Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Michael Gendler made a public records request for location-specific accident reports from the Washington State Patrol (WSP). The WSP refused to provide the records unless Gendler certified that he would not use the records in any litigation against the State, claiming a federal statute (23 U.S.C. sec. 409) protected the records sought. WSP claimed the records were shielded because they were located in an electronic database that the Department of Transportation (DOT) utilized for purposes related to the federal hazard elimination program. Respondent then brought a suit under the PRA and argued section 409 did not apply to the WSP because it did not compile or collect the information for the hazard elimination program's purposes. Rather, the information was collected pursuant to WSP’s statutory duty under RCW 46.52.060. The trial court agreed and on summary judgment ordered WSP to produce the requested accident reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed because section 409 does not extend to police accident reports generated and received by WSP pursuant to its own statutory duty. View "Gendler v. Batiste" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved a preelection challenge by Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government to an initiative measure (Proposition 1) which repealed an ordinance governing the use of automated traffic safety cameras in the city of Mukilteo. The trial court declined to grant an injunction, and Proposition 1 was placed on the November 2, 2010 Snohomish County general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the legislature expressly granted authority to the governing body of the city of Mukilteo to enact ordinances on the use of automated traffic safety cameras, the subject matter of Proposition 1 was not within the initiative power. The Court reversed the trial court's order that denied the Citizens declaratory relief. View "Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Gov't v. City of Mukilteo" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Snohomish County's motion to dismiss Respondent-Cross Petitioner Scott Stafne's land use petition and complaint. The issue on appeal involved whether a landowner seeking review of a county's decision not to adopt a proposed comprehensive plan amendment must appeal to the growth management hearings board (growth board) before seeking a remedy in superior court. This case also centered on whether a party is entitled to a constitutional writ of certiorari or declaratory relief under the circumstances of this case. The Court of Appeals held that based on its conclusion that appeal to the growth board would be futile, the complaint was properly filed in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Both parties were granted review. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but held that decisions related to amendment of comprehensive plans must be appealed to the growth board under the procedures provided for in the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and failure to do so precludes superior court review. The Court also held that a constitutional writ and declaratory relief are unavailable under the circumstances of this case. View "Stafne v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

Respondents William and Sally Chapin Kiely owned real property in Port Townsend next to property owned by Kenneth and Karen Graves. An alley ran the length of the properties, and as long as anyone could remember, a wire fence ran the length of the two properties. The Graves property adjacent to the disputed alley has remained open space where the Graves have planted fruit trees, berry vines, and garlic. Part of the Kielys' cottage encroached upon the disputed alley. In 2008, the Graves filed a petition with the city to vacate the western half of the alley and merge it into their adjoining lands. The city held a public hearing on the application. In February 2009, the Port Townsend City Council passed an ordinance to vacate the alley and convey the vacated alley to the Graves through a lot line adjustment. The Kielys filed an action alleging ownership of the entire alley through adverse possession on June 10, 2009. The trial court entered a judgment and decree in favor of the Kielys. The Supreme Court granted direct review to decide whether the Kielys could assert adverse possession based on events which preceded vacation of the alley. Upon review, the Court found that Port Townsend held an easement interest in the alley until it was vacated by public hearing. Therefore, RCW 7.28.090 prohibited the Kielys from obtaining title to the alley through adverse possession. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision. View "Kiely v. Graves" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Several issues arose after a special deputy prosecuting attorney failed to attend a pretrial hearing and a superior court judge appointed a local defense attorney to take her place. The State appealed the resulting judgment and sentence and the trial court's refusal to vacate its appointment. The Court of Appeals found the appointment was improper and vacated the defendant's guilty plea. Affirming the Court of Appeals' holdings that the State has a right to appeal and that a superior court may appoint an attorney to replace any special prosecuting attorney, the Supreme Court found that the appointed attorney in this case was not qualified to serve as a prosecuting attorney due to a conflict of interest. In addition, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holdings that the "de facto official" doctrine could not save the attorney's appointment and that remand of the case did not violate the double jeopardy clause. The Court reversed the appellate court's holding that on remand, the case be tried to a different judge, noting that nothing in the record of this case suggested the judge displayed "animosity or bias, but simply demonstrated frustration at [the special deputy prosecuting attorney's] repeated failure to appear." View "Washington v. Tracer" on Justia Law

Four Mason County residents brought suit in Mason County Superior Court challenging the validity of an ordinance, which levied a special assessment on nonforest lands within the Mason Conservation District. The superior court ruled for the residents, concluding that the county ordinance is an unconstitutional tax. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the ordinance was invalid on statutory grounds. View "Cary v. Mason County" on Justia Law

Respondent Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Petitioner Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Respondent sought to collect Petitioner's only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money could not be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Washington has one statute that exempts a beneficiary's money "whether [it] be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned." Other exemption statutes exempt only "[t]he right . . . to a . . .retirement allowance." The survey of case law and the plain language in the LEOFF exemption statutes indicate that the latter statutes exempt funds before they are given into the hands of the beneficiary, but not after receipt. View "Anthis v. Copland" on Justia Law

The city of Tacoma has franchise agreements with Pierce County and the cities of Fircrest, University Place, and Federal Way (Municipalities) to provide them with water services. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether those franchise agreements required Tacoma to both maintain fire hydrants and bear the maintenance costs of those hydrants. Tacoma raised questions about the impact of the agreements' indemnification clauses had on this dispute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the franchise agreements contractually required Tacoma to provide hydrants to the Municipalities, and that the indemnification provisions did not preclude this case. View "City of Tacoma v. City of Bonney Lake" on Justia Law

ZDI Gaming, Inc. distributes certain gaming machines that allow players to play what amounts to "slot machines" using "cash cards" to place their bets. The version of the machine that gave rise to this case allows the machine to credit-back a player's winnings onto the card. The State Gambling Commission ultimately denied further distribution of the machines, finding that the machines "extended credit and allowed gambling without prepayment by 'cash, check or electronic point-of-sale bank transfer'" violating then-operative regulations. ZDI appealed the Gambling Commission's ruling to the Pierce County superior court; the State responded that it believed RCW 9.46.095 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the Thurston County superior court, and suggested that ZDI withdraw its petition from Pierce and refile at Thurston County. ZDI declined and the State moved to dismiss. Noting that sometimes "when the Legislature uses the word 'jurisdiction,' it really mean[s] 'venue,'" [the Pierce County court] denied the State’s motion to dismiss, but transferred the case to the Thurston County superior court. The Thurston County court reversed the Gambling Commission, finding that the cash cards were the equivalent to both cash and merchandise and therefore lawful under state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Pierce County had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and that substantial evidence did not support the Gambling Commission's determination that the cards did not meet the statutory definition of "cash." The court then remanded the case to Thurston County. The Supreme Court surmised that "this case was filed in a county other than where it was to be adjudicated," and asked whether "as a consequence, the case [would] not be heard." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the proper forum was a question of venue and not subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts," but otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n" on Justia Law