclay Court. Four years later, Bilanko challenged the amendment as improperly passed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Bilanko's challenge was timely under the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), chapter 64.34 RCW. The Court determined that it was not timely and reversed. View "Bilanko v. Barclay Court Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Richard and Susan Millies purchased a secluded piece of property in Stevens County overlooking Deer Lake. Their title company overlooked an easement that could have rendered the property far less secluded. The title insurer, LandAmerica Transnation Title Insurance Company, conceded that the easement had been overlooked in the title search and conceded coverage for the omission. After the two sides could not agree on the proper amount of compensation, the Millies sued on a variety of grounds. The jury returned a verdict in favor of LandAmerica, and the Millies appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review concerned the authority of an Idaho court to impact property in Washington and whether the Washington Court had to respect that court's orders. This case arose through OneWest Bank FSB's attempted foreclosure of Washington property based on a reverse mortgage that an Idaho court ordered through Bill McKee's conservatorship proceedings. McKee's daughter, Maureen Erickson, challenged the foreclosure, claiming the reverse mortgage was void because she was the actual owner of the property and the Idaho court had no jurisdiction to affect Washington property. The trial court granted summary judgment to OneWest, allowing it to proceed with foreclosure, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted summary judgment for Erickson. The Washington Supreme Court had to decide whether the lower courts were required to give full faith and credit to the Idaho court orders. After review, the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit was due and OneWest was entitled to foreclose its reverse mortgage on the Spokane property. View "OneWest Bank FSB v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments. The Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property. Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA). The Cabreras answered, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking money for rent, security deposit, utility deposit, relocation assistance and other expenses related to moving into a new home, plus $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, and $5,209.55 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of RCW 59.18.085 does not allow recovery for emotional distress. View "Segura v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

After defaulting on her home loan, Darlene Brown requested a foreclosure fairness act (FFA) mediation. The Department denied the request, reasoning the beneficiary of her deed of trust was exempt from mediation. Whether that determination was correct turned on whether the beneficiary of Brown's deed of trust for purposes of the exemption statute, was the holder of her promissory note (M&T Bank, an exempt entity), or its owner (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), a nonexempt entity). The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Department correctly recognized the holder of the note as the beneficiary for the purposes of the mediation exemption statute. In addition, the Court held that a party's undisputed declaration submitted under penalty of perjury that the party is the holder of the note satisfied the DTA's proof of beneficiary provisions: “The holder of the note satisfies these provisions and is the beneficiary because the legislature intended the beneficiary to be the party who has authority to modify and enforce the note. The Department correctly determined that Brown is not entitled to mediation because the note holder and beneficiary, M&T Bank, satisfies the conditions of the mediation exemption statute, RCW 61.24.166.” View "Brown v. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

The Unit Owners Association of Centre Pointe Condominium (Centre Pointe) was formed in May 2003 by a declaration of condominium (Declaration) recorded in Whatcom County. A clubhouse and three residential buildings with 97 units of the Centre Pointe complex were built prior to 2011. In May 2011, Filmore LLP bought an unfinished portion of the Centre Pointe complex and all related development and special declarant rights. Filmore's property was part of the Centre Point complex and subject to its Declaration. Section 9.1.14 of the Declaration provided that there was "no restriction on the right of any Unit Owner to lease his or her Unit" other than the restrictions described in section 9.1.14. Nothing in section 9.1.14 limited the number of units that could be leased. In October 2011, owners of Centre Pointe units to which at least 67 percent (but less than 90 percent) of the votes in Centre Pointe were allocated approved a 12th amendment to the Declaration, requiring that no more than 30 percent of the total number of units could be leased. In October 2012, Filmore filed a complaint at the Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that the Declaration's Twelfth Amendment violated RCW 64.34.264(4) and section 17.3 of the Declaration because the 12th amendment was not passed with 90 percent of the eligible votes. Filmore requested that the 12th amendment be found void and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Filmore, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments. View "Filmore, LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Centre Pointe Condo." on Justia Law