Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a dispute regarding one rural public hospital district's ability to provide services once it acquired a medical group that operated outside its boundaries (and within the boundaries of another's). The superior court granted a writ of prohibition against Skagit Valley to stop from operating within United General's boundaries. Skagit Valley challenged the superior court's decision to issue the writ. But finding that the trial court properly granted the writ of prohibition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 304 v. Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed Appellant Richard Piel's suit against the City of Federal Way, finding that the existence of statutory remedies authorized under state law prevented him from establishing the "jeopardy prong" of his common law claim for wrongful termination. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to better explain the jeopardy analysis and harmonize its recent decisions in "Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc." and "Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc." with "Smith v. Bates Technical College." The "Smith" decision recognized that an employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement may bring a common law claim for wrongful termination based on the public policy provisions of RCW 41.56, notwithstanding administrative remedies available through the Public Employees Relations Commission. "Korsland" and "Cudney" did not alter "Smith's" holding. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Piel v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law

Applicants challenged a Department of Development and Environmental Services order declaring the use of the property at issue here was not compliant with King County zoning ordinances. The assertion was that the use was established before the ordinances were revised and characterized as non-conforming. The hearing examiner found for the landowner (and county) on all relevant issues, but the superior court reversed. The appellate court reversed the superior court, and the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the landowner's use was not established within the meaning of the county code. View "King County Dep't of Dev. & Envtl. Servs. v. King County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the public disclosure of Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. SHA hearing decisions contain welfare recipients' personal information; this information is exempt from disclosure under the PRA, but the PRA requires redaction and disclosure of public records insofar as all exempt material can be removed. Applicable federal regulations do not exempt the hearing decisions from disclosure, nor do applicable federal regulations preempt the PRA. Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly ordered SHA to produce the grievance hearing decisions pursuant to the redaction requirement of the PRA, properly ordered SHA to produce the responsive records in electronic format and to establish necessary policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the PRA, and properly awarded statutory damages. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court and awarded respondent Resident Action Council (RAC) its attorney fees on appeal. View "Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

During its investigation of Ameriquest Mortgage Company's lending practices, the Washington State Office of the Attorney General (AGO) obtained a number of e-mail messages from Ameriquest that Ameriquest employees had created while processing consumer loans. The AGO wanted to disclose redacted versions of a subset of these e-mails to Melissa A. Huelsman, an attorney who has requested the records in accordance with the Public Records Act (PRA). Ameriquest claimed that the Supreme Court decided in the first appeal of this case that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. secs. 6801-6809, and its accompanying regulations, prohibited the disclosure of any e-mails containing nonpublic personal information, even after redaction. Ameriquest also claimed that the e-mails were shielded by the PRA's investigative records exemption, and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which shields materials produced in response to a civil investigative demand (CID). Additionally, Ameriquest claimed it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery into why the AGO is not invoking the investigative records exemption. The trial court held that the GLBA did not prevent disclosure, that the PRA exemption and CPA shield were inapplicable, and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in part, holding that the GLBA prevented the AGO from newly redacting and disclosing those e-mails that contained nonpublic personal information, even when the redaction process removed all of the nonpublic personal information. The Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the PRA investigative records exemption and the CPA's shield did not apply and that Ameriquest did not get discovery. View "Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen." on Justia Law

Less than one year after Mayor Cy Sun took office, Donald Thomson started a recall petition alleging numerous acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, and violation of the oath of office. The superior court found two charges adequate for submission to voters, namely, that Sun attempted to use the city police department as his own personal police force and that Sun's actions jeopardized the city's liability insurance coverage. Sun appealed the superior court order finding these charges sufficient. Also at issue was Thomson's cross appeal asking the court to reinstate several charges that the superior court found insufficient. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "In re Recall of Sun" on Justia Law

While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine. QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied. The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that was error. The Court remanded because questions of material fact remained as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly constituted peer review body. Further, questions remained as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff privileges. View "Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Grant County" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

In 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark County Natural Resources Council and Futurewise (challengers) filed a petition with the Growth Management Hearings Board alleging Clark County was not in compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA). The Challengers specifically argued that under the Act's requirements, the various lands affected by a 2007 local zoning ordinance designated as agricultural land of long-term commercial significance (ALLTCS) could not be designated as an urban growth area (UGA) by the ordinance. The cities of Camas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certain parcels of the disputed lands designated UGA by the 2007 ordinance. The Challengers did not contest the annexations, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention of the Board. The Board ultimately found that Clark County was not in compliance with the GMA, specifically finding that certain land designations from the 2007 ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation of the annexed lands as UGA. Multiple parties were permitted to intervene, and the Board's decision was appealed. The superior court entered an order that resolved various claims on appeal, including claims related to the annexed lands. The court reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation of a portion of the annexed lands as UGA was erroneous. The Challengers thereafter appealed the superior court's order. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of appellate procedure: whether the court of appeals erred by reviewing separate and district claims that had been resolved but were not actually raised on appeal. THe parties did not challenge the disposition of those claims, thus those claims were finally adjudicated. However, the appellate court addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's opinion reversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. View "Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Flaherty attempted to file a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance with the Spokane Superior Court. In 2009, Petitioner was considered a "career offender" and subject to an increased sentence for a federal conviction. Petitioner tried to file his motion on the grounds that his attorney failed to advise him that pleading guilty would contribute to the "career offender" determination. The court refused the file the motion as untimely. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: "it is plainly not part of the clerk's ministerial function to determine whether a collateral challenge is timely." View "Washington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law