Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When petitioner Mike Belenski requested certain records from Jefferson County (County), the County responded that it had "no responsive records." Over two years later, Belenski sued the County, asserting that this response violated the Public Records Act (PRA) because the County did in fact have such records and failed to make the proper disclosures. The Court of Appeals dismissed this claim as time barred under the two-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.130. At issue was which statute of limitations applied to Belenski' s PRA claim and whether the applicable statute rendered his claim time barred. The Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations in the PRA applied to Belenski' s claim and that this limitations period usually begins to run on an agency's final, definitive response to a records request. However, the Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether equitable tolling should have tolled the statute of limitations. View "Belenski v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) created a new option for eligible retirees in which the retiree could opt for a pension that would allow a surviving spouse to continue to receive monthly pension benefits at the same amount after the retiree's death. To make this pension actuarially equivalent in value to the previous pension, the DRS provided for a greater reduction in the retiree's monthly benefits. In 2010, the DRS adopted rules that modified the degree of the actuarial reduction. Appellant Tim Lenander challenged the changes to the reduction, arguing that the changes violated the statutory scheme and impaired his contract right to a lower reduction in his pension payment. The Supreme Court found Lenander's arguments unavailing, holding that the DRS acted within its authority in amending the survivor benefit actuarial reduction regulations as set forth under former WACs 415-02-380 (2010) and 415-103-215 (2010). In amending these regulations, the DRS did not violate the contract clause of article I, section 23 of the Washington Constitution. Consequently, the Court held that the DRS did not infringe on Lenander's right to an "actuarial equivalent" survivor benefit, and that Lenander did not suffer substantial impairment to his pension contract rights. View "Lenander v. Dep't of Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Alsco, Inc. was a textile rental and sales company that supplied uniforms, linens, and other products to other businesses in industrial, hospitality, health care, and other fields. Alsco did not provide products or services for resale. Alsco and its employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review turned on whether Alsco was a "retail or service establishment" (RSE) under chapter 49.46 RCW for purposes of an exemption to the overtime pay requirement. The trial court granted the employees' motion for summary judgment regarding entitlement to overtime pay, finding that Alsco was not an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay exception. In granting the employees' subsequent motion for summary judgment on the issue of calculating the amount of overtime due, the court calculated the "regular rate of pay" by dividing the total weekly compensation actually paid by 40 hours, not by hours actually worked. The Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that Alsco was an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay requirement. View "Cooper v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) condemned property owned by Airport Investment Company (AIC) in order to secure easements to construct and operate an elevated light rail. The parties could not agree on the amount of just compensation for the taking, so the matter proceeded to trial. AIC argued it was statutorily entitled to attorney fees because Sound Transit failed to make a valid settlement offer 30 days before trial. Specifically, AIC argued that the 30-day offer Sound Transit made did not reflect the reduced temporary construction easement it ultimately obtained, making the offer ineffective or resulting in a total abandonment of the condemnation. AIC also sought a new trial, alleging the trial court erroneously allowed Sound Transit's counsel to question AIC's president about the taking valuation of an appraisal expert who did not testify. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed the Court of Appeals: a condemnee is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070(l)(a) only "[i]f[the] condemnor fails to make any written offer in settlement" at least 30 days before trial. Sound Transit made a timely settlement offer, which was not rendered ineffective by subsequent revisions to reduce the impact of its temporary construction easement. The Court was not persuaded by AIC's evidentiary objection, finding the trial court properly admitted the president's testimony under ER 80l(d)(2) as an admission of a party opponent. View "Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Airport Inv. Co." on Justia Law

The State of Washington sued more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies (including petitioners) for price fixing. The State claimed the foreign companies conspired to fix prices by selling CRTs (cathode ray tubes) into international streams of commerce intending they be incorporated into products sold at inflated prices in large numbers in Washington State. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the foreign companies. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the State alleged sufficient minimum contacts with Washington to satisfy both the long arm statute and the due process clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

John Kovacs injured his back while working for Pro Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. on September 29, 2010. Kovacs filed an application for benefits on September 29, 2011. The Department of Labor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. Kovacs's employer challenged the award, arguing that Kovacs's application was not timely. In response, the department reversed its decision, rejected the claim, and ordered Kovacs to pay back the benefits already paid to him. Kovacs appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the department's decision that the application was untimely. Kovacs appealed again to the superior court, which reversed the board's decision, held that Kovacs's claim was "timely within the meaning of RCW 51.28.050," entered judgment for Kovacs, and granted Kovacs's motion for attorney fees. By divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The Supreme Court found that applications for workers' compensation benefits had to be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." Generally, the day of injury is excluded from time calculations. The Court determined that the legislature did not intend to include the day of injury in calculating the time to file a worker's compensation claim, and held that the one-year statute of limitations here began to run the day after the injury and reversed. View "Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants sought reversal of a King County Superior Court order declaring Initiative 1366 (I-1366) unconstitutional. At the center of this case, the fact that I-1366, if enacted, would "result[] in either a onetime reduction in the sales tax or [the proposal of a constitutional amendment]." Based on the plain language of the initiative, the Supreme Court held that I -13 66 required the legislature to choose between two operative provisions. "This does not constitute valid contingent legislation. Instead, this is the kind of logrolling of unrelated measures article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution was adopted to prevent." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that I-1366 violated the single-subject rule of article II, section 19, and that it was void in its entirety. View "Lee v. Washington" on Justia Law

New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, an affiliate of AT&T Mobility LLC, provides both wireless voice telephone services and data services to customers in the city of Clyde Hill. Clyde Hill imposes a local utility tax on wireless telephone services, which applies to both voice and data services. New Cingular had for years collected utility taxes from Clyde Hill's residents on all charges for wireless and telephone voice and data services, and paid the tax to the city. In this case, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the cellular service provider could challenge a city fine through an action for declaratory judgment in superior court. The trial court dismissed, holding that a declaratory judgment action was improper and judicial review should have been sought by way of a statutory writ of review under RCW 7 .16.040. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the declaratory action and remanding for a decision on the merits. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. City of Clyde Hill" on Justia Law

Lyons Enterprises Inc. was a regional franchisor of an international janitorial franchise operating in western Washington. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) determined that some of Lyons' franchisees, those that did not actually employ subordinates, met the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA, Title 51 RCW) definition of "worker" and assessed workers' compensation premiums against Lyons for those franchisees. The parties appealed the initial agency audit through four different administrative and judicial bodies that reached varying results as to whether Lyons' franchisees were covered workers. As part of these determinations, each adjudicative body that ruled that Lyons' franchisees were workers had also considered whether the franchisees were exempt from coverage under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "White v. Department of Labor & Industries," (294 P.2d 650 (1956)) or under RCW 51.08.195. "[T]he answer to the exemption question has changed at nearly every level of review." Whether the franchisor-franchisee relationship was subject to the IIA was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Board to determine which of Lyons' franchisees actually employed subordinates. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc." on Justia Law