Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Theresa Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Karlin Townsend, a process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Townsend's father at his home. But Townsend did not live at her father's home. Townsend's father later handed the summons and complaint directly to Townsend within the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed for lack of service, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no error with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scanlan v. Townsend" on Justia Law

In August 2007, Winnie Lyons signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering her real property in Burien. The property served as Lyons' primary residence and was also where she operated an adult family home (AFH). Wells Fargo Bank NA was the lender and beneficiary; Northwest Trustee Services LLC (NWTS) was the trustee. In October 2009, an employee of Wells Fargo executed a beneficiary declaration identifying Wells Fargo as trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006. In June 2010, another beneficiary declaration was executed by an employee of Wells Fargo naming Wells Fargo Bank as the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation evidencing the above-referenced loan "or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said obligation." In 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. While Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee's sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold. Wells Fargo told Lyons' attorney that the modification had been approved, the terms of which were that Lyons had to pay $10,000 by a set deadline. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. Lyons made the payment as requested, however, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons' loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan (to be effective May 1, 2012). NWTS received notice of the sale and service release; Lyons received notice of this sale. Lyons' attorney was informed that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, Lyons had received a loan modification, so she was no longer in default. Lyons' attorney again called NWTS to inform them of the loan modification and the sale of the loan. A NWTS employee informed her that Carrington had directed NWTS to continue with the foreclosure sale as scheduled. Lyons' attorney called Carrington and an employee indicated that Carrington did not show the property in foreclosure status. Another employee further indicated that Carrington had not told NWTS to go forward with the sale. Lyons' attorney then sent a cease and desist letter to NWTS and Carrington. Lyons' attorney followed up with NWTS; NWTS acknowledged receipt and informed her the sale was still on but that the matter had been referred to an attorney. Lyons' attorney again spoke with NWTS' attorney, who refused to discontinue the sale. Lyons' attorney filed the complaint. NWTS then executed and recorded a notice of discontinuance of the trustee's sale. Lyons alleged that this situation the foreclosure sale created had serious emotional and economic impacts on her. In addition to the sense of humiliation Lyons felt, Lyons alleged she lost business as a result of the foreclosure process. Lyons asserted that she experienced constant nausea from the stress and continuously worried about losing her business and the subsequent homelessness of herself, her son, and the elderly clients she cared for. NWTS moved for summary judgment. After argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all claims against NWTS. Subsequently, Lyons and the remaining defendants (Stanwich, Carrington, and Wells Fargo) entered a stipulated order of dismissal. Lyons' motion for reconsideration of the order of summary judgment was denied. We granted Lyons' petition for direct review. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the alleged violations of the deed of trust act (DTA) and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but the Court reversed and remanded as to Lyons' Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. View "Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In December 1995, Teresa Schmidt slipped and fell while visiting a Tacoma grocery store. She retained Timothy Coogan to represent her in a claim against the store. Just days before the statute of limitations ran, Coogan filed a complaint naming the wrong defendant. He subsequently filed two amended complaints, but the trial court dismissed the case as barred by the statute of limitations. Schmidt filed a complaint against Coogan, asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. The case went to trial in November 2003, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt and granted recovery for past economic and noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a new trial on the issue of damages only, finding that Coogan was denied a fair trial: Schmidt's counsel gave an improper closing argument, and the damages were so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial. In 2010, Schmidt moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for outrage/reckless infliction of emotional distress, alleging that Coogan harassed, intimidated, and belittled her when she raised the problem of the statute of limitations before it expired. In the 2003 trial, the jury was instructed to determine general damages arising out of Coogan's conduct and malpractice. In the second trial, however, Coogan challenged the availability of general damages in legal malpractice cases. Because her counsel could not find settled authority either affirming or denying the availability of emotional distress damages in Washington, Schmidt sought to add a claim that encompassed the damages. The trial court denied Schmidt's motion to amend. Schmidt also filed a motion for summary judgment on the availability of general damages and a motion in limine. The court denied both motions. After Schmidt rested her case in the damages-only trial, Coogan moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that collectibility was an essential element of legal malpractice and that Schmidt presented no evidence that a judgment against Grocery Outlet would have been collectible. The court denied the motion, and the jury again returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt. Coogan appealed the jury verdict, and Schmidt cross appealed on the ground that general damages are available in attorney malpractice claims and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that collectibility was an essential component of damages that Schmidt failed to prove, and it reversed the trial court's denial of Coogan's motion. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Supreme Court: (1) whether the elements of legal malpractice include the collectibility of an underlying judgment; and (2) whether emotional distress damages are available in legal malpractice cases. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment, holding that the uncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense to legal malpractice that defendant-attorneys must plead and prove. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court properly denied emotional distress damages because Coogan's actions were not particularly egregious, nor was the subject matter personal. View "Schmidt v. Coogan" on Justia Law

In this case, Gary Walston was exposed to asbestos while working at The Boeing Company and was later diagnosed with mesothelioma. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Boeing was immune from suit because Walston had not raised a material question of fact as to whether Boeing had actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. The Supreme Court agreed after its review of the matter: Walston has not made such a showing, and therefore, he was limited to the recovery provided by the IIA' s workers' compensation system. View "Walston v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, under Evidence Rules (ER) 702 through 705, the trial court properly admitted expert biomechanical testimony in an automobile collision case. In August 2006, Dawn Matsunaga rear-ended the car that Cathy Johnson-Forbes was riding in. Johnston-Forbes claimed that she suffered injuries as a result of the collision and sued Matsunaga. Before trial, Matsunaga identified Dr. Allan Tencer as an expert who would be testifying as a biomechanical engineer. In a motion in limine, Johnston-Forbes moved to exclude Tencer's testimony, arguing that he was not qualified as an engineer, that his opinion lacked sufficient foundation, and that in viewing photographs he could not account for Johnston-Forbes's precise body position at the time of impact. The trial court limited Tencer's testimony but denied Johnston-Forbes's motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Matsunaga. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga" on Justia Law

Christiana Anaya suffered from uncontrolled diabetes, which left her susceptible to serious infections. She went to the Toppenish Community Hospital with a urinary tract infection. Blood test results revealed Ms. Anaya had a yeast infection. The lab called Ms. Anaya's primary care facility (the Yakima Valley Farm Workers Clinic) where Respondent Dr. Mark Sauerwein was covering for Ms. Anaya's usual provider. Sauerwein was concerned about the lab results. Due to the serious nature of a blood infection, the doctor decided that if Ms. Anaya was feeling ill, she should come in immediately for treatment. If she was feeling better, it was more likely that the test result was a false positive, a common occurrence in microbiology labs. Dr. Sauerwein used the complete clinical picture available to him to conclude that the lab result was a false positive resulting from contamination but had the nurse contact Mrs. Anaya to move her next appointment up to the following week. Dr. Sauerwein did not tell Mrs. Anaya about the test result. The lab positively identified candida glabrata as the yeast in Ms. Anaya's blood. An infection of glabrata in the blood is serious. Lab microbiologists entered this information into Ms. Anaya's medical record but did not notify Dr. Sauerwein, the Clinic, or anyone else about the positive test result. Before Ms. Anaya's next visit to the Clinic, her condition worsened. Ms. Anaya went to Yakima Memorial Hospital where she was prescribed amphotericin B, which is highly toxic to the kidneys. Given the compromised state of Ms. Anaya's kidneys from her diabetes, a health care provider would not normally prescribe amphotericin B until positively identifying glabrata. Unfortunately, the amphotericin B treatment came too late to stop the infection from spreading to the internal organs. Ms. Anaya died at age 32 of cardiac arrest, deprivation of oxygen to the brain, and fungal sepsis; all stemming from type II diabetes mellitus. Mr. Anaya Gomez, as personal representative of Ms. Anaya's estate, filed suit against Dr. Sauerwein and the Clinic for malpractice. Three weeks before the jury trial, the estate moved to add a claim for failure to obtain informed consent. At the close of Mr. Anaya's case, the defense moved for judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed the informed consent claim, arguing that case law precluded the claim in misdiagnosis cases. The jury then found Dr. Sauerwein did not breach any duty owed to Ms. Anaya. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when a health care provider rules out a particular diagnosis based on the patient's clinical condition-including test results, medical history, presentation upon physical examination, and any other circumstances surrounding the patient's condition that are available to the provider the provider may not be liable for informed consent claims arising from the ruled out diagnosis. The Court affirmed the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gomez v. Sauerwein" on Justia Law

Paul Chan Kim murdered his partner, Baerbel K. Roznowski, after officer Andrew Rensing of the Federal Way Police Department served Kim with an antiharassment order forbidding him to contact or remain near Roznowski. Roznowski's two daughters filed suit against the city of Federal Way, alleging that Rensing's negligent service of the order resulted in Roznowski's death at Kim's hands. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict against the City. The City claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it owed Roznowski no duty under the public duty doctrine, foreclosing any tort liability. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City had a duty to serve the antiharassment order on Kim, and because it had a duty to act, it had a duty to act with reasonable care in serving the order. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motions, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals. View "Washburn v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law

Jared Barton sued Korrine Linvog, her parents Thomas and Madonna Linvog, and the State. Barton reached a settlement with the Linvogs through which the Linvogs agreed to advance Barton money in exchange for his promise not to execute a judgment against them above their insurance policy limits. Neither Barton nor the Linvogs disclosed this settlement to the court or to the State. After a jury trial, Barton was awarded $3.6 million, and the trial court entered judgment against the State and the Linvogs. In the process of paying the judgment, the State discovered the agreement. The State then moved to vacate the judgment on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court denied the motion but sanctioned Barton's attorney for failing to disclose the terms of the agreement. Barton's attorney appealed the sanction. Finding no abuse of discretion in its sanction against Barton's attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barton v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

In "Keller v. City of Spokane," (44 P.3d 845 (2002)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the duty to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways extended "to all persons, whether negligent or fault-free." This case presented an opportunity to clarify the relationship between questions of duty and legal causation in the context of a municipality's or utility's obligation to design and maintain reasonably safe roadways. In this case, the Court held that the reasoning of Keller equally supported a determination of legal causation. Therefore, if the jury finds the negligent placement of the utility pole too close to the roadway was a cause of plaintiff's injuries when defendant's car left the roadway and struck the pole then it was also a legal cause of plaintiff's injuries. View "Lowman v. Wilbur" on Justia Law

In 2003, members of the Committee Against the VietCong Flag disseminated an e-mail message throughout the Olympia Vietnamese community accusing Duc Tan and the Vietnamese Community of Thurston County (VCTC), a nonprofit corporation, of engaging in procommunist activities. Additionally, defendant Norman Le authored three newsletter articles repeating allegations from the e-mail and also accusing Tan and the VCTC of being undercover Viet Cong agents. Tan and the VCTC sued the authors of the publications for defamation. The trial judge determined that Tan and the VCTC were public figures as a matter of law at summary judgment. The case then proceeded to trial where a jury found Le and his coauthors liable for defamation and awarded Tan and the VCTC $310,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal, finding the statements in the e-mail and newsletters were protected opinion supported by disclosed facts, with the exception of the allegation that members of the VCTC, including Tan, were undercover Viet Cong agents. The court found Tan and the VCTC failed to make the requisite showing that the authors published any of the statements with actual malice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defamatory statements made by Nonnan Le and the other authors were not protected opinion and therefore actionable. The Court also held that that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported the jury's finding of actual malice with respect to those statements. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Tan v. Le" on Justia Law