Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On certification from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, the Supreme Court considered whether the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA), and Washington’s laws prohibiting driving while under the influence (DUI) are inadequate to promote the public policies underlying them. Plaintiff Matthew Cudney, whose employment was terminated by ALSCO Inc., asserted a claim in federal court for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting that a managerial employee drove a company vehicle during business hours while that employee was intoxicated. The issues presented for certification pertained to (1) whether WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace safety and protecting workers who report safety violations so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (2) whether the DUI laws adequately promote the public policy of protecting the public from drunken drivers so as to preclude a separate claim by a terminated employee for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In response, the Court held that both WISHA and the state’s DUI laws adequately promote the stated public policies. View "Cudney v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

Commissioner of Public Lands Peter Goldmark sought a writ of mandamus to compel Attorney General Robert McKenna to pursue an appeal of a trial court decision in a condemnation action. Although Mr. McKenna provided representation at the trial court, he refused to pursue the appeal based on his evaluation of the merits of the case. The commissioner wished to appeal, which he discussed with his general counsel, an assistant attorney general. Then the commissioner and the attorney general exchanged correspondence and met on at least one occasion, but the attorney general refused to file the appeal for the commissioner. The attorney general also refused to appoint a special assistant attorney general (SAAG) to pursue the appeal for the commissioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue in this case was one of first impression: the Court had never been "squarely presented" with an instance of the attorney general refusing to represent a state officer on an appeal. "Under the statutes, the responsibility is clear." Because the Court found no discretion within the attorney general’s statutory duty, the Court issued the writ and directed the attorney general to provide the commissioner with legal representation. View "Goldmark v. McKenna" on Justia Law

Appellants Kim Koenig, Lawrence Koss and Althea Paulson sought review of two separate superior court orders that enjoined disclosure of investigative records compiled by the Cities of Puyallup and Mercer Island. The records contained results of internal police department investigations whereby Appellants complained of gross officer misconduct. Appellants argued the records were wrongfully withheld. The appellate court affirmed withholding the records, interpreting case law that held police investigative records relating to an arrest was exempt from retention and copying under state law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's interpretation: "the statute does not exempt information relating to the conduct of the police during the investigation." The Court reversed the trial courts with direction that the trial courts redact the offending officers' identities, but that the description of the police department's investigation should have been produced. View "Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City Of Puyallup" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether RCW 82.02.020, which generally prohibits local governmental bodies from imposing taxes or fees on development, applied to shoreline master programs (SMP) created pursuant to the Shoreline Management Act of 1981. Members of the Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning (CRSP) owned land regulated under Whatcom County's SMP. The group filed a complaint alleging, in part, that the regulations contained in the SMP constituted a direct or indirect tax, fee or charge on development in violation of RCW 8202.020. The superior court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review of the implicated legal authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: "[w]hile local jurisdictions play a role in tailoring SMPs to local conditions, the Shoreline Management Act dictates that the Department of Ecology retains control over the final contents and approval of SMPs. Therefore, SMP regulations are the product of state action and are not subject to RCW 82.02.020." View "Citizens for Rational Shoreline Planning v. Whatcom County" on Justia Law

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS. View "Dolan v. King County" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jack and Delaphine Feil appealed the issuance of development permits for the construction of a pedestrian and bike trail by the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. "Rocky Reach Trail" was scheduled for development entirely on public property. The Feils are orchardists and members of the Right to Farm Association of Baker Flats. Their property abuts the public property on which the proposed trail would be sited. They contended a developed trail would force the removal of mature fruit trees within the right-of-way, and that the trail violated multiple zoning ordinances that governed the area at issue. The Feils brought several unsuccessful appeals through the Commission and state development-management boards before taking their appeal to the superior court. The superior court dismissed their claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the site's comprehensive plan supported the proposed Rocky Reach Trail and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the orchardists' claims. View "Feil v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision. View "Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care" on Justia Law

Petitioners Kittitas County and several other parties challenged two final decisions and orders of the Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (Board). The Board found several provisions of the County's revised comprehensive plan (Plan) and development code noncompliant with the Growth Management Act (GMA). Petitioners argued that the Board misinterpreted the law and acted beyond its jurisdiction, without substantial evidence, and arbitrarily and capriciously in making findings related to rural and agricultural densities and uses, zoning techniques, land use near airports and water resources. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the Board did not improperly disregard evidence and appropriately found that the County violated the GMA by failing to: develop the required written record explaining its rural element; include provisions in its Plan that protect rural areas; provide for a variety of rural densities; protect agricultural land; and protect water resources. However, the Court found that the Board improperly found the County's airport overlay zone was noncompliant with the GMA. The Court remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings with respect to the airport overlay zone. View "Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners Albert Ugas and Daniel Fishburn filed a recall petition against Respondent Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist, charging him with misfeasance and/or malfeasance and breach of his oath of office. Petitioners alleged that Mr. Lindquist failed to investigate alleged corruption and falsification of records by a former county assessor-treasurer. Additionally, Petitioners contended that Mr. Lindquist obstructed justice by deterring law enforcement from investigating the assessor-treasurer. The lower court dismissed Petitioners' affidavit of prejudice and held that the recall petition was legally and factually insufficient. The court awarded Mr. Lindquist $50,000 in attorney fees for Petitioners' intentionally filing a frivolous recall petition in bad faith. Petitioners argued on appeal that their recall petition was legally and factually sufficient and that they should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees. Upon review of the petition and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re Recall of Lindquist" on Justia Law

The issue before the court came from the involuntary commitment of D.F.F. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course under state law. D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing that the mandatory closure of the proceedings violated her rights under the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law was unconstitutional and reversed the commitment order. The Supreme Court held upon review that "a fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceedings falls far short of guaranteeing open justice." The Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the applicable state law (MPR 1.3) is unconstitutional and reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order. The case was remanded for new commitment proceedings. View "In re Detention of D.F.F." on Justia Law