Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the Washington Growth Management Hearings Board’s (“Board”) decision to dismiss a timely petition for review was arbitrary and capricious when it found that the petitioner did not substantially comply with the service requirements under WAC 242-03-230(2)(a) without considering prejudice. The City of Kenmore argued and the Court of Appeals held that the Board’s interpretation of substantial compliance derived from Your Snoqualmie Valley v. City of Snoqualmie, No. 11-3-0012 (Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd. Mar. 8, 2012 (Ord. on Mots.)), was entitled to deference, that the definition did not require a finding of prejudice, and that the Board’s application of the test for substantial compliance to the facts in this case was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the Board’s erroneous interpretation and application of the substantial compliance standard articulated in the prior Board decision constituted arbitrary and capricious action and that the petitioners substantially complied with the service requirements. View "Kenmore MHP LLC v. City Of Kenmore" on Justia Law

In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

CC (mother) and VC (father) were driving through eastern Washington when CC went into premature labor. CC gave birth to AC in a nearby hospital. AC’s umbilical cord tested positive for cannabis. Hospital staff noted that CC was disabled, that CC and VC were homeless, and that they had no baby supplies. The hospital reported its concerns to the State, and the State sent social worker Michelle Woodward to investigate. Woodward contacted CC’s family from whom she heard reports of the couple’s domestic violence, criminal history, and drug use. The State took custody of AC and temporarily placed him with a foster family. The court later found AC dependent at a contested shelter care hearing and ordered CC to participate in random drug testing and an evidence-based parenting program. The court also ordered the State to provide regular, supervised visitation. At about this time, a new social worker, Diana Barnes, was assigned to AC. The court held another dependency hearing where Woodward, Barnes, and parenting therapist Logan Wright testified in support of AC’s dependency. Woodward and Barnes relied extensively on hearsay based largely on secondhand reports and statements rather than their own personal interactions or investigations. None of these reports were submitted into evidence, no records custodian authenticated them, and none of the out-of-court witnesses whose statements were recorded in those reports were called to testify. Counsel for VC made two unsuccessful objections to the hearsay presented through the social workers. The court ultimately found that the parents’ past history with the criminal justice system and Child Protective Services supported dependency, a finding substantially based on hearsay. CC and VC appealed. The Washington Supreme Court held the trial court’s impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s dependency finding for AC as to both parents. View "In re Dependency of A.C." on Justia Law

The Washington Department of Revenue issued instructions to Lakeside Industries Inc. regarding the valuation of Lakeside’s self-manufactured asphalt products. This valuation determined the amount of use tax that Lakeside had to pay to use its asphalt in public road construction projects. Lakeside did not follow DOR’s instructions and, instead, petitioned for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW. The Washington Supreme Court held that the APA’s general review provisions did not apply to Lakeside’s nonconstitutional tax challenge. To obtain judicial review of DOR’s tax reporting instructions, Lakeside had to follow the specific procedures for tax challenges set forth in Title 82 RCW (Title 82). Therefore, Lakeside’s APA petition for judicial review was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lakeside Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Six months after United States and global health authorities declared COVID-19 a public health emergency, the city of Seattle (City) passed an ordinance (Seattle Ordinance 126094) authorizing hazard pay for certain workers who delivered food to consumers’ homes. By that time, Governor Inslee had issued stay-at-home orders requiring Washingtonians to leave home only for the most essential of trips. Among some of the conditions in the ordinance were that food delivery network companies could not reduce workers’ compensation or otherwise limit their earning capacity as a result of the ordinance, and they were prohibited from reducing the areas of the City they served or to pass on the cost of the premium pay to customers’ charges for groceries. The Washington Food Industry Association and Maplebear Inc., d/b/a Instacart, challenged the ordinance, seeking a declaration invalidating the ordinance on statutory and state and federal constitutional grounds. The trial court dismissed the statutory claim under chapter 82.84 RCW but permitted all remaining claims to proceed. After review of the limited record, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) affirming dismissal of the 82.84 RCW claim; (2) reversing dismissal of the equal protection claim; and (3) reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the privileges and immunities claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wash. Food Indus. Ass'n v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Delaura Norg called 911 seeking emergency medical assistance for her husband, Fred. She gave the 911 dispatcher her correct address, which the dispatcher relayed to emergency responders from the Seattle Fire Department (SFD). The Norgs’ apartment building was three blocks away from the nearest SFD station, but it took emergency responders over 15 minutes to arrive. This delay occurred because the SFD units failed to verify the Norgs’ address and, instead, went to a nearby nursing home based on the mistaken assumption that the Norgs lived there. The Norgs sued the City for negligence, alleging that SFD’s delayed response aggravated their injuries. The City pleaded the public duty doctrine as an affirmative defense and both parties moved for summary judgment on the question of duty. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in the Norgs’ favor and struck the City’s affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed on interlocutory review. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to the Norgs on the question of duty. In doing so, the Court expressed no opinion on the remaining elements of the Norgs’ claim (breach, causation, and damages). The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Norg v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The collective bargaining contract between the Washington State Council of County and City Employees, AFSCME Council 2 (Union) and the City of Spokane expired on December 31, 2020. Prior to its expiration, the Union wrote to the City’s labor relations manager that it desired to engage in traditional labor negotiations for renewal of the contract and included proposed ground rules for negotiations. The rules included a condition that the negotiating meetings be closed to the public. In response, the City informed the Union it intended to conduct the bargaining negotiations open to the public, consistent with the 2019 revision of section 40 of the city charter. Through counsel, the Union drafted an opinion letter pointing out that the City’s open bargaining rule was a violation of state law to which the City responded that it had not implemented open bargaining and were willing to negotiate in good faith. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the municipal ordinance, requiring all collective bargaining between the city and union representatives be conducted in a manner open to the public, was preempted by state law and unconstitutional under the Washington State Constitution. The trial court ruled that section 40 of the city charter was preempted by state law; to this, the Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "Wash. State Council of County & City Emps. v. City of Spokane" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Washington Department of Ecology (Department) revised its Water Quality Program Permit Writer’s Manual to add a new section addressing methods permit writers could use to identify and measure polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) discharged into Washington waters. This specific revision was challenged on the grounds it constituted rule making outside the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Washington Supreme Court determined the manual revision was not a rule for the purposes of the APA because it merely guided permit writers, who had discretion to choose test methods on a case-by-case basis, and did not require the uniform application of a standard to an entire class of entities who discharged PCBs. View "Nw. Pulp & Paper Ass'n. v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Rather than using the insurance agency’s in-house presiding officer, American Property Casualty Insurance Association (Association) requested an adjudicative hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant to RCW 48.04.010(5). The request was denied. The Association sought a writ of mandamus against Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler, requiring him to transfer the hearing. The Washington Supreme Court concluded the Association could have sought judicial review by way of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW, thus, the Association failed to demonstrate it had “no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy” at law, one of the three requirements for a writ to issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. View "Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass'n v. Kreidler" on Justia Law