Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Allan Tabingo was seriously injured while working aboard a fishing trawler owned and operated by American Seafoods Company LLC and American Triumph LLC (collectively American Seafoods). Tabingo alleged the lever used to operate a hatch on the trawler's deck broke when an operator tried to stop the hatch from closing. The hatch closed on Tabingo' s hand, leading to the amputation of two fingers. He brought numerous claims against American Seafoods, including a general maritime unseaworthiness claim for which he requested punitive damages. American Seafoods argued that as a matter of law, punitive damages were unavailable for unseaworthiness claims. The issue of whether punitive damages were available for a claim of unseaworthiness was a question of first impression for both the United States and Washington State Supreme Courts. The United States Supreme Court recently held that punitive damages were available for maintenance and cure, another general maritime claim. The Court held that because both the claim and the damages were historically available at common law and because Congress had shown no intent to limit recovery of punitive damages, those damages were available. Here, the Washington Court followed the United States Supreme Court's rationale and found that, like maintenance and cure, punitive damages were available for a general maritime unseaworthiness claim. The Washington Court reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tabingo v. Am. Triumph LLC" on Justia Law

One evening, plaintiff Deborah Peralta was drinking beer with a neighbor in a downtown Vancouver tavern. After an argument at the party, Peralta left on foot, became lost, and called her brother Jorge Peralta. She told him she had been drinking and asked for a ride home. After several unsuccessful efforts to meet her brother, Peralta mistook an approaching car for her brother's car. She stepped in front of the car, which was driven by a Washington State Patrol Sergeant who did not see Peralta in time to stop. The trooper struck her with his vehicle. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review was the trial court's ruling that plaintiff’s admission during pretrial discovery should have been given conclusive effect. Plaintiff admitted without qualification to being "under the influence of intoxicating liquors" at the time she was struck and injured. The Supreme Court held that her admission in this context was unambiguous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled she was bound by her admission. The jury instruction incorporating this ruling was also appropriate. As a result, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this point. The Supreme Court did not address the other evidentiary errors identified by the Court of Appeals, but instead remanded them for a determination of prejudice. View "Peralta v. Washington" on Justia Law

Consolidated cases involved two city of Bellevue (City) firefighters who were diagnosed with malignant melanoma and filed claims for workers' compensation benefits. In both cases, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) denied the firefighters' claims. Both firefighters then appealed the Board's decision to King County Superior Court. Under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, a worker injured in the course of employment who suffers from an "occupational disease" is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The parties disagreed about various aspects of how and whether the presumption in RCW 51.32.185 should operate when a board decision was appealed to superior court. The Supreme Court noted that RCW 51.32.185 reflected a strong social policy in favor of the worker and concluded that: (1) whether the City rebutted the firefighter presumption was a factual determination that was properly given to the jury in Larson, but improperly decided as a matter of law in “Spivey;” (2) RCW 51.32.185 shifted both the burden of production and burden of persuasion to the employer; (3) in “Larson,” jury instruction 9 was proper; and ( 4) Larson was entitled to attorney fees at the Board level. The Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in “Larson” and reversed in “Spivey.” View "Spivey v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dean Wilcox fell 50 feet through an open catwalk hatch onto a concrete floor. Having sustained severe injuries, he sued the on-site safety planner, Steven Basehore, for negligent planning causing the fall; Wilcox also named the safety planner's employer, Bartlett Services, Inc., and an intermediary company, ELR Consulting, Inc. (ELR), in respondeat superior. Before trial, the court granted ELR judgment as a matter of law. At trial, the court instructed the jury on the borrowed servant doctrine, an extension of respondeat superior. Wilcox appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court also affirmed: the borrowed servant doctrine was a question for the jury, where complete control was a disputed fact. Whether the servant is loaned through an intermediary does not preclude application of the doctrine. “We decline to consider the implications of Wilcox's indemnification argument because it was raised as a jury instruction challenge for the first time on appeal.” The Court found that judgment as a matter of law was properly granted in favor of ELR because no reasonable jury could find that ELR had a right to control Basehore's conduct. View "Wilcox v. Basehore" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical malpractice action for a lost chance of a better outcome. The parties jointly sought direct discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(4), challenging two pretrial rulings: (1) whether a court should use a "but for" or "substantial factor" standard of causation in loss of chance cases; and (2) whether evidence relating to a contributory negligence defense should be excluded based on the plaintiffs failure to follow his doctor's instructions. The trial court decided that the but for standard applies and the contributory negligence defense was not appropriate in this case. "Traditional tort causation principles guide a loss of chance case." Applying those established principles, under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court concluded a but for cause analysis was appropriate, and affirmed the trial court's ruling on that issue. The Court reverse the trial court's partial summary judgment dismissing the contributory negligence defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dunnington v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Gerald Cook and Francisco Entila were both employees of the Boeing Company. Early in the morning on February 18, 2010, Cook finished work and walked to his vehicle in an employee parking lot. He was driving his personal vehicle out of the lot and onto a Boeing access road. The access road is located on Boeing's property, and it is maintained by Boeing. As Entila walked across the access road, Cook struck and injured him. Entila received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and filed suit against Cook for negligence. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of the immunity provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA) as applied to a third party tort action against another employee when the accident occurred after working hours, but where the injured plaintiff qualified for benefits under the act. The trial court dismissed the suit on summary judgment, holding the act applied to bar suit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that immunity did not apply because the alleged co-employee tortfeasor was not acting in the scope and course of employment. The court also reversed the court's consideration of an injured plaintiff's receipt of IIA benefits in determining immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Entila v. Cook" on Justia Law

Jan DeMeerleer murdered Rebecca Schiering and her nine year old son Philip, and attempted to murder Schiering's older son, Brian Winkler. After the attack, DeMeerleer committed suicide. DeMeerleer had been an outpatient of psychiatrist Dr. Howard Ashby for nine years leading up to the attack, during which time he expressed suicidal and homicidal ideations but never named Schiering or her children as potential victims. At issue in this case was whether Ashby, as a mental health professional, owed DeMeerleer's victims a duty of care based on his relationship with DeMeerleer. After review, the Supreme Court held that Ashby and DeMeerleer shared a special relationship and that special relationship required Ashby to act with reasonable care, consistent with the standards of the mental health profession, to protect the foreseeable victims of DeMeerleer. Ashby conceded the existence of a special relationship between him and DeMeerleer; the foreseeability of DeMeerleer's victims was a question of fact appropriately resolved by the fact finder. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the medical negligence claim. View "Volk v. DeMeerleer" on Justia Law

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

Highland High School quarterback Matthew Newman suffered a permanent brain injury at a football game in 2009, one day after he allegedly sustained a head injury at football practice. Three years later, Newman and his parents (collectively Newman) sued Highland School District No. 203 (Highland) for negligence. Before trial, Highland's counsel interviewed several former coaches and appeared on their behalf at their depositions. Newman moved to disqualify Highland's counsel, asserting a conflict of interest. The superior court denied the motion but ruled that Highland's counsel "may not represent non-employee witness[es] in the future." Newman then sought discovery concerning communications between Highland and the former coaches during time periods when the former coaches were unrepresented by Highland's counsel. Highland moved for a protective order, arguing its attorney-client privilege shielded counsel's communications with the former coaches. The trial court denied the motion, and Highland appealed. At issue was whether postemployment communications between former employees and corporate counsel should have been treated the same as communications with current employees for purposes of applying the corporate attorney-client privilege. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the privilege does not broadly shield counsel's postemployment communications with former employees. The superior court properly denied Highland's motion for a protective order. View "Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203" on Justia Law

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law