Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the legislature's amendment to a business and occupation (B&O) tax exemption, applied retroactively, violated a taxpayer's rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, collateral estoppel, or separation of powers principles. Taxpayer Dot Foods contended that it should have remained eligible for a B&O tax exemption pursuant to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Dot Foods, Inc. v. Department of Revenue," (215 P.3d 185 (2009) (Dot Foods I)), despite an intervening, contrary amendment to the applicable law. Because Dot Foods I did not encompass the tax periods at issue in this case, the Supreme Court held that retroactive application of the legislative amendment to Dot Foods did not violate due process, collateral estoppel, or separation of powers principles. View "Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner Will Knedlik filed a recall petition against Washington State Auditor Troy Kelley, charging him with misfeasance, malfeasance, and breach of his oath of office for: (1) violating the residency requirements of his office, (2) failing to adequately investigate and report alleged illegal activity by Sound Transit, and (3) pressuring employees of the auditor's office to hire Jason JeRue without following proper employment procedures. The superior court judge dismissed the recall petition, finding the charges factually and/or legally insufficient for submission to the voters. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Recall of Kelley" on Justia Law

In 1988, when petitioner John Anderson was 17 years old, he pled guilty in juvenile court to statutory rape in the first degree. The victim was two and a half years old. Anderson was sentenced to 100 weeks in a juvenile rehabilitation facility. When Anderson's juvenile sentence was about to expire in 1990, the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed and he was transferred to Western State Hospital (WSH) for an evaluation. Before the evaluation period ended, Anderson voluntarily sought civil commitment. In February 2000, Anderson announced his intention to end his voluntary commitment and the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. Anderson was transferred to the Special Commitment Center (SCC) during the pendency of the State's petition in March 2001. In 2004, after a bench trial, the trial court found Anderson was an SVP. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint Anderson's requested expert witness. The Supreme Court agreed. On remand, Anderson moved to dismiss, contending that his juvenile adjudication was not a conviction, and thus he could not be subject to an SVP petition under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). He also contended that his sexual contacts with other patients at WSH were not recent overt acts as a matter of law. The trial court denied Anderson's motion to dismiss, and Anderson was retried by a jury. The jury concluded that Anderson was an SVP, and the trial court entered an order committing him to the SCC. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. Anderson petitioned the Supreme Court to ask that his civil commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW be reversed. Specifically, he asked whether juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense was a predicate "convict[ion]" under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). The Supreme Court held that it was, and affirmed his civil commitment. View "In re Det. of Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2008, petitioner Guy Wuthrich was riding a motorcycle on Avondale Road Northeast in King County, approaching an intersection with Northeast 159th Street. Drivers on 159th Street are controlled by a stop sign at the intersection; drivers on A von dale Road were not. Defendant Christa Gilland was driving a car on 159th Street. When she reached the intersection with Avondale Road, she stopped to wait for passing traffic but did not see Wuthrich approaching from the left. She turned left onto Avondale Road and collided with Wuthrich's motorcycle, seriously injuring him. Wuthrich filed a complaint against both Gilland and the County, alleging that the County was liable for his injuries because overgrown blackberry bushes obstructed Gilland's view of traffic at the intersection. The trial court dismissed the action against the County on summary judgment. The Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the County had a duty to keep the roadway at issue here in a reasonable safe condition. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wuthrich v. King County" on Justia Law

In 20 13, PUD commissioners Buz Ketcham and Kurt Anagnostou passed a censure resolution against Edward Piper. The resolution alleged nine instances of misfeasance but contained no underlying factual description to support the charges. Petitioners William Ammons, Douglas Irvine, and Charles Wallace then petitioned to recall Piper. At a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the allegations, Petitioners voluntarily withdrew the recall petition. Finding that the recall petition was frivolous and intentionally filed in bad faith, the superior court awarded Piper attorney fees. Petitioners moved for review of the attorney fees award. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "In re Recall of Piper" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to reverse a superior court order denying appellants' motion to enjoin the secretary of state from placing Initiative 1366 (I-1366) on the November 2015 general election ballot. Appellants claimed the initiative went beyond the scope of the people’s initiative power under article II, section 1 of the Washington constitution and was therefore not proper for direct legislation. The trial court ruled that: ( 1) appellants had standing to challenge the initiative as taxpayers, county election officials, and legislators; (2) this was a challenge to the scope of the initiative and therefore appropriate for preelection review; (3) the "fundamental, stated and overriding purpose" of I-1366 was to amend the constitution in violation of article II of the state constitution; (4) I-1366 violated article XXIII of the state constitution; and (5) appellants were unable to show a "clear legal or equitable right" to an injunction under “Rabon v. City of Seattle,” ( 957 P.2d 621 (1998)), because the Supreme Court had yet to decide whether preelection restrictions on initiatives infringe on free speech rights under the First Amendment or article I, section 5 of the Washington constitution. After review, the Washington Court determined that appellants did not make a clear showing that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the broad scope of the people's power of direct legislation and, as such, failed to demonstrate a clear legal right for injunctive relief. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "Huff v. Wyman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to a water right permit issued to the City of Yelm. The permit allowed the Department of Ecology to authorize withdrawals of water that impaired minimum flows where it was determined overriding considerations of public interest (OCPI) were established by the permit applicant. The trial court affirmed the Pollution Control Hearings Hoard's decision approving the permit. Sara Foster was the challenger to Yelm's permit, arguing Ecology exceeded its statutory authority in approving the permit under the OCPI exception. While this case was pending in the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court decided "Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Department of Ecology," (311 P.3d 6 (2013)), in which the Court comprehensively analyzed the statutory provision at issue here, and held that the provision operated as an exception to the overall prioritization of water rights, and that withdrawals of water authorized under that statute could not permanently impair senior water rights with earlier priority. After review of Foster's arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that "Swinomish" controlled in this matter, and reversed for many of the same reasons. View "Foster v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

In this case, the Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund (CAPR) sought to invalidate several ordinances passed by San Juan County, alleging violations of Washington's Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA). Specifically, CAPR contended that four ordinances passed as part of a state-mandated update of the County's critical area ordinances (CAO) should have been voided because the ordinances had first been discussed by an informal group of county officials and employees (CAO Team) in meetings that did not comply with the OPMA. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court rejected CAPR's arguments because: (1) none of the CAO team meetings constituted "meetings" of the San Juan County Council under the OPMA; (2) the CAO Team itself was not a "committee" of the Council; and (3) the CAO Team never acted on behalf of the Council. View "Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

The Unit Owners Association of Centre Pointe Condominium (Centre Pointe) was formed in May 2003 by a declaration of condominium (Declaration) recorded in Whatcom County. A clubhouse and three residential buildings with 97 units of the Centre Pointe complex were built prior to 2011. In May 2011, Filmore LLP bought an unfinished portion of the Centre Pointe complex and all related development and special declarant rights. Filmore's property was part of the Centre Point complex and subject to its Declaration. Section 9.1.14 of the Declaration provided that there was "no restriction on the right of any Unit Owner to lease his or her Unit" other than the restrictions described in section 9.1.14. Nothing in section 9.1.14 limited the number of units that could be leased. In October 2011, owners of Centre Pointe units to which at least 67 percent (but less than 90 percent) of the votes in Centre Pointe were allocated approved a 12th amendment to the Declaration, requiring that no more than 30 percent of the total number of units could be leased. In October 2012, Filmore filed a complaint at the Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that the Declaration's Twelfth Amendment violated RCW 64.34.264(4) and section 17.3 of the Declaration because the 12th amendment was not passed with 90 percent of the eligible votes. Filmore requested that the 12th amendment be found void and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Filmore, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments. View "Filmore, LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Centre Pointe Condo." on Justia Law