Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alsco, Inc. was a textile rental and sales company that supplied uniforms, linens, and other products to other businesses in industrial, hospitality, health care, and other fields. Alsco did not provide products or services for resale. Alsco and its employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review turned on whether Alsco was a "retail or service establishment" (RSE) under chapter 49.46 RCW for purposes of an exemption to the overtime pay requirement. The trial court granted the employees' motion for summary judgment regarding entitlement to overtime pay, finding that Alsco was not an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay exception. In granting the employees' subsequent motion for summary judgment on the issue of calculating the amount of overtime due, the court calculated the "regular rate of pay" by dividing the total weekly compensation actually paid by 40 hours, not by hours actually worked. The Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that Alsco was an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay requirement. View "Cooper v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

Nine employees of Western State Hospital (WSH) claimed that the hospital illegally took race into account when making staffing decisions in response to patients' race-based threats or demands. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court found that WSH managers issued a staffing directive that prevented African-American staff from working with a violent patient making threats over the course of one weekend in 2011. Despite this race-based staffing directive, the trial court entered a verdict for the State and dismissed Employees' employment discrimination claims. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's racially discriminatory staffing directive violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). View "Blackburn v. Washington" on Justia Law

John Kovacs injured his back while working for Pro Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. on September 29, 2010. Kovacs filed an application for benefits on September 29, 2011. The Department of Labor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. Kovacs's employer challenged the award, arguing that Kovacs's application was not timely. In response, the department reversed its decision, rejected the claim, and ordered Kovacs to pay back the benefits already paid to him. Kovacs appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the department's decision that the application was untimely. Kovacs appealed again to the superior court, which reversed the board's decision, held that Kovacs's claim was "timely within the meaning of RCW 51.28.050," entered judgment for Kovacs, and granted Kovacs's motion for attorney fees. By divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The Supreme Court found that applications for workers' compensation benefits had to be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." Generally, the day of injury is excluded from time calculations. The Court determined that the legislature did not intend to include the day of injury in calculating the time to file a worker's compensation claim, and held that the one-year statute of limitations here began to run the day after the injury and reversed. View "Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Lyons Enterprises Inc. was a regional franchisor of an international janitorial franchise operating in western Washington. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) determined that some of Lyons' franchisees, those that did not actually employ subordinates, met the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA, Title 51 RCW) definition of "worker" and assessed workers' compensation premiums against Lyons for those franchisees. The parties appealed the initial agency audit through four different administrative and judicial bodies that reached varying results as to whether Lyons' franchisees were covered workers. As part of these determinations, each adjudicative body that ruled that Lyons' franchisees were workers had also considered whether the franchisees were exempt from coverage under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "White v. Department of Labor & Industries," (294 P.2d 650 (1956)) or under RCW 51.08.195. "[T]he answer to the exemption question has changed at nearly every level of review." Whether the franchisor-franchisee relationship was subject to the IIA was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Board to determine which of Lyons' franchisees actually employed subordinates. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

In a workers' compensation appeal, the trial court denied the worker-employee's proposed instruction, which would inform the jury that it must give special consideration to the (opinion) testimony of his attending physician. The trial court ruled against the worker. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial on an unrelated basis (holding that the trial court reversibly erred when it refused the worker's request to revise the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' (Board) erroneous finding regarding the location of his injury). However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court correctly rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether it was error to refuse to give the special consideration instruction. The Court held the instruction should have been given. View "Clark County v. McManus" on Justia Law

Bart Rowley Sr. was injured while driving a truck for work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) denied Rowley's claim because it determined that Rowley was injured while committing a felony: possession of a controlled substance. The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, barred payment of workers' compensation under that circumstance. Rowley filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). After considering testimony from several witnesses, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) found that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Department's decision and ordered the Department to approve Rowley's claim. The Department challenged that order four times: in an appeal before a three-member board panel, at superior court, at the Court of Appeals, and finally to the Washington Supreme Court. Every lower court affirmed the IAJ's decision that Rowley was entitled to benefits. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding on the applicable evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court also agreed that Rowley was entitled to benefits. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Rowley" on Justia Law

Farmworkers filed a class action lawsuit against four corporate defendants. Two questions of Washington law were certified to the Washington Supreme Court, arising from this suit: The first question implicated RCW 19.30.010(2)'s definition of a "farm labor contractor." The second question implicated RCW 19.30.200, which imposed joint and several liability for Farm Labor Contractor Act (FLCA) violations. The certified questions required the Supreme Court to decide whether defendant-appellant NW Management and Realty Services Inc. was a "farm labor contractor" under RCW 19.30.01 0(2) and, if so, whether the other defendants "knowingly use[ d]" its services under RCW 19.30.200 (There is no dispute that NW was unlicensed at all times relevant to this case). The plain language of the FLCA compels the Washington Court to answer yes to both certified questions. View "Saucedo v. John Hancock Life & Health Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brian Long sued his former employer, Bo Brusco and Brusco Tug & Barge Inc. (Brusco), alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for opposing Brusco's discriminatory conduct against another employee. The underlying facts were disputed, and centered on Brusco's response to Long's having hired as a deckhand Anthony Morgan, an individual who had a prosthetic leg. Long appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial based on a claim of juror misconduct. As the trial court explained in its order denying Long's motion for a new trial, "it was repeatedly conveyed to the jury that whether or not, in hindsight, Mr. Morgan was discriminated against was not their concern; rather, their focus should begin with the question of whether or not Mr. Long, at that time, had a reasonable belief that Mr. Morgan was being discriminated against." The question before the Washington Supreme Court was whether the juror declarations Long submitted in support of his motion describe actual misconduct by jurors or instead reveal matters that inhere in the verdict. The Court concluded the declarations expose the jury's deliberative process behind closed doors and cannot be considered to impeach the verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court and the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Long was not entitled to a new trial. View "Long v. Brusco Tug & Barge, Inc." on Justia Law

The jeopardy element of the tort for wrongful discharge against public policy and whether the administrative remedies available under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) were at issue in this case. This was one of three concomitant cases before the Washington Supreme Court concerning the "adequacy of alternative remedies" component of the jeopardy element that some of Washington cases seemingly embrace. The complaint here alleged that Anderson Hay & Grain Company terminated petitioner Charles Rose from his position as a semi-truck driver when he refused to falsify his drivetime records and drove in excess of the federally mandated drive-time limits. Rose had worked as a truck driver for over 30 years, the last 3 of which he worked as an employee for Anderson Hay. In March 2010, Rose sued under the STAA in federal court but his suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he failed to first file with the secretary of labor. Rose then filed a complaint in Kittitas County Superior Court, seeking remedy under the common law tort for wrongful discharge against public policy. The trial court dismissed his claim on summary judgment, holding that the existence of the federal administrative remedy under the STAA prevented Rose from establishing the jeopardy element of the tort. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the appellate court for reconsideration in light of "Piel v. City of Federal Way," (306 P.3d 879 (2013)). Like the statute at issue in Piel, the STAA contained a nonpreemption clause. On remand, the Court of Appeals distinguished Rose's case from Piel, and again affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court addressed the cases the Court of Appeals used as basis for its decision, and held that adequacy of alternative remedies component misapprehended the role of the common law and the purpose of this tort and had to be stricken from the jeopardy analysis. The Court "re-embraced" the formulation of the tort as initially articulated in those cases, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co." on Justia Law