Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

M.H.P. was the son of Leslie Bramlett and Paul Parvin. He was less than two years old when dependency proceedings commenced. M.H.P.'s parents experienced repeated episodes of mental illness, substance abuse, and incarceration in the years preceding and following M.H.P.'s birth. The dependency proceedings commenced after Bramlett, accompanied by M.H.P., arrived at an emergency room showing signs of paranoia and threatening the ER staff. M.H.P. was removed from his parents' care; he remained in the custody of the State until a guardianship order was entered more than two years later. The Department of Social and Health Services and Diana Farrow, the court appointed special advocate (CASA) for M.H.P., appealed a superior court order denying their motion to unseal several sets of motions and orders. The underlying documents at issue were filed by M.H.P.'s parents to obtain public funding for expert services in connection with proceedings to terminate their parental rights. The court granted the motions ex parte without holding a hearing or providing notice to the other parties or to the public. After the CASA discovered the disputed orders, the Department moved to unseal the disputed documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the superior court's "indiscriminate ex parte sealing of documents pertaining to motions for public funding for expert services" violated General Rule (GR) 15; the justifications advanced by the superior court did not warrant creating a blanket exemption from GR 15 in parental termination cases; and in its memorandum opinion explaining the disputed orders, the superior court did not apply (or even mention) the "lshikawa" factors that all courts must analyze before granting a motion to seal. View "In re Dependency of M.H.P." on Justia Law

M.S.M.-P. was born in April 2000. His biological parents, S.K. and N.P.'s relationship was marked from the beginning by physical abuse against S.K. S.K. and N.P.'s relationship ended within two weeks of M.S.M.-P.'s birth. During the first three years of M.S.M.-P.'s life, N.P. visited him fewer than 10 times, and he had not seen or had any contact with him since then. In 2002, when M.S.M.-P. was two years old, his mother S.K. began a relationship with A.K. S.K., A.K., and M.S.M.-P. lived together as a family since 2003, and S.K. and A.K. married in 2008. A.K. has cared for M.S.M.-P. since they began living together and has been the only father M.S.M.-P. has known. S.K. and A.K. have had two other children together. In early 2010, A.K. decided to adopt M.S.M.-P. and sought N .P. 's consent. After N .P. refused to consent to the adoption, A.K. filed a petition to terminate N.P.'s parental rights and to obtain permanent custody with the right to adopt. S.K. joined in the petition. In 2012, N.P.'s parental rights to M.S.M.-P. were terminated in a closed proceeding. N.P. 's attorney affirmatively consented to the closure, and soon afterward, M.S.M.-P. was adopted by his stepfather. N.P. sought reversal because the trial court closed the proceeding without analyzing the "Ishikawa" factors. After review, the Supreme Court concluded N .P. waived his right to open proceedings under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. View "In re Adoption of M.S.M.-P." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Washington legislature enacted a new guardianship statute, chapter 13.36 RCW, to create permanency for children in foster care through the dismissal of dependency and the appointment of a guardian. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) petitioned for an order appointing a guardian for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute, and the children's mother, T.P. DSHS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A.W. and M.W based on the former RCW 13.34.030(5)(c) (2003), which stated that the child "[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development." In December 2009, T .P. agreed to the dependency. In March 2010, the court approved transitioning the children to T.P.'s home contingent on T.P.' s compliance with court ordered services and a DSHS safety plan that continued until the guardianship. In December 2010, the transition to T.P.'s home was terminated. The trial court found that based on T.P.'s substance abuse, poor judgment, incarcerations, chaotic lifestyle, failure to remedy parental deficiencies, and the length of time of this case, there was little likelihood that conditions could be remedied such that the children could be returned to T.P. in the near future. The trial court entered findings and conclusions and an order appointing guardians for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute. T.P. appealed, arguing that: (1) establishing a guardianship under the new statute using the preponderance of the evidence standard was unconstitutional because it violated due process; and (2) even if preponderance of the evidence was the correct standard, the trial court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process, and that the trial court's record supported the trial court's decision to appoint guardians. View "In re Welfare of A.W." on Justia Law

The estate of Etsuko Futagi Toland appealed a Court of Appeals decision upholding summary judgment that denied registration of a Japanese divorce decree awarding Etsuko Toland a monetary award against her former husband, Peter Paul Toland. The question to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying recognition of the divorce decree under comity principles because Paul was not given notice of a Japanese guardianship proceeding involving the couple's daughter. The Washington Court reversed: the 2008 guardianship had no effect on Paul's legal obligations under the 2006 divorce decree. The divorce decree was valid, and whether it should have been recognized as a matter of comity did not depend on whether Paul had notice of the guardianship proceeding. The Washington Court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and remanded this case back to the trial court for registration of the divorce decree. View "In re Estate of Toland" on Justia Law

The Certified Professional Guardianship Board (Board) has petitioned the Supreme Court to suspend guardian Lori Petersen for actions stemming from her guardianship of D.S. and J.S. Petersen has been a certified professional guardian since 2001. She owned and operated Empire Care and Guardianship, a large agency serving over 60 wards. From December 2009 until April 2010, the Board received a number of grievances and complaints regarding Petersen's treatment of three wards who were all, at one point, housed at Peterson Place, an adult family home. Petersen contended that suspension was improper and suggested:(1) the Board ran afoul of separation of powers principles; (2) violated the appearance of fairness doctrine; (3) impermissibly lowered the evidentiary standard; and (4) failed to consider the proportionality of the sanction. The Supreme Court agreed with Petersen as to her last contention: "She has questioned, albeit obliquely, the proportionality of the sanction, and so the Board should have considered the sanction's magnitude relative to those imposed in other cases. Accordingly, we remand to the Board to conduct a consistency analysis pursuant to its internal regulations" and the Court's opinion. View "In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen" on Justia Law

Amy Westman (Buecking) filed for legal separation from Tim Buecking. Over a year later, she filed an amended petition for dissolution of marriage. The decree was entered 8 days too soon. Mr. Buecking appealed, raising for the first time on appeal his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it entered the decree before the 90-day period had elapsed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory 90-day period commences when the petition for dissolution is filed, not when a petition for legal separation (if any) is filed. Furthermore, the Court held in this case the error of duration was a legal error but not an error involving subject matter jurisdiction that could be raised at any time. View "In Re Marriage of Buecking" on Justia Law

The State brought a paternity action in 2008 to establish the parentage of C.M.F. Respondent Jonathan Fairfax was adjudicated C.M.F.'s father. Petitioner Amanda Simpson was designated custodian. Fairfax petitioned the family court to establish a parenting plan for C.M.F. Trial began on two years later. After Mr. Fairfax completed his case, Simpson moved the court to dismiss the petition under CR 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Fairfax had filed the wrong petition and failed to establish that there was adequate cause to hold a modification hearing. The court denied the motion, finding that the parentage order was not a custody decree and that Simpson's motion was untimely. Simpson presented her case, and the court created a final parenting plan that had C.M.F. residing with Fairfax for the majority of the time and designated Fairfax the "custodian of the child solely for purposes of all other state and federal statutes…" Simpson appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Because the superior court previously entered a parentage order that qualified as a custody decree, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Parentage of C.M.F." on Justia Law

B.M.H.'s natural father died six months before he was born. His mother's former boyfriend Michael Holt, was present at B.M.H.'s birth and, shortly afterward, married his mother. Mr. Holt petitioned for third party custody, or alternatively, an adjudication of de facto parentage. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether, under "In re Parentage of MF.," (228 P.3d 1270 (2010)), no former stepparent could bring a de facto parentage petition. Another issue that arose from this case was whether there was adequate cause to support Mr. Holt's nonparental custody petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Mr. Holt did not meet the high burden imposed on those seeking third party custody. However, the Court found he was entitled to maintain his de facto parentage action. View "In re Custody of B.M.H." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether de facto parent status "stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent" biological, adoptive or otherwise. The Court concluded that in most cases foster parents will not be able to meet the criteria set forth in "In re Parentage of L.B." (122 P.3d 161 (2005)), but that status as a foster parent is not itself an absolute bar to establishing de facto parentage, and that the trial court can consider facts that arise during a foster care placement. View "In re Custody of A.F.J." on Justia Law

Abeda Jafar filed an action in superior court to obtain a parenting plan involving her 19-month old son. She also filed a motion under GR 34 to waive all mandatory fees and surcharges on the basis of indigency. The trial court found that Jafar was indigent, but granted her only a partial waiver of the fees and surcharges. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether under GR 34 trial courts had discretion to grant partial waivers of fees and surcharges. The Court held that GR 34 provided a uniform standard for determining whether an individual is indigent, and further required the court to waive all fees and costs for individuals who meet this standard. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the trial court's order with instructions to waive all filing fees and surcharges. View "Jafar v. Webb" on Justia Law