Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bank of America, NA v. Owens" on Justia Law

RCW 60.04.091(2) requires mechanics' liens to be "acknowledged pursuant to chapter 64.08 RCW." In other words, an authorized person must certify in writing that the signor executed the lien freely and voluntarily. RCW 60.04.091(2) also includes a sample claim of lien that the statute states "shall be sufficient" but that does not include language satisfying the acknowledgment requirement. Contractors Athletic Fields Inc. and Hos Bros.Construction Inc. each filed claims of lien that used the sample form and did not contain certificates of acknowledgment. In each case, the lower court concluded the lien was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial courts and held that a claim of lien in the sample form is valid despite the absence of a proper acknowledgment. View "Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute that arose after the sale of a plot of residential land pursuant to a statutory warranty deed. Specifically, the issue on appeal centered on whether a grantor's duty to defend against another's claim to title was satisfied by that grantor's independent decision to settle the claim and pay the grantee damages for the breach of warranty. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the duty to defend requires that a grantor defend in good faith. The grantor in this case, Csaba Kiss, was ordered by a trial court to pay damages to grantees Ivan and Varvara Popchoi when the court granted summary judgment against them and awarded a portion of their land to their neighbors J.E. and Naomi Edmonson through adverse possession. Mr. Kiss did not dispute that he owed damages, but appealed whether he owed attorney fees to the Popchois to defend against the Edmonsons' claim. The Supreme Court held Mr. Kiss was liable to the Popchois for the breach of the warranty to defend and ordered to pay their attorney fees. View "Edmonson v. Popchoi" on Justia Law

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision. View "Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care" on Justia Law

In 2007, the city council of Woodinville (City) unanimously denied two applications submitted by Respondent Phoenix Development, Inc. (Phoenix) to rezone a parcel of undeveloped property. The superior court dismissed Phoenix's petition, holding that Phoenix failed to establish that the City failed to follow its own procedure when it denied Phoenix's applications. The Supreme Court found that substantial evidence in the record supported the City's decision to deny Phoenix's requests under the controlling city ordinance. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision to dismiss Phoenix's applications. View "Phoenix Dev., Inc. v. City Of Woodinville" on Justia Law