Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellants Vicki Parker, James Johnson, and Marie Clarke appealed a superior court order directly to the Supreme Court. The lower court's order denied them relief in an action challenging the candidacy of Christine Schaller for the office of judge of the Thurston County Superior Court. Appellants argued that Schaller was not statutorily eligible for the office because she did not reside in, and therefore was not a qualified elector of, Thurston County. Upon review, the Court held that Schaller was not required to reside in or be an elector of Thurston County to be eligible for the office. View "Parker v. Wyman" on Justia Law

William Munich was shot and killed by his neighbor, Marvin Ballsmider, approximately 18 minutes after he placed his first phone call to the Skagit Emergency Communications Center. The two had been in a property dispute related to access to a driveway and Ballsmider's property. Norma Smith, a Skagit 911 operator, took the call. Smith assured Munich that law enforcement was on the way. Smith entered the call as a priority two weapons offense rather than a priority one emergency call. Based on the code, the dispatched deputy, Dan Luvera, did not activate his emergency lights and only traveled slightly over the speed limit. About seven minutes later, Munich again called 911. Tammy Canniff took the second call, and Munich told her that he was running away from Ballsmider who was following and shooting. The dispatcher informed Deputy Luvera of these facts and the deputy consequently activated his emergency lights and siren and increased his speed. The second call ended with the sound of Munich being fatally shot on the highway. Deputy Luvera arrived two minutes later and arrested Ballsmider for Munich's murder. Munich was running toward the direction from which Deputy Luvera arrived. Munich's estate sued Skagit County, the Skagit County Sheriff's Office, and Skagit Emergency Communications Center (County) for wrongful death, alleging the County negligently responded to the incident. The County moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Estate’s claims asserting it was not liable for Munich's death under the public duty doctrine, specifically that the "special relationship" exception because the County provided no inaccurate or false information that Munich had detrimentally relied on. The trial court denied summary judgment, ruling the special relationship exception did not require false or inaccurate assurances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where the express assurance promises action there is no falsity requirement because the assurances may be superficially correct but negligently fulfilled. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of an assurance has no bearing on the issue of whether an actionable duty was established. View "Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'n Ctr." on Justia Law

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

The Automotive United Trades Organization (AUTO) and Tower Energy Group (Tower) brought an as-applied state constitutional challenge to a tax based on the possession of petroleum as a hazardous substance. AUTO and Tower claimed that the hazardous substances tax (HST) violated article II, section 40 of the state constitution because the revenue from motor vehicle fuel was not being "placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes." The trial court held on summary judgment that AUTO's claim was barred because it was not filed within a reasonable time under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and that the HST does not violate article II, section 40. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court in barring AUTO and Tower from bringing their constitutional challenge because to do so would deprive the Supreme Court of its vested power to determine the constitutionality of specific legislation. The Court affirmed the trial court, however, in granting summary judgment to the State because article II, section 40 provides that "this section shall not be construed to include revenue from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily for highway purposes." View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Parties David Koenig and Thurston County sought review of a decision by the Court of Appeals which held that a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluation could be disclosed under the Public Records Act (PRA), but a victim impact statement could not. The Court of Appeals found that both the SSOSA evaluation and victim impact statement were investigative records. The court then determined the victim impact statement was exempt under the essential-to-effective-law enforcement prong of the investigative records exemption but concluded the SSOSA evaluation was not exempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the SSOSA evaluation nor the victim impact statement are investigative records within the meaning of RCW 42.56.240. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Koenig v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

Three certified questions came before the court from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning application of the farm labor contractors act (FLCA), chapter 19.30 RCW. The primary question asked whether a trial court, if awarding statutory damages under the civil remedies provision of the FLCA must award $500 per plaintiff per violation. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The second question asked whether requiring a trial court to award $500 per plaintiff per violation violated due process or public policy; the Court answered in the negative, expressly limiting its analysis and holding on this question to state due process principles and statutes. The third question asked whether the FLCA provided for awarding statutory damages to persons who have not been shown to have been aggrieved by a particular violation. "Because our standing jurisprudence tracks that of the United States Supreme Court, we leave to the Ninth Circuit to answer this question based on its standing jurisprudence and the standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court." View "Perez-Farias v. Global Horizons, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the Public Records Act (PRA) and whether, under RCW 42.56.540, the superior court could consider the identity of a public records requester when determining whether to issue an injunction. The superior court ruled it could not consider a requester's identity and scheduled a permanent injunction hearing to determine whether the records were exempt from disclosure. Franklin County sought review of the trial court's ruling regarding identity. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the superior court and held that identity could be considered under RCW 42.56.540 because a superior court's injunctive powers are equitable. It also held that RCW 42.56.565, enacted while review was pending, is retroactive. Having determined that the Court of Appeals improperly reviewed the case when the trial court had not ruled on whether the records were exempt, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a hearing on the permanent injunction. View "Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Parmelee" on Justia Law

After an amendment to the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Debra Loeffelholz sued the University of Washington and her superior, James Lukehart (collectively “University”), for discrimination based on sexual orientation. She alleged the sexual-orientation-based discrimination created a hostile work environment based on a series of preamendment acts and one potentially postamendment act. This case presented two related issues on appeal: (1) whether the WLAD amendment applied retroactively and, if not, whether preamendment discriminatory conduct is actionable and (2) whether a single comment made postamendment is a discriminatory act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the WLAD amendment is not retroactive and that the preamendment conduct was not actionable as it was not unlawful when it occurred. The postamendment, allegedly discriminatory comment is arguably similar enough to the preamendment conduct to survive summary judgment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals only in reversing summary judgment for the University and clarified that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing recovery for preamendment conduct. View "Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Automotive United Trades Organization brought suit against Washington State and its officials, challenging the constitutionality of disbursements the State gives to Indian tribes under fuel tax compacts. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to join indispensable parties, namely the Indian tribes party to the agreements, under CR 19. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the tribes were not indispensable parties under CR 19(b). Although the tribes are necessary parties under CR 19(a) whose joinder was not feasible due to tribal sovereign immunity, equitable considerations allowed this action to proceed in their absence. View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law