Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A 16-year-old girl, Luna, was involved in a fatal altercation with another teenager, S.P.T., whom she knew only through social media. The conflict began when S.P.T. arrived at Luna’s home and initiated a physical fight by punching Luna. Luna responded by using a pocketknife, resulting in S.P.T.’s death. Prior to the incident, Luna had received social media messages that she interpreted as threats, including an image suggesting gang violence. The State charged Luna with murder, and she was tried as an adult.In the Kitsap County Superior Court, the State was permitted to introduce various pieces of social media evidence and a video of Luna’s police interrogation to suggest preexisting violent intent and lack of remorse. Luna argued self-defense and sought to introduce additional social media evidence to support her fear of S.P.T., but some of this evidence was excluded. The jury found Luna guilty of intentional, but not premeditated, second-degree murder. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that some social media evidence was improperly admitted but deemed the error harmless. The appellate court also held that a new statute requiring juveniles to be provided counsel before interrogation did not apply retroactively to Luna’s case.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the new statute, RCW 13.40.740, did not apply retroactively to Luna’s interrogation. However, the court found that Luna did not validly waive her right to silence, and her interrogation statements should have been excluded. The court also determined that several evidentiary rulings regarding social media evidence were erroneous and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Supreme Court vacated the jury verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Luna" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after reports of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Two of the children, C.V.I. and C.J.J.I., are considered “Indian children” under federal and state law due to their tribal affiliations, while the third, R.A.R., is not. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families sought and obtained orders for out-of-home placement and later filed dependency petitions. The children spent several months in foster care while the court process unfolded, with the Department offering various services to the mother and involving the relevant tribe.The Spokane County Superior Court (juvenile court) held a fact-finding hearing and found the children dependent but ruled that whether the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family was a dispositional issue, not required at the dependency stage. The court ordered the children to remain in out-of-home care until disposition. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court found that the Department had made active efforts and continued the children’s out-of-home placement. The mother appealed, arguing that the Department was required to prove “active efforts” at the dependency hearing. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not making an “active efforts” finding at the dependency hearing, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that when a child is placed outside the home, the juvenile court must find that the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before entering an order of dependency. If such findings are not made, the dependency and dispositional orders must be vacated, and the children must be returned to their parent unless doing so would subject them to substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "In re Dependency of C.J.J.I." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old juvenile pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault and was placed under community supervision with several conditions, including abstaining from alcohol. Over several months, she repeatedly violated these conditions, including using alcohol, failing to report to her probation officer, and leaving her home. The State sought multiple bench warrants, ultimately arguing that her actions, including a suicide attempt while intoxicated, posed a serious threat to public safety. The juvenile court issued a bench warrant, finding that her conduct met the “serious threat to public safety” standard required by a court rule, JuCR 7.16.On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the facts did not meet JuCR 7.16’s “serious threat to public safety” requirement, as the connection between her actions and a threat to public safety was too attenuated. However, the appellate court also held that JuCR 7.16 irreconcilably conflicted with RCW 13.40.040, a statute with less restrictive prerequisites for issuing juvenile arrest warrants. The majority concluded that JuCR 7.16 was substantive, not procedural, and therefore invalid because it conflicted with the legislature’s authority over substantive law. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the rule as procedural.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that JuCR 7.16 is a procedural rule governing the issuance of warrants and falls within the court’s inherent, constitutional, and statutory authority. The court further held that JuCR 7.16 and RCW 13.40.040 can be harmonized, requiring courts to satisfy both sets of prerequisites before issuing a warrant. The court also clarified that “serious threat to public safety” under JuCR 7.16 does not include threats solely to the juvenile’s own safety. The Supreme Court declined to recuse itself from the case. View "State v. A.M.W." on Justia Law

A minor, J.H.-M., was adjudicated guilty of second-degree rape by forcible compulsion. The juvenile court imposed a Special Sex Offender Disposition Alternative, including 30-40 weeks of confinement, suspended for a 24-month supervision period. Conditions of supervision included maintaining employment or school enrollment, compliance with treatment requirements, and registration. Although the sentencing judge verbally declined to impose a condition prohibiting sexually explicit material, the written order included this prohibition.J.H.-M. appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the condition prohibiting sexually explicit material was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The State initially moved to concede error based on the judge's verbal statement, but Division One of the Court of Appeals denied the motion and directed briefing on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the condition, concluding it was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, distinguishing it from a similar condition in a previous case, State v. Padilla.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that the condition prohibiting sexually explicit material was not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that the term "sexually explicit conduct" was sufficiently defined by prior case law and the referenced statute, former RCW 9.68A.011(4), which provided specific examples of prohibited acts. The court concluded that the condition provided adequate notice of proscribed conduct and ascertainable standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. The Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the condition and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. J.H.-M." on Justia Law

In 2001, a 17-year-old Morris Mullins killed a 78-year-old widow, Amy Davis, and was charged as an adult with rape and aggravated murder. Mullins pled guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the State dropping the rape charge and not seeking the death penalty. He was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). At the sentencing, the court considered evidence of Mullins’s dysfunctional upbringing and psychological evaluation but ultimately imposed a juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentence.Mullins later challenged his sentence as unconstitutional, citing the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In 2013, he filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. The district court denied his motion in 2016, and Mullins’s appeal was delayed until 2020 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the sentencing court properly considered Mullins’s youth and potential for change as required by Miller and subsequent cases. The court found that the sentencing judge’s comments suggested ambiguity about Mullins’s capacity for change, undermining confidence in the constitutionality of the JLWOP sentence. The court vacated Mullins’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need to consider the constitutional implications of Mullins’s youth and potential for rehabilitation. View "Galassi v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

A child, Baby Boy B (BBB), was removed from his mother, JB, shortly after birth and placed in shelter care with his maternal grandmother. The King County Superior Court held shelter care hearings in April, May, and June, finding no contested issues and maintaining prior orders. The court then decided not to hold additional hearings unless there was a motion alleging a change in circumstances, based on King County Superior Court Local Juvenile Court Rule (LJuCR) 2.5.The trial court found that JB's requests for 30-day shelter care hearings were unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources, as her visits were unsupervised. The court stated it would hear motions under LJuCR 2.5 if new issues arose. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, interpreting the statute to not require monthly review hearings for continued shelter care and finding that LJuCR 2.5 was not contrary to RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i) requires trial courts to hold shelter care review hearings every 30 days while the dependency decision is pending, unless there is a valid waiver or agreed continuance. The court emphasized that ongoing judicial oversight is necessary to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of the child, and to hold parties accountable. The court found that King County LJuCR 2.5 was inconsistent with the statute. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Dependency of Baby Boy B." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

Michael Reynolds Jr. received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for a crime he committed at age 33. The events triggering that sentence, though, were his two “strikes” under Washington’s “three strikes” law—one of which Reynolds committed at age 17, when he was a juvenile. If Reynolds’ current sentence constituted punishment for his earlier offense committed at age 17, then it would be unconstitutional under case law. But under the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent precedent, his current sentence did not constitute punishment for that prior offense. In Washington v. Moretti, decided two years after Bassett, the Supreme Court held that a “three strikes” sentence of mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole constituted punishment for the last crime or third “strike,” not the earlier first or second “strikes.” “And for years, we have held that our state’s ‘three strikes’ law as applied to adults does not violate article I, section 14.2 That assessment could certainly change over time. But in this case, the parties have not asked us to overrule it.” The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law