Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Washington State Hospital Association, a health care advocacy group, challenged Rule WAC 246-310-010(54), arguing, among other things, that the State Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule. The Rule was made with regard to the "certificate of need" program, and in response to the Governor's mandate to "consider how the structure of affiliations, corporate restructuring, mergers, and other arrangements among health care facilities results in outcomes similar to the traditional methods of sales, purchasing, and leasing of hospitals, particularly when control of part or all of an existing hospital changes from one party to another." The trial court found that the department exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule and invalidated it on that basis without reaching the Association's other arguments. The Department appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that the Rule was indeed invalid because it interpreted terms in RCW 70.38.105(4)(b) in a manner too broad to be consistent with the statute. View "Wash. State Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

This case involved statutory interpretation of Washington's recreational land use statute, RCW 4.24.210. Plaintiff Steven Jewels sued the city of Bellingham for negligence following an injury he sustained when he was thrown from his bicycle after hitting an obstacle in a city-maintained park. Under the statute, landowners who open their property for recreational use free of charge are immune from liability when visitors injure themselves. This immunity did not apply, however, "for injuries sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted." The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims on summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the statute by concluding that the plaintiff had to show the city of Bellingham knew the condition was dangerous. However, the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the condition in this case was obvious (that is, not latent). Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Jewels v. City Of Bellingham" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on plaintiffs' claims under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and Planning Enabling Act (PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, were properly dismissed as time barred. The trial court granted defendant-Skamania County's summary judgment motion on each of the plaintiffs' claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the GMA and PEA claims, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained as to: (1) whether Skamania County actually completed periodic review on August 2, 2005, which Skamania County argues triggered the clock for the GMA claim; and (2) the date on which the inconsistency, if any, arose between the unmapped classification and the conservancy designation, which would have triggered the clock for the PEA claim. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in part, holding that both claims were timely because: (1) inaction generally does not trigger the GMA 60-day appeal period; and (2) in this case, no actionable inconsistency existed between a 1986 ordinance and the "2007 Comprehensive Plan" (2007 Plan) until August 2012. Because further factual development was unnecessary to address the time bar issue, The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City of Bothell assumed responsibility for maintaining a drainage pipe installed in a residential subdivision in Snohomish County. The subdivision, Crystal Ridge, was developed from two residential plats that the County approved in 1997. The area was incorporated into the City in 1992. One of the plats contained a drainage easement within a tract owned by the Crystal Ridge Homeowners Association. The plat dedicated the drainage easement to the County. The City argued that the disputed drainage pipe was outside the scope of the drainage easement that the City inherited from Snohomish County. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the Crystal Ridge plat is that Snohomish County (and therefore the City) assumed responsibility for maintaining the drainage pipe. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. View "Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell" on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

WestNET was a multiagency, multijurisdictional drug task force formed by an "Interlocal Drug Task Force Agreement" executed in June 2009 among several Washington State municipalities and the federal Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS). The Agreement at issue here explicitly provided that because WestNET "does and must operate confidentially and without public input," "[t]he parties do not intend to create through, this Agreement, a separate legal entity subject to suit." In 2010, petitioner John Worthington filed a public records request that WestNET disclose records related to a raid of his residence four years earlier, which he alleged was conducted by the WestNET drug task force. WestNET did not respond, and instead, the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office made some initial disclosures. The sheriffs office did not indicate why it responded instead of WestNET. Dissatisfied with the response, Worthington sued for relief under the Public Records Act, serving the complaint on the address shared by the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office and the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office. However, the complaint named WestNET as the only defendant. Because the trial court granted the defendant's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was a narrower procedural issue: can the parties to an inter local agreement establish, as a matter of law, that their own task forces do not exist for the purpose of the PRA? The Court held that the ICA did not provide the contributing agencies with such an unqualified power. In concluding that the terms of the agreement alone conclusively established WestNET's capacity for suit, the trial court deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to present evidence in support of his argument that WestNET's actual operational structure subjects it to the PRA's purview. That approach is inconsistent with our general approach to PRA issues and the ICA itself. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further factual determination proceedings. View "Worthington v. WestNET" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the State Liquor Control Board's spirits distribution licensing fee structure brought by Association of Washington Spirits and Wine Distributors (Association). Specifically, the Association challenged the Board's decision to exempt distillers who distribute their own manufactured spirits and others acting as distributors pursuant to certificates of approval from contributing to a shortfall of $104.7 million in licensing fees imposed on persons holding spirits distributor licenses. The Association asked the Supreme Court to hold that the distillers must contribute proportionately to eliminating the shortfall. The Court rejected the Association's arguments, holding that the Board acted within its authority and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Additionally, the Board did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. View "Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Liquor Control Bd." on Justia Law

ln consolidated cases, petitioners brought an untimely challenge to San Juan County's issuance of a garage-addition building permit. Petitioners did not receive notice of the permit application and grant until the administrative appeals period had expired. Thus, petitioners claim that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, required them to appeal a decision without actual or constructive notice of it. Acknowledging a strong public policy supporting administrative deadlines, the Supreme Court found: (1) petitioners were required to exhaust available administrative remedies to obtain a land use decision; (2) there were no equitable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement; (3) the plain language of LUPA says as much; and (4) there was no due process violation because petitioner had no constitutionally protected property interest in the denial of his neighbor's land-use permit. View "Durland v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the city of Lakewood's explanation for redacting driver's license numbers from records produced for David Koenig was inadequate and, if so, whether Koenig was entitled to attorney fees. In October 2007, Koenig requested three sets of records from the city :(1) records about the arrest and prosecution of a Lakewood police detective in January 2005 for patronizing a prostitute; (2) records about a November 2006 auto accident in the city of Fife, where a Fife police officer struck a pedestrian with his patrol car and the Lakewood Police Department assisted with the investigation; and (3) records about Tacoma police officer Michael Justice's 1998 arrest and subsequent prosecution on fourth degree assault charges. In November 2007, the city advised Koenig by letter that responsive records were available for review and pickup. The city redacted, among other things, driver's license numbers from various types of documents it produced. The city justified the redaction of driver's license numbers by citation to certain statutes. Koenig questioned the city's reliance on the statutes it cited, asking the city to specify which exemption it claimed under RCW 42.56.240 and to clarify whether the it was also claiming driver's license numbers were exempt under the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (FDPPA). The city supplemented its earlier citations to the pertinent statutes. Thereafter, the city warned Koenig that it was "prepared to prosecute a declaratory judgment action decreeing that it fully complied with" Koenig's requests. Koenig filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the city had not met its burden. Furthermore, he argued he was entitled to attorney fees for the violation of the statute's brief explanation requirement, regardless of whether the numbers were ruled exempt. The Supreme Court held that the city's response was inadequate and Koenig was entitled to fees. View "City of Lakewood v. Koenig" on Justia Law

This case centered on the interpretation of a state tax deduction statute. Former RCW 82.04.4292 (1980) provided that in computing their business and occupation (B&O) tax, banks and financial institutions could deduct from their income "amounts derived from interest received on investments or loans primarily secured by first mortgages or trust deeds on nontransient residential properties." Between 2004 and 2007, petitioner Cashmere Valley Bank invested in mortgage-backed securities known as real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). Cashmere claimed that interest earned on these investments was deductible under RCW 82.04.4292. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded Cashmere could not claim the deduction because its investments in REMICs and CMOs were not "primarily secured" by first mortgages or trust deeds. The ultimate source of cash flow was mortgage payments. However, Cashmere's investments were not backed by any encumbrance on property nor did Cashmere have any legal recourse to the underlying trust assets in the event of default. Thus, Cashmere's investments were not "primarily secured" by mortgages or trust deeds. View "Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law