Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Petitioner Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Respondent sought to collect Petitioner's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money could not be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned." Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . .retirement allowance." The survey of case law and the plain language in the LEOFF exemption statutes indicate that the latter statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not after receipt. View "Anthis v. Copland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company" and "Weismann v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" for the purpose of clarifying the pro rata sharing rule announced in several precedential cases, including "Mahler v. Szucs" (957 P.2d 632). The rule is based on the "common fund" exception to the "American rule" on attorney fees. The rule requires personal injury protection (PIP) insurers to share pro rata in the attorney fees incurred by injured persons when the PIP insurer wins at trial. Plaintiffs in these cases recovered PIP funds as insureds under policies held by the tortfeasors. They incurred attorney fees arising from the recovery of the liability insurance. The insurance companies attempted to offset the funds expended under PIP policies by reducing plaintiffs' award under the tortfeasors' liability insurance. The Court of Appeals held that neither plaintiff was entitled to recoup a pro rata share of attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the pro rata fee sharing rule applied in this context. View "Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

In November 1998, Respondent David Moeller’s 1996 Honda Civic CRX was damaged in a collision. Respondent had an insurance policy through Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers). Farmers chose to repair Respondent's damaged car, and he authorized the repairs. In May 1999, Respondent brought suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Farmers policy holders in Washington State asserting a breach of contract claim on the grounds that Farmers failed to restore his vehicle to its "preloss condition through payment of the difference in the value between the vehicle's pre-loss value and its value after it was damaged, properly repaired and returned." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the contract between Farmers and Respondent provided for the diminished value of the post-accident, repaired car. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the policy language at issue here allowed for recovery for the diminution in value. View "Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

Linda Mohr suffered a trauma-induced stroke and became permanently disabled. She and her husband, Charles, claimed that negligent treatment by her health care providers caused Mrs. Mohr a loss of the chance of a better outcome. In "Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound," the Supreme Court recognized the "lost chance doctrine" in a survival action when the plaintiff died following the alleged failure of his doctor to timely diagnose his lung cancer. The Mohr's case "compel[led]" consideration of whether, in the medical malpractice context, there was a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate result is some serious harm short of death. The Supreme Court held that there was such a cause of action and, accordingly, reversed the order of summary judgment. View "Mohr v. Grantham" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ruled that under the Washington courts' application of "Frye v. United States," there must be general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that a particular type of in utero toxic exposure can cause a particular type of birth defect before expert testimony on causation is admissible. Plaintiff Julie Anderson worked for Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., from 1998 until she filed a safety complaint with the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) and was fired. While it was not officially part of her job, Plaintiff regularly mixed paint. Employees were required by official company policy to wear respirators when mixing paint, but there was reason to believe that the policy was not rigorously enforced and may have been actively undermined by management. Plaintiff gave birth to a son in January 2000. By 2003, it was clear the child suffered from "medical abnormalities." He was diagnosed with a neuronal migration defect, congenital hemiplegia, microcephalus, and a multicystic dysplastic kidney, among other things, along with "delays in motor, communication, cognitive, and adaptive behavior." Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation and subsequent ruling on the issue. The Court held that the Frye test is not implicated if the theory and the methodology relied upon and used by the expert to reach an opinion on causation is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The Court affirmed the trial court's rulings on comparative fault and wrongful discharge. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc." on Justia Law

On certification from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), and Washington’s laws prohibiting driving while under the influence (DUI) are inadequate to promote the public policies underlying them. Plaintiff Matthew Cudney, whose employment was terminated by ALSCO Inc., asserted a claim in federal court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting that a managerial employee drove a company vehicle during business hours while that employee was intoxicated. The issues presented for certification pertained to (1) whether WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace safety and protecting workers who report safety violations so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (2) whether the DUI laws adequately promote the public policy of protecting the public from drunken drivers so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In response, the Court held that both WISHA and the state’s DUI laws adequately promote the stated public policies. View "Cudney v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

Ten special education students and their parents and guardians (Appellants) sued Clover Park School District for intentional torts, outrage, negligence and unlawful discrimination under state law. Clover Park moved for summary judgment to dismiss, arguing that Appellants had not exhausted the administrative remedies available under the state Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The trial court granted Clover Park’s motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to state-law claims nor does Washington State law require exhaustion before filing such claims. View "Dowler v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400" on Justia Law

Central to this case is the proper interpretation of a 2006 statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to a claim for medical malpractice. Appellant Lisa Unruh filed suit against her orthodontist, Dr. Dino Cacchiotti, alleging that his negligent treatment when she was a minor resulted in her losing her teeth and having to undergo extensive implant surgery. The Doctor successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations had expired. At the Court of Appeals, the Doctor raised an alternative ground for dismissing Appellant's case based on an eight-year statute of repose. After requesting supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case for the Supreme Court's review. After review of the applicable legal authority, the Court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose barred Appellant's claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Unruh v. Cacchiotti" on Justia Law

In 1994, Respondent Sylvia Smith began to experience pain in her wrists and swelling in her arms. She was prescribed splints to wear while working for Petitioner Crown, Cork & Seal as a "bagger." In 1997, Respondent sustained an injury at work when a forklift ran over and fractured her leg. In 2005, the Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) determined that because of the forklift accident Respondent was permanently and totally disabled. L&I ordered Crown to place Respondent on the pension rolls. L&I also issued an order that denied Crown "second injury fund" coverage. On Crown's appeal, the superior court reversed the L&I orders. The court concluded that Respondent's wrist injuries preexisted the forklift injury and as such did not constitute a "previous bodily disability." L&I appealed to the Court of Appeals, who reversed the superior court's ruling. The question before the Supreme Court was what constituted a "previous bodily disability" for second injury fund coverage. The Court responded by holding that a "previous bodily injury" under state law is one that "effectively impacts an employee's performance in the workplace or materially diminishes the employee's functional ability to perform the routine activities associated with daily living." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's holding in favor of Respondent. View "Crown, Cork & Seal v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner and Washington resident Delbert Williams was employed by an Idaho employment agency. The agency regularly sent him to work for Pro-Set Erectors, an Idaho construction subcontractor. In 2007, Pro-Set was hired by Respondent Leone & Keeble (L&K), a general contractor. L&K is a Washington company. Later that year, Petitioner was injured on the job. He filed a claim with the Idaho State Insurance Fund, who accepted his claim and issued workers' compensation payments. In late 2008, the payments stopped. Petitioner filed suit against L&K in Washington, but the trial court dismissed his petition citing lack of jurisdiction over Petitioner's Idaho workers' compensation claim. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over Petitioner's claim: "our courts below...seem to have given deference to opinions of the Idaho courts" instead of applying Washington law. L&K argued that because Petitioner received benefits from Idaho, he was barred from bringing the same claim in Washington. Petitioner's claim was allowed under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act, which fell under the jurisdiction of Washington courts. The Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and remanded Petitioner's case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc." on Justia Law