Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Erika Rickman brought this suit against her former employer, Premera Blue Cross, for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Rickman alleged she was terminated in retaliation for raising concerns about potential violations of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and its Washington counterpart, the Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA). The trial court dismissed Rickman's suit on Premera's motion for summary judgment, concluding Rickman could not satisfy the jeopardy element of the tort because Premera's internal reporting system provided an adequate alternative means to promote the public policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted review of this case and two others in order to resolve confusion with respect to the jeopardy element of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Consistent with its decisions in the other two cases, the Court held that nothing in Premera' s internal reporting system, nor in HIPAA or UHCIA, precluded Rickman's claim of wrongful discharge. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals but remanded for that court to address Premera's alternate argument for upholding the trial court's order of dismissal. View "Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

Edward Gorre was a firefighter employed by the city of Tacoma (City), who suffered from valley fever (coccidioidomycosis). Gorre's diagnosis was not disputed. At issue was whether valley fever was considered a "respiratory disease" or an "infectious disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) or (d) that shifts the burden of proving the disease's proximate cause from Gorre to the employer City. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's judgment in the City's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that "respiratory disease," as used in RCW 51.32.185(1 )(a), referred only to diseases that medical experts diagnose as respiratory diseases. The Court also concluded that the "infectious diseases" qualifying for RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s evidentiary presumption were limited to those diseases specifically enumerated in RCW 51.32.185( 4 ). Because medical experts in Gorre's case testified that valley fever was an infectious disease, not a respiratory one, and because it was not one of the infectious diseases enumerated in RCW 51.32.185(4), the presumption did not apply. View "Gorre v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

In 2013, SeaTac city voters approved a local initiative to establish the minimum wage for hospitality and transportation workers at $15-per-hour. Opponents of "Proposition 1" challenged the validity under state and federal law. The trial court largely rejected the challenges, with two exceptions: (1) under state law, Proposition 1 could not be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport; and (2) federal labor law preempted a provision of Proposition 1 protecting workers from certain types of retaliation. The Washington Supreme Court reversed both of these rulings, holding that Proposition 1 could be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport because there was no indication that it would interfere with airport operations. The Court also held that federal labor law did not preempt the provision protecting workers from retaliation. The Court otherwise affirmed the trial court and upheld Proposition 1 in its entirety. View "Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac" on Justia Law

The United District Court for the Western District of Washington certified two questions of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The questions arose from a class action employment lawsuit then pending in the federal court. This case began in 2013 when two workers sued Sakuma Brothers Farms Inc. in federal district court on behalf of all seasonal and migrant agricultural workers Sakuma employed. Sakuma paid a "piece rate" wage based on the Workers' productivity. The piece rate was the only compensation the Workers received. In the only claim relevant here, the Workers alleged that Sakuma deprived them of paid rest breaks required by WAC 296-131-020(2). The Workers contended "on the employer's time" meant that Sakuma had to pay a wage separate from the piece rate for the 10-minute period they are on break, since no piece rate wages accumulate during that time. Sakuma responded that it sets the piece rate with rest periods in mind and that breaks were therefore "on the employer's time" as regulated. The Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of WAC 296-131-020(2) required employers to pay employees for rest breaks separate and apart from the piece rate. "An all-inclusive piece rate compensates employees for rest breaks by deducting pay from the wages the employee has accumulated that day. Hourly employees do not finance their own rest breaks in this way, and requiring pieceworkers to do so strips the phrase 'on the employer's time' of any practical meaning. That same language requires that rest breaks for pieceworkers be paid at least at the applicable minimum wage or the employee's regular rate, whichever is greater." View "Demetrio v. Sakuma Bros. Farms" on Justia Law

This case arose from an interest arbitration award that retroactively increased employee health care premiums for a period when there was no enforceable collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Superior Court struck a portion of the award that granted the retroactive increase, ruling that the award: (1) was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the due process clause; (2) violated Washington's wage rebate act (WRA); and (3) was arbitrary and capricious. Kitsap County appealed this ruling and the Washington Supreme Court granted direct review. Finding the arbitration award proper, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Kitsap County Deputy Sheriffs' Guild v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law

Linda Darkenwald worked as a dental hygienist in the office of Dr. Gordon Yamaguchi from 1985 to 2010. Initially, Darkenwald worked one day a week, but she increased this to two days a week and then four days a week. In 1998, she suffered a neck and back injury. Darkenwald received worker's compensation benefits after the Department of Labor and Industries found that she had a permanent impairment. Despite her injury, Darkenwald continued to work three to four days a week until 2006. From that point on, Darkenwald worked only on Mondays and Wednesdays, for a total of 14 to 17 hours per week. In 2010, Dr. Yamaguchi added another dentist to his practice, and asked Darkenwald to return to working three days a week. In the alternative, he offered her a position as an on-call or substitute hygienist. Darkenwald found neither of these alternatives acceptable and thus interpreted Dr. Yamaguchi's request as a termination of her employment. Darkenwald believed she had been fired, while Dr. Yamaguchi believed that she had quit. Darkenwald appealed the Washington Employment Security Department's denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The issue her case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a desire to work only part time constituted a good cause reason for leaving work, thus permitting an individual who left work for that reason to collect unemployment benefits. The Court found that Darkenwald relied on a statute that did not apply to her and would not give her good cause to leave work even if it were applicable. Furthermore, the Employment Security Act (Act), Title 50 RCW, listed good-cause reasons for voluntarily leaving work and states that this list is exclusive; a desire to perform only part-time wor View "Darkenwald v. Emp't Sec. Dep't" on Justia Law

Scott Walter Maziar sustained injuries while on board a ferry operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC). Maziar used the ferry to get to and from work. Since Maziar was injured at sea, he brought a general maritime negligence claim against the DOC. He initially requested a jury trial, but he moved to strike his demand because he thought that no jury trial right existed for general maritime negligence cases. The DOC objected, but the trial court agreed with Maziar, struck his jury request, and awarded him damages after a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on the jury trial issue but on different grounds, holding that although a jury trial right generally applied to general maritime negligence actions in state court. The State did not have a constitutional or statutory jury trial right in tort actions. The issue this case presented on appeal was whether the State had a jury trial right in tort actions. The Court held that it does: several statutes read together demonstrate that the legislature meant to treat the State as if it were a private party with regard to matters of civil procedure and confer on any party (including the State) the right to have a jury determine most matters of fact. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a jury trial. View "Maziar v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Patricia Doss filed a claim for workers' compensation with the Department of Labor and Industries after suffering chemical exposure during the course of employment with The Boeing Company. The exposure permanently aggravated her preexisting asthma, and she needed ongoing medical treatment as a result of these combined injuries. The Department determined that the combined effects of Doss's preexisting asthma and the aggravation of this condition during her Boeing employment rendered her permanently totally disabled. A right knee injury also contributed to Doss's preexisting disability. Due to her permanent total disability, the Department awarded Doss a pension. Boeing agreed to pay for the portion of the pension attributable to Doss' workplace injury but challenged the Department's order requiring it to pay for her postpension medical treatment. Boeing argued that the cost of this treatment should also be covered by the second injury fund. Boeing appealed to the Board. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Boeing, as a self-insured employer, was entitled to second injury fund relief for a Doss' postpension medical costs. The Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of the governing statutes did not allow a charge to the second injury fund for postpension medical treatment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Boeing Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

In 2011, Michael Henne, a Yakima police officer, filed an employment-related lawsuit against his employer, the city of Yakima. Several other officers had filed complaints about Henne's behavior, resulting in internal investigations of Henne. Henne's lawsuit alleged that those other officers' complaints lodged against him formed a pattern of harassment and retaliation that amounted to a hostile workplace. He sued Yakima for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its employees, which, he asserted, perpetuated a hostile work environment and entitled him to damages. Yakima responded to Henne's complaint not with an answer but with a motion to strike under RCW 4.24.525, the 2010 anti-SLAPP statute. Yakima's motion asserted that because Henne's claims were based on coworker complaints and the city's resulting internal investigations, a new, broader anti-SLAPP statute applied to those claims. In other words, Yakima claimed the protection of the anti-SLAPP suit law because it received controversial communications from others; Yakima made no communications of its own. The Supreme Court held that a governmental entity like Yakima cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statutes at least where, as here, the challenged lawsuit is not based on the government's own communicative activity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss as moot Yakima's appeal of the trial court's decision to deny Yakima's anti-SLAPP motion. Instead, the Court held that the case was ripe for review and reinstated the trial court's decision to deny Yakima's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Henne v. City of Yakima" on Justia Law

In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law