Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a challenge to two provisions of the voter-enacted RCW 43.135.034 (2011) (Initiative 1053). The first provision required that any bill containing tax increases be passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature, and the second provision required that any tax bill increasing state spending above a prescribed limit be approved by the voters. The Court addressed only whether the challenges to the provisions were justiciable and whether they violated the Washington Constitution. A superior court found both provisions justiciable but that the supermajority requirement and referendum requirement both violated the Constitution. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the superior court's holding that one provisions were justiciable, and that justiciable provision, the supermajority requirement, violated Article II, section 22 of the state Constitution. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that the referendum provision was justiciable. Accordingly, the Court made no determination as to its constitutionality. View "League of Educ. Voters v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned an arbitration award arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitration award in this case reinstated Port of Seattle (Port) employee Mark Cann with a 20-day unpaid suspension after he was terminated for hanging a noose in the workplace for nonracial reasons. The reviewing trial court found this punishment so lenient that it violated the public policy against racial harassment in the workplace and imposed a six-month unpaid suspension instead. The arbitrator found that Cann intended the noose as a joke toward an older white co-worker. The arbitrator determined that Cann's impression of a noose was "not racial" and that in this situation, Cann was "more clueless than racist." The arbitrator also noted that the white employee targeted by the "joke" was not offended, and an African-American employee who observed the noose was angry but did not feel harassed. In light of these facts, the arbitrator determined that a 20-day unpaid suspension was the appropriate discipline. Given that Cann's 20-working-day unpaid suspension amounts to a month without pay, and given that so many working families live month to month, the Supreme Court found that to be a substantial penalty. "As we are bound by the arbitrator's findings of fact, we cannot find that a 20-day suspension was insufficient to deter such conduct in the future. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitrator's award. We also take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court that properly vacates an arbitration award does not have authority to impose its own remedy. Instead, trial courts facing such a situation should remand for further proceedings." View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on what the State must prove when seeking to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals interpreted language from the Court's decision in "In re Dependency of J.C.," (924 P.2d 21 (1996)), to mean that when the State presents evidence sufficient to prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), it necessarily proved the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the parental rights of K.D.S.'s father, Derek Gladin, because the State proved RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm on these grounds. However, because the trial court properly found that the State had proved each element, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Gladin's parental rights. View "In re Dependency of K.D.S." on Justia Law

Brandon Afoa was paralyzed in an accident while he was working at Sea-Tac Airport and sought to recover from the Port of Seattle on three theories the Supreme Court applied in other multiemployer workplace cases: as a business invitee; for breach of safety regulations under the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973 (WISHA); and the duty of a general contractor to maintain a safe common area for any employee of subcontractors. The Court concluded that the same principles that apply to other multiemployer workplaces apply to Sea-Tac and that a jury could find the Port (which owns and operates the airport) liable under any of these three theories. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Afoa's claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle and Officers Kevin McDaniel and Pohna Lim challenged an appellate court's decision affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Respondent Elsa Robb, on behalf of her deceased husband Michael Robb, alleged that law enforcement acted negligently by failing to pick up and remove shotgun shells lying near Samson Berhe after stopping him on suspicion of burglary. After the stop, Berhe returned to retrieve the cartridges, and shortly thereafter used one of them to kill Michael Robb. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B may create an independent duty to protect against the criminal acts of a third party where the actor’s own affirmative act creates or exposes another to the recognizable high degree of risk of harm. However, the Court also held that in this case, the police officer’s failure to pick up shotgun shells lying near defendants in a "Terry" stop was not an affirmative act as contemplated by the Restatement. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Robb v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from a contract for construction of a baseball stadium and home field for the Seattle Mariners baseball team. In its first trip to the Supreme Court, "Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Construction Company," (202 P.3d 924 (2009) (PFD I)), the Court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the owner’s suit against the general contractor because the action was brought for the benefit of the State, and therefore the exemption from the statute of limitations set out in RCW 4.16.160 applied. This case raised questions about whether the construction statute of repose barred suit against the general contractor and, if not, whether the general contractor may pursue third party claims against two of its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment of dismissal in favor of the general contractor and the subcontractors on statute of repose grounds. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "the statute of repose does not bar suit against the general contractor. In accord with several provisions in the subcontracts, the subcontractors are subject to liability to the same extent that the general contractor may be liable for any defective materials or work under the subcontracts. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statute of repose bars Hunt Kiewit’s third party claims against the subcontractors." View "Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols-Kiewit Constr. Co." on Justia Law

The issue in this case concerned a challenge to a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration of an insurance coverage dispute. James River Insurance Company issued two "surplus line" insurance policies under which the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) claimed coverage. James River sought to compel arbitration of the coverage dispute pursuant to the insurance policies' arbitration clauses. WSDOT opposed arbitration and filed a motion for declaratory judgment, arguing that the arbitration clauses are unenforceable under RCW 48.18.200(1)(b), which prohibits insurance contracts from "depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer," and under RCW 48.15.150(1), which requires that "an unauthorized insurer must be sued in the superior court of the county in which the cause of action arose." In addition, WSDOT argued that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. 1012), shields the statutes from preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. secs. 1-14). The trial court agreed with WSDOT and denied James River's motion to compel arbitration. James River appealed and the Supreme Court granted direct review. The Court affirmed: "RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) is not merely a forum selection provision as James River maintain[ed], but rather a provision prohibiting binding arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. As such, we hold that this provision regulates the 'business of insurance' because it is aimed at protecting the performance of an insurance contract by ensuring the right of the policyholder to bring an action in state court to enforce the contract." The Court concluded that RCW 48.18.200(1)(b) was shielded from preemption by the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. View "Dep't of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The King County Superior Court relied on "Waples v. Yi," (234 P.3d 187 (2010)) in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. This case stemmed from a paragliding accident Petitioner Glen McDevitt suffered, for which he underwent surgery at Harborview. Petitioner sued Harborview for malpractice in relation to his treatment. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Petitioner failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that Petitioner's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, Petitioner argued that our decision in "Waples" invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. The King County Superior Court denied Harborview’s motion for summary judgment. Harborview then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court on the grounds that the legislature could establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue. "[W]e hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution. View "McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr." on Justia Law