Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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In 2021, Lyra Jean Spencer filed a personal injury lawsuit against Franklin Hills Health-Spokane LLC. To serve the summons, her attorney hired a process server who, after learning that the registered agent was unavailable, served the documents to the company's human resources manager, Sheri Flavel. Franklin Hills filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that service on Flavel was improper as she was not authorized to accept service under RCW 4.28.080(9). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Spencer had not met her initial burden to show that service was proper.Spencer appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that Spencer had made a prima facie showing that service to Flavel was proper and the trial court erred in dismissing the case without first holding an evidentiary hearing to determine if Flavel was a “managing agent” or “office assistant” under RCW 4.28.080(9).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted Franklin Hills’s petition for review. The court concluded that the service statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of accomplishing service of process and notice to the defendant. The court held that a person may be a managing agent if they are in charge of a single department of the corporation’s business, even if their discretion is controlled somewhat by a superior, provided that they have substantial managerial responsibilities and authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court found that Flavel, as the human resources manager, met the definition of a managing agent under the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, allowing the lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. View "Spencer v. Franklin Hills Health-Spokane, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the death of a patient, Cindy Essex, who visited Samaritan Hospital's emergency room due to severe shoulder pain. The doctors, who were not employees of the hospital but independent contractors, failed to diagnose her necrotizing fasciitis, a severe soft-tissue infection, leading to her death within 24 hours. The estate of Cindy Essex sought to hold Samaritan Hospital liable for the doctors' alleged negligence under theories of nondelegable duty, inherent function, and agency law principles of delegation.The trial court denied the estate's motion for partial summary judgment concerning Samaritan’s potential vicarious liability for the doctors' alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that ostensible agency is the sole basis for holding a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of nonemployee physicians.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that statutes and regulations impose nondelegable duties on hospitals concerning the provision of emergency services. A hospital remains responsible for those nondelegable duties regardless of whether it performs those duties through its own staff or contracts with doctors who are independent contractors. The court also found that the estate provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment concerning its corporate negligence claim against Samaritan. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Essex v. Grant County Public Hospital District No. 1" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to consider a class action suit brought by patients against MultiCare Health System, Inc., a Washington corporation that operates Good Samaritan Hospital. The suit arose after a nurse employed by MultiCare, Cora Weberg, improperly diverted injectable narcotics for her own use and infected some emergency department patients with hepatitis C. The patients claimed that MultiCare failed to meet the accepted standard of care in supervising and hiring Nurse Weberg. The trial court divided the class into two groups: those who were assigned to Nurse Weberg and those who were not. It then dismissed the claims of the second group. The trial court ruled that legal causation was not satisfied because Nurse Weberg did not directly treat these patients. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed both courts and held that legal causation is satisfied. The court held that both classes can proceed with their chapter 7.70 RCW claims, which govern civil actions for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care. The court reasoned that the General Treatment Class's injuries arose as a result of health care, allowing their claim under chapter 7.70 RCW to proceed. The court also found that legal causation is satisfied when a hospital’s negligent supervision and hiring potentially exposes patients to a bloodborne pathogen, inducing fear and requiring blood testing. Thus, the court concluded that the General Treatment Class's claims should not have been dismissed. View "M.N. v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered two questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding a university's duty of care towards its students. The plaintiff, a student, alleged that the defendant university was negligent in failing to protect her from being raped by a fellow student, who had prior complaints of sexual misconduct, at an off-campus party. The first question asked whether under Washington law a university has a special relationship with its students that gives rise to a duty to use reasonable care to protect them from foreseeable harm caused by other students. The Court answered yes, indicating that such a relationship exists as defined by the common law principles laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344. This duty applies when a student is on campus or participating in university-sponsored activities. The second question asked about the scope of this duty. The Court determined that the duty applies within the confines of the university campus or at university-controlled events, and is based on a student's enrollment and presence on campus. The Court did not extend this duty to off-campus situations or situations not under the university's control. Therefore, the Court concluded that the university was not liable for the plaintiff's off-campus assault. View "Barlow v. State" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to determine whether a landowner could delegate its duty to protect invitees on its premises from known or obvious dangers to an independent contractor. The case arose from the death of Jeffry Eylander, an employee of an independent contractor, Commercial Industrial Roofing Inc. (CIR), who fell through a skylight while cleaning the roof of a warehouse owned by Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund and Prologis Management LLC (collectively, Prologis). Eylander's daughter, as personal representative of his estate, sued Prologis for wrongful death, alleging that Prologis had breached its duty of reasonable care to protect Eylander from harm.The Court held that Prologis had reasonably delegated its duty of reasonable care to protect invitees from known or obvious dangers to CIR. The Court found that Prologis had fulfilled its duty by selecting a professional and experienced contractor, CIR, and by requiring CIR to follow all applicable laws, be solely responsible for the health and safety of its employees, and create and post a site-specific safety plan before starting work. Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Prologis. View "Eylander v. Prologis Targeted U.S. Logistics Fund" on Justia Law

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In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution. View "Bennett v. United States" on Justia Law

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Carmella DeSean sought a Sexual Assault Protection Order Act (SAPOA) order against Isaiah Sanger after an evening of drinking ended in unwanted sex. At the evidentiary hearing, Sanger argued DeSean consented and had capacity to do so. The trial court found DeSean lacked capacity due to intoxication, declined to consider Sanger’s defense, and granted the SAPO. Sanger appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the SAPOA and Nelson v. Duvall, 387 P.3d 1158 (2017), the trial court should have considered Sanger’s affirmative defense. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the SAPOA did not permit respondents in nonconsensual sexual penetration cases to raise the affirmative defense that they reasonably believed the victim had capacity to consent. "The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and omits affirmative defenses. The SAPOA functions independently from the criminal code, and we decline to graft a criminal defense into a statute intended to provide sexual assault victims with civil remedies." View "DeSean v. Sanger" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an invitee, was allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos on the defendant landowner’s property. The landowner, petitioner ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), requested a jury instruction to limit its potential liability for injuries caused by “known or obvious” dangers pursuant to § 343A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1965). The trial court declined to give the § 343A instruction, and the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mobil argued that the jury should have been instructed on both §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement as a matter of law. According to Mobil, an instruction on § 343A was necessary to make the jury instructions complete and to allow Mobil to argue its theory of the case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: “it is well established that the issuance of jury instructions is ‘within the trial court’s discretion’ and that instructions on ‘a party’s theory of the case’ are not ‘required’ unless they are supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” View "Wright v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

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This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law