Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In open court, Appellant Vanessa Condon and Respondent Fely Condon entered into a stipulated settlement and dismissal with prejudice of Vanessa's claims against Fely, stemming from an automobile accident. Before payment, Fely requested that Vanessa sign a release agreement, which the parties had not discussed nor placed on the record. Vanessa refused to sign, and Fely made a motion to enforce the settlement and release. The trial court deemed the release signed, and Vanessa appealed the trial court's order. On appeal, she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce release terms that were not a part of the original agreement. Fely argued that Vanessa waived her right to appeal by accepting the settlement check. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Vanessa did not waive her right to appeal, and that the trial court improperly added implied terms to the agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Condon v. Condon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on what the State must prove when seeking to terminate parental rights. The Court of Appeals interpreted language from the Court's decision in "In re Dependency of J.C.," (924 P.2d 21 (1996)), to mean that when the State presents evidence sufficient to prove the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), it necessarily proved the element codified in RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of the parental rights of K.D.S.'s father, Derek Gladin, because the State proved RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm on these grounds. However, because the trial court properly found that the State had proved each element, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Gladin's parental rights. View "In re Dependency of K.D.S." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether records "sealed for good cause" submitted in support of a motion that was never decided became public information. The issue stemmed from a petition for the dissolution of a marriage. Smith Bunday Berman Britton PS (Smith Bunday) was the accounting firm for the parties Todd and Rondi Bennett. Rondi Bennett sued Smith Bunday alleging it aided Todd Bennett in embezzling and hiding money that belonged to businesses she co-owned with her ex-husband and her father. As part of discovery, plaintiffs requested tax records of nonparties to the suit. Smith Bunday objected on the ground that the disclosure was prohibited without the nonparty's consent. To resolve the problem, plaintiffs proposed a protective order, stipulated by the parties. The documents were ultimately produced under seal; Rondi Bennett moved to remove certain documents from the protective order so that they could be attached unsealed to her motion in response to Smith Bunday. The trial court ordered that the documents should be filed under seal first, then upon receipt, the court would examine them and determine whether they should remain subject to the protective order. A few hours after the response was filed but before the court had examined the motion to dismiss, the response and the documents, the case settled. Smith Bunday notified the court that the case had been settled and that its summary judgment motion should be removed from the calendar. Settlement did not bring resolution. Smith Bunday noticed that Rondi Bennett's response and supporting declaration contained or made reference to documents that had been stamped "confidential," but were not filed them under seal as required by the stipulated protective order. This was apparently accidental. After discussing the matter, and despite the fact the case had settled, the parties stipulated the plaintiffs would refile redacted and sealed versions of the response and declaration in accordance with the stipulated protective order. The plaintiffs' expert moved to intervene. He asserted his right as a member of the public to open access to court records in the case already filed under seal. The trial court granted his motion to intervene, but denied his motion to unseal. The expert appealed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order. The expert then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial court made no decision involving the disputed information, the Supreme Court concluded the supporting material (produced under seal) could not be relevant to a nonexistent decision. "We hold that because the information at issue in this case was not relevant to any decision made by the court, it is not presumptively public under article I, section 10 [of the Washington Constitution]." View "Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS" on Justia Law

This case concerned the dissolution of marriage and foreign travel restrictions imposed as part of a parenting plan under RCW 26.09.191(3). The restrictions were imposed by the trial court based on evidence that the father made threats to abscond with his children to India. The father denied making such threats and claimed the restrictions are not supported by the trial court’s findings. He further argued the court committed prejudicial error by allowing improper expert testimony regarding “risk factors” for child abduction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s parenting plan and travel restrictions, concluding the admission of risk factor evidence was improper but not prejudicial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals except for its conclusion that the trial court erred by admitting the expert testimony. The Court upheld the travel restrictions because the trial court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and admission of the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. View "In re Marriage of Katare" on Justia Law

After trial, a judge found that the State had established all statutory and constitutional factors necessary for the termination of Appellant Nyakat Luak's parental rights to her twin sons. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding two of the statutory factors: (1) that the State expressly and understandably offered or provided to her all the necessary services to correct her parental deficiencies; and, (2) that there was little likelihood those deficiencies could be remedied in the foreseeable future. Additionally, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in not appointing counsel to represent her twin sons. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the judge's findings. The Court agreed that children whose parents are subject to dependency and termination proceedings have vital liberty interests at stake and may constitutionally be entitled to counsel to protect those interests. "But whether any individual child is entitled to counsel must be decided case by case." The Court held that the deprivation, if any, of a child's right to counsel in such circumstances may be protected by appellate review. Appellant raised her due process claim for the first time on appeal, denying the trial judge of the opportunity to timely consider the issue. Accordingly, Appellant failed to meet her burden of showing reversible error, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Dependency of M.S.R." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Almgren and Carol Schneider divorced in Nebraska and Schneider moved to Washington with the couple's two children. The decree of dissolution set child support to continue during each child's minority. In Nebraska, the age of majority is 19 years. The Nebraska court modified the decree, approving the mother's move and adjusting certain obligations. Neither modification changed the duration of the father's child support obligation. The mother registered and moved to modify the Nebraska decree in Asotin County under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Asotin County Superior Court entered an order of child support stating that the obligation would terminate when the children reach 18 or graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, and reserving the right to request postsecondary support. The order was entered without objection by the father regarding the application of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the Nebraska child support order. The mother later petitioned for postsecondary educational support for their daughter. The father filed a cross-motion to modify child support due to his recent job loss. The trial court granted the mother's motion for postsecondary educational support and denied the father's motion for a downward modification. The father moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of the trial court’s authority under the UIFSA to enter orders extending child support for his daughter beyond the age of majority in Nebraska, which was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by extending the father's child support obligation by granting postsecondary support for the daughter to attend college. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schneider v. Almgren" on Justia Law

James R. Hardman and his mother Alice Hardman, certified professional guardians, are the court-appointed guardians of more than twenty Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) clients residing at the Fircrest School, a residential habilitation center (RHC) in the city of Shoreline. The Hardmans also engage in extensive advocacy activities, lobbying officials at the local, state, and federal levels to keep Fircrest and other RHCs open and to oppose efforts to place Fircrest residents in community-based programs that the Hardmans believe provide inadequate care. In their triennial guardian reports, the Hardmans requested compensation for their advocacy activities. DSHS opposed the fee requests, arguing that the advocacy work was outside the scope of the guardians' duties. The Court of Appeals denied the Hardmans' request for advocacy fees, finding that the advocacy work did not provide a direct benefit to the indidivual wards. Upon review of the trial court record and the parties' appellate briefs, the Supreme Court found that the Hardmans were not entitled to the compensation because the advocacy activities were neither individualized to serve a particular ward's best interests nor necessary to perform their guardianship duties. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Guardianship of Lamb" on Justia Law

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bank of America, NA v. Owens" on Justia Law

The issue central to this case involved a trial court's method of valuing stock options in a dissolution proceeding. After separating, Daniel and Teresa Farmer entered into a stipulated agreement dividing their community assets, including several thousand stock options Daniel had received from his employer during the marriage. Under the terms of the agreement, Teresa could decide when to exercise her share of the stock options. Before entry of the decree of dissolution, however, Daniel fraudulently exercised all of the options. The trial court was unaware of this when it awarded Teresa half of the community stock options in the final decree. When the facts came to light, Teresa moved for relief from the dissolution decree by asking the court to invoke its equitable authority to award her damages for her loss. The court assessed damages based on the present value of the stock options as calculated by Teresa's expert witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed, deferring to the trial court's equitable discretion to make Teresa whole. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating damages to Teresa. View "In re Marriage of Farmer" on Justia Law

K.N.J. was born in 2005 to Marquesha Everett and Petitioner Michael Jenkins. K.N.J. suffered extreme abuse at the hands of her mother. After discovery of the abuse, K.N.J. was removed from her mother's care and placed in foster care. Petitioner was served with a summons and petition for a dependency hearing. A judge pro tempore presided over the initial hearing. The mother consented to the judge's hearing the case. Petitioner did not appear and was not represented by counsel. The judge pro tempore entered a default order of dependency despite her status and Petitioner's lack of consent. Subsequent hearings were held, and an elected judge presided over them. Petitioner did not appear until the permanency planning hearing. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the original dependency order was void because Petitioner did not consent to a judge pro tempore. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss and terminated his parental rights. Petitioner appealed the termination to the Supreme Court. The Court found that K.N.J.'s dependency was amply proved at the termination trial where Petitioner was present and represented by counsel. Furthermore the trial court's findings supported the termination of Petitioner's parental rights. The Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court.