Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Klein Honda was a Honda dealership. From time to time, Honda (the manufacturer) offered a "dealer cash" incentive program for its dealerships whereby dealerships can earn a specific amount of extra money if they sold specific Honda models during specific times and comply with other terms and conditions. At issue in this case was whether Klein Honda's dealer cash earnings were taxable. "Klein Honda received additional, separate income beyond its ordinary retail sales. That constitutes an additional taxable business activity under the [B&O] catchall provision. Although dealer cash would not be taxable under one of the Washington State Department of Revenue's regulations if it represented a 'bona fide discount' on Klein Honda's wholesale purchase of vehicles, dealer cash is not a bona fide discount because Klein Honda does not purchase vehicles from Honda subject to a dealer cash discount. Dealer cash payments are not necessarily quantified or even knowable at the time that Klein Honda purchases vehicles from Honda. Thus, Klein Honda's dealer cash is taxable." View "Steven Klein, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved two requests for public records that Glenda Nissen, a sheriff's detective, sent to Pierce County (County). Both requests asked for records related to Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist. The telephone number identified in these requests was connected to Lindquist's private cell phone. There was no dispute that Lindquist personally bought the phone, paid for its monthly service, and sometimes used it in the course of his job. The County reviewed call and text message logs and disclosed partially redacted copies to Nissen. Accompanied by an exemption log, the redactions concealed line items for calls and text messages that Lindquist self-described as personal in nature. The remaining unredacted portions related to calls and text messages that the County and Lindquist admitted might be work related. The County did not produce the contents of any text message, however, though copies of them existed on the service provider Verizon' s servers. Dissatisfied with the County's disclosures, Nissen sued the County, seeking an in camera review of Lindquist's text messages and the call and text message logs to determine if all of the information was a public record. Lindquist intervened and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin further disclosure of records related to his cell phone. The County moved to dismiss Nissen's complaint under CR 12(b)(6), arguing the records at issue could not be public records as a matter of law, because they related to a personal cell phone rather than a county-issued one. The trial judge granted the County's CR 12(b)(6) motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Applying the Public Record Act's (PRA) definition of "public record," the Court of Appeals held that Lindquist's text messages were public records because he "prepared" them in his official capacity. The court further held that the factual record was not sufficiently developed on the issue of whether the call logs also qualify as "public record[s]," noting that the issue turned on whether Lindquist used or retained the logs in his capacity as prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part. Records that an agency employee prepares, owns, uses, or retains on a private cell phone within the scope of employment can be "public records" of the agency under RCW 42.56.010(3). Because the Court found it "impossible" to determine if any messages were in fact public records, on remand the parties were directed as follows. Lindquist must obtain a transcript of the content of all the text messages at issue, review them, and produce to the County any that are public records. View "Nissen v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

Edward Gorre was a firefighter employed by the city of Tacoma (City), who suffered from valley fever (coccidioidomycosis). Gorre's diagnosis was not disputed. At issue was whether valley fever was considered a "respiratory disease" or an "infectious disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) or (d) that shifts the burden of proving the disease's proximate cause from Gorre to the employer City. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's judgment in the City's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that "respiratory disease," as used in RCW 51.32.185(1 )(a), referred only to diseases that medical experts diagnose as respiratory diseases. The Court also concluded that the "infectious diseases" qualifying for RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s evidentiary presumption were limited to those diseases specifically enumerated in RCW 51.32.185( 4 ). Because medical experts in Gorre's case testified that valley fever was an infectious disease, not a respiratory one, and because it was not one of the infectious diseases enumerated in RCW 51.32.185(4), the presumption did not apply. View "Gorre v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Several Indian tribes successfully challenged the imposition of state fuel taxes on tribal retailers. Since then, the State and various tribes signed agreements under which the tribes agreed to buy taxed fuel, and the State agreed to refund a portion of the fuel tax receipts to the tribes. An industry group unsuccessfully challenged the lawfulness of these agreements. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review reduced to whether those agreements violated article II, section 40 of the State Constitution. "Without passing judgment on whether the legislature successfully moved the legal incidence of the tax away from tribal retailers," the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the industry group's challenge. View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

After an incident involving his then-deputy coroner, Grant County Coroner Jerry Lee Jasman pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and resigned. By statute, Jasman's conviction prohibited him from holding public office again. However, the new Grant County coroner, Craig Morrison, quickly hired Jasman as chief deputy coroner and chief investigator. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review asked whether Jasman could hold those positions given that he was prohibited from holding public office: Jasman could not hold those positions if they were "public officer" positions. As a separate issue, the Court had to decide whether Coroner Morrison was entitled to a special prosecutor's representation when he intervened as a defendant in this lawsuit. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) both positions were "public officer" positions and that Jasman could not hold either position; and (2) Coroner Morrison was not sued for money damages and the State or county was not the real party in interest, so he was not entitled to a special prosecutor's representation. View "Grant County Prosecuting Att'y v. Jasman" on Justia Law

The Washington State Hospital Association, a health care advocacy group, challenged Rule WAC 246-310-010(54), arguing, among other things, that the State Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule. The Rule was made with regard to the "certificate of need" program, and in response to the Governor's mandate to "consider how the structure of affiliations, corporate restructuring, mergers, and other arrangements among health care facilities results in outcomes similar to the traditional methods of sales, purchasing, and leasing of hospitals, particularly when control of part or all of an existing hospital changes from one party to another." The trial court found that the department exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule and invalidated it on that basis without reaching the Association's other arguments. The Department appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that the Rule was indeed invalid because it interpreted terms in RCW 70.38.105(4)(b) in a manner too broad to be consistent with the statute. View "Wash. State Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

This case involved statutory interpretation of Washington's recreational land use statute, RCW 4.24.210. Plaintiff Steven Jewels sued the city of Bellingham for negligence following an injury he sustained when he was thrown from his bicycle after hitting an obstacle in a city-maintained park. Under the statute, landowners who open their property for recreational use free of charge are immune from liability when visitors injure themselves. This immunity did not apply, however, "for injuries sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted." The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims on summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the statute by concluding that the plaintiff had to show the city of Bellingham knew the condition was dangerous. However, the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the condition in this case was obvious (that is, not latent). Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Jewels v. City Of Bellingham" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on plaintiffs' claims under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and Planning Enabling Act (PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, were properly dismissed as time barred. The trial court granted defendant-Skamania County's summary judgment motion on each of the plaintiffs' claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the GMA and PEA claims, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained as to: (1) whether Skamania County actually completed periodic review on August 2, 2005, which Skamania County argues triggered the clock for the GMA claim; and (2) the date on which the inconsistency, if any, arose between the unmapped classification and the conservancy designation, which would have triggered the clock for the PEA claim. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in part, holding that both claims were timely because: (1) inaction generally does not trigger the GMA 60-day appeal period; and (2) in this case, no actionable inconsistency existed between a 1986 ordinance and the "2007 Comprehensive Plan" (2007 Plan) until August 2012. Because further factual development was unnecessary to address the time bar issue, The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City of Bothell assumed responsibility for maintaining a drainage pipe installed in a residential subdivision in Snohomish County. The subdivision, Crystal Ridge, was developed from two residential plats that the County approved in 1997. The area was incorporated into the City in 1992. One of the plats contained a drainage easement within a tract owned by the Crystal Ridge Homeowners Association. The plat dedicated the drainage easement to the County. The City argued that the disputed drainage pipe was outside the scope of the drainage easement that the City inherited from Snohomish County. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the Crystal Ridge plat is that Snohomish County (and therefore the City) assumed responsibility for maintaining the drainage pipe. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. View "Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell" on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law