Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Gerald Cook and Francisco Entila were both employees of the Boeing Company. Early in the morning on February 18, 2010, Cook finished work and walked to his vehicle in an employee parking lot. He was driving his personal vehicle out of the lot and onto a Boeing access road. The access road is located on Boeing's property, and it is maintained by Boeing. As Entila walked across the access road, Cook struck and injured him. Entila received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and filed suit against Cook for negligence. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of the immunity provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA) as applied to a third party tort action against another employee when the accident occurred after working hours, but where the injured plaintiff qualified for benefits under the act. The trial court dismissed the suit on summary judgment, holding the act applied to bar suit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that immunity did not apply because the alleged co-employee tortfeasor was not acting in the scope and course of employment. The court also reversed the court's consideration of an injured plaintiff's receipt of IIA benefits in determining immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Entila v. Cook" on Justia Law

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A police dog bit a police officer during a nighttime search for a burglary suspect in an abandoned building. Dog owners are usually strictly liable for dog bite damages. However, there is a statutory exception to strict liability for dog bites caused by the "lawful application of a police dog." At issue in this case was whether the County was strictly liable for an on-duty police dog biting an on-duty police officer. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the County was not subject to strict liability. View "Finch v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

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After the Department of Labor and Industries (Department) learned it had been overpaying respondent Jose Birrueta's industrial insurance benefits for years, it issued two orders, one assessing an overpayment and another changing Birrueta's status from married to unmarried for compensation purposes. Because Birrueta was overpaid due solely to an innocent misrepresentation about his marital status made on his behalf, the Supreme Court held the Department's orders were timely and authorized. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the ruling of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals upholding the Department's orders. View "Birrueta v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

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In 2000, the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) created a new option for eligible retirees in which the retiree could opt for a pension that would allow a surviving spouse to continue to receive monthly pension benefits at the same amount after the retiree's death. To make this pension actuarially equivalent in value to the previous pension, the DRS provided for a greater reduction in the retiree's monthly benefits. In 2010, the DRS adopted rules that modified the degree of the actuarial reduction. Appellant Tim Lenander challenged the changes to the reduction, arguing that the changes violated the statutory scheme and impaired his contract right to a lower reduction in his pension payment. The Supreme Court found Lenander's arguments unavailing, holding that the DRS acted within its authority in amending the survivor benefit actuarial reduction regulations as set forth under former WACs 415-02-380 (2010) and 415-103-215 (2010). In amending these regulations, the DRS did not violate the contract clause of article I, section 23 of the Washington Constitution. Consequently, the Court held that the DRS did not infringe on Lenander's right to an "actuarial equivalent" survivor benefit, and that Lenander did not suffer substantial impairment to his pension contract rights. View "Lenander v. Dep't of Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

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Alsco, Inc. was a textile rental and sales company that supplied uniforms, linens, and other products to other businesses in industrial, hospitality, health care, and other fields. Alsco did not provide products or services for resale. Alsco and its employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review turned on whether Alsco was a "retail or service establishment" (RSE) under chapter 49.46 RCW for purposes of an exemption to the overtime pay requirement. The trial court granted the employees' motion for summary judgment regarding entitlement to overtime pay, finding that Alsco was not an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay exception. In granting the employees' subsequent motion for summary judgment on the issue of calculating the amount of overtime due, the court calculated the "regular rate of pay" by dividing the total weekly compensation actually paid by 40 hours, not by hours actually worked. The Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that Alsco was an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay requirement. View "Cooper v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

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Nine employees of Western State Hospital (WSH) claimed that the hospital illegally took race into account when making staffing decisions in response to patients' race-based threats or demands. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court found that WSH managers issued a staffing directive that prevented African-American staff from working with a violent patient making threats over the course of one weekend in 2011. Despite this race-based staffing directive, the trial court entered a verdict for the State and dismissed Employees' employment discrimination claims. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's racially discriminatory staffing directive violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). View "Blackburn v. Washington" on Justia Law

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John Kovacs injured his back while working for Pro Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. on September 29, 2010. Kovacs filed an application for benefits on September 29, 2011. The Department of Labor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. Kovacs's employer challenged the award, arguing that Kovacs's application was not timely. In response, the department reversed its decision, rejected the claim, and ordered Kovacs to pay back the benefits already paid to him. Kovacs appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the department's decision that the application was untimely. Kovacs appealed again to the superior court, which reversed the board's decision, held that Kovacs's claim was "timely within the meaning of RCW 51.28.050," entered judgment for Kovacs, and granted Kovacs's motion for attorney fees. By divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The Supreme Court found that applications for workers' compensation benefits had to be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." Generally, the day of injury is excluded from time calculations. The Court determined that the legislature did not intend to include the day of injury in calculating the time to file a worker's compensation claim, and held that the one-year statute of limitations here began to run the day after the injury and reversed. View "Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

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Lyons Enterprises Inc. was a regional franchisor of an international janitorial franchise operating in western Washington. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) determined that some of Lyons' franchisees, those that did not actually employ subordinates, met the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA, Title 51 RCW) definition of "worker" and assessed workers' compensation premiums against Lyons for those franchisees. The parties appealed the initial agency audit through four different administrative and judicial bodies that reached varying results as to whether Lyons' franchisees were covered workers. As part of these determinations, each adjudicative body that ruled that Lyons' franchisees were workers had also considered whether the franchisees were exempt from coverage under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "White v. Department of Labor & Industries," (294 P.2d 650 (1956)) or under RCW 51.08.195. "[T]he answer to the exemption question has changed at nearly every level of review." Whether the franchisor-franchisee relationship was subject to the IIA was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Board to determine which of Lyons' franchisees actually employed subordinates. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

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In a workers' compensation appeal, the trial court denied the worker-employee's proposed instruction, which would inform the jury that it must give special consideration to the (opinion) testimony of his attending physician. The trial court ruled against the worker. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on an unrelated basis (holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it refused the worker's request to revise the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' (Board) erroneous finding regarding the location of his injury). However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court correctly rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether it was error to refuse to give the special consideration instruction. The Court held the instruction should have been given. View "Clark County v. McManus" on Justia Law